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ABSTRACT  
 
International human rights law (IHRL) has traditionally only imposed duties on 
states. But as multinational corporations (MNCs) and other business entities are 
perceived as increasingly powerful agents in the global economy, and capable of 
impacting on many of the interests protected by IHRL, scholars as well as 
practitioners argue that IHRL should be extended to apply to these entities. 
My argument in this thesis is twofold. Firstly, I make the normative case that 
calls for business accountability under IHRL misunderstand the particular role of 
IHRL, taking the point of IHRL as protecting important human interests against 
anyone who has the capacity to harm these interests. I argue that the role of 
IHRL is better understood as holding states accountable for the performance of 
their special institutional duties. If we were to extend international human rights 
duties to business entities, many of the core principles of IHRL would need to be 
changed which in turn would undermine the very identity of this body of law – it 
would no longer fulfil the distinct function of regulating political authority. I 
argue that it would impoverish our legal vocabulary if we were no longer able to 
express the distinction between state violations of human rights and harm done 
by private actors.  
And secondly, I argue that there are a number of practical challenges to 
extending IHRL to business entities, and that the implementation mechanisms of 
IHRL are currently not well-suited to address many of the concerns that give rise 
to calls for business-human rights-accountability in the first place. I conclude 
that an extension of IHRL may therefore not be the straightforward and effective 
solution that it tends to be made out in the current debate and that alternative 
approaches to business regulation may be preferable. 
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CHAPTER 1: SHOULD INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW BE 
EXTENDED TO APPLY TO MNCS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTITIES?  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
International human rights law (IHRL) has traditionally only imposed duties on 
states.
1
 In a nutshell, international human rights law is an area of international 
law that sets out a broad range of entitlements individuals hold against 
governments, ranging from so-called civil and political rights, such as the rights 
to be free from arbitrary deprivation of life, torture and other ill-treatment, or to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to social and economic rights such 
as the rights to health, to education or to an adequate standard of living. IHRL is 
laid down in a number of different international treaties - broadly, we can 
distinguish between United Nations human rights treaties on the one hand, and 
the human rights treaties of regional organizations on the other.
2
   
 
 
 
                                                             
1
Walter Kälin and Jörg Künzli, The Law of International Human Rights Protection (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), p.78. Note that some authors have made the argument that IHRL 
can already been interpreted as imposing duties on private actors like business entities; I will 
address this argument in chapter 4B, section 5 below. 
2
 The different international human rights treaties will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4. 
The eight core UN human rights treaties are the International Convention on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the International Convention 
on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. At the regional level, there are the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the European Social Charter, the American 
Convention on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and the Arab 
Charter on Human Rights. For a discussion of the interaction of national, regional and global 
legal human rights provisions see Stephen Gardbaum, ‘Human Rights as International 
Constitutional Rights’, European Journal of International Law, 19.4 (2008), 749-768. 
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1.1 DEFINING MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ENTITIES 
As multinational corporations (MNCs) and other business entities are perceived 
as increasingly powerful agents in the global economy, and consequently 
capable of impacting on many of the interests protected by IHRL, scholars as 
well as practitioners have called for an extension of international human rights 
law to businesses. In other words, it has been argued that IHRL should apply 
directly to business entities, that these entities should be duty bearers under 
IHRL. 
3
  
 
Multinational corporations have been defined as such business entities which 
have their home in one country but which operate in other countries as well and 
thereby also live under the laws of countries other than their home countries.
4
 In 
other words, multinational corporations (they are also interchangeably referred 
to as ‘transnational corporations’ or ‘TNCs’ in the contemporary business-and-
human rights debate) exist simultaneously in a number of different sovereign 
                                                             
3
 Chris Jochnick, ‘Confronting the Impunity of Non-State Actors: New Fields for the Promotion 
of Human Rights’, Human Rights Quarterly, 21.1 (1999), 56-79; Mahmood Monshipouri, 
Welch, Claude E. and Kennedy, Evan T., ‘Multinational Corporations and the Ethics of Global 
Responsibility: Problems and Possibilities’, Human Rights Quarterly, 25 (2003), 965-989; David 
Weissbrodt and Muria Kruger, ‘Current Developments: Norms on the Responsibilities of TNCs 
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’, American Journal of 
International Law, 97.4 (2003), 901-922; David Kinley and Junko Tadaki, ‘From Talk to Walk: 
The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law’, 
International Law, 44.4 (2003-2004), 931-1023; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of 
Non-State Actors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.195-270; Philip Alston (ed.), Non-
State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Francesco Francioni, 
‘Alternative Perspectives on International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations by 
Multinational Corporations’, in Economic Globalisation and Human Rights, ed. by Wolfgang 
Benedek, Koen de Feyter, and Fabrizio Marrella  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), pp.245-265; Amnesty International, The UN Human Rights Norms for Business: Towards 
Legal Accountability (2004),  
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR42/002/2004/en/c17311f2-d629-11dd-ab95-
a13b602c0642/ior420022004en.pdf . 
4
 Stephen J. Kobrin, ‘Sovereignty@Bay: Globalization, Multinational Enterprise, and the 
International Political System’, in The Oxford Handbook of International Business, ed. by Alan 
M. Rugman and Thomas L. Brewer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp.183-204 
(p.183). 
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jurisdictions.
5
 Business entities can be defined, for the purposes of this thesis, as 
any private, non-state, and for-profit entity.  
 
For the most part, I will refer to multinational corporations as well as other 
business entities jointly as ‘businesses’, ‘business enterprises’, ‘business 
entities’, ‘companies’, or ‘corporations’ interchangeably as the arguments 
concerning a possible extension of IHRL to these respective agents that I present 
in this thesis are for the most part the same. In some passages, I will explicitly 
talk about multinational corporations (MNCs) as they pose particular challenges 
in some ways. In these instances, I will clearly indicate the particular issue at 
stake due to the multinational nature of such entities.  
 
1.2 SOME EXAMPLES OF ‘CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS HARM’ 
To name only some of the examples in which corporations have come under 
scrutiny from a human rights perspective: particularly (but certainly not only) in 
the footwear, clothing and sporting goods industries, violations of basic labour 
standards are routinely brought to light. Common allegations include, for 
instance, that companies use child or forced labour, pay inadequate wages, or do 
not provide decent working conditions, which may include not adhering to basic 
health and safety standards.
6
 Corporations have also been known to withhold 
                                                             
5
 David J. Karp, Responsibility for Human Rights – Transnational Corporations in Imperfect 
States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p.28. 
6
 Cristina Baez, Michele Dearing, Margaret Delatour, and Christine Dixon (1999/2000) 
‘Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights’, University of Miami International and 
Comparative Law Review, 8 (1999-2000) 183-249 (pp.244-246); quoted after Kinley and Tadaki, 
‘From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at 
International Law’, p.933. In the summer of 2014, some major global supermarkets chains made 
the headlines for sourcing prawns from Thailand produced with slave labour. Companies 
involved included, for instance, Tesco, Walmart, Costco and Carrefour. See, for instance, 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jun/25/government-uk-retailers-ordered-improve-
human-rights .
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workers’ identity papers in order to force them into abusive contracts.7 They 
have been found to fail to provide safety training or safety equipment for 
hazardous jobs,
8
 or to prevent workers from organizing and bargaining.
9
   
 
Companies particularly in the agricultural and mining sectors have also been 
criticized for causing large scale resettlements, resulting not only in material 
losses but also forcefully expelling individuals or entire communities from lands 
that have cultural or religious value. Corporations in the oil, gas or mining 
industries have been reported to engage in environmentally degrading practices 
affecting the livelihoods and health of indigenous people. So for instance, the 
U.S. petrochemical corporation Chevron's drilling practices in the Ecuadorian 
Amazon have been related to severe pollution and health problems of the local 
population.
 10
 In the Niger Delta, oil spills by the Royal Dutch Shell company 
have resulted in ongoing damage to fisheries and farm lands. This, in turn, has 
had negative impacts on people’s livelihoods in a number of ways – to name just 
                                                             
7
 The case of private companies in Qatar (and other Gulf countries), where under the kafala 
system employees depend for their work permit on a sponsor who is often the employer,  has 
attracted particular attention in the current debate. See for instance, Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Rights of Migrants, ‘Report on Mission to Qatar’, A/HRC/26/35/Add.1.  
8
 In Bangladesh, an eight-story garment factory producing clothes for many European and US 
brands (including, for instance, Benetton, Bonmarché, El Corte Inglés, Monsoon Accessorize, 
Mango, Primark, and Walmart) collapsed after a fire in April 2013, killing and injuring 
thousands of employees. See, for instance, http://www.business-
humanrights.org/Search/SearchResults?SearchableText=rana+plaza&x=6&y=11. Surviving 
employees later reported that employers had not only failed to comply with any acceptable fire 
and safety standards, but actively prevented workers from leaving the building once the fire 
broke out.  
9
 See Kinley and Tadaki, ‘From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities 
for Corporations at International Law’, p.934, on cases of suppression, systematic intimidation, 
torture, kidnapping, or murder of trade unionists as in the cases of Coca Cola in Colombia or 
Phillips-Van Heusen in Guatemala. Also see Human Rights Watch, A Strange Case: Violations 
of Workers’ Freedom of Association in the United States by European Multinational 
Corporations (2010) on the actions of a range of European companies like Deutsche Telekom, 
T-Mobile, Tesco, Robert Bosch, and Siemens in the US, against trade unionists at  
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/09/02/strange-case-0 
10
See, for instance, the report at http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/business-and-
human-rights/oil-gas-and-mining-industries/chevron-corp ; for an account of related law suits see 
http://business-humanrights.org/en/texacochevron-lawsuits-re-ecuador#c9332 . 
 19 
 
a few of the consequences critics have pointed out, people who worked as 
fishermen and farmers have largely lost their jobs, food prices have risen 
significantly, and drinking water has been contaminated which causes cancer 
and other serious health problems to the population who consumes the water.
11
 
Companies have also been found to employ repressive security forces against 
local communities in order to protect their plants, and to be implicated in violent 
clamp-downs of protests against their operations, resulting in severe physical 
harm to or even death of protesters. The case of the oil company Royal Dutch 
Shell in Nigeria figures among the most well-known in this respect: Ken Saro 
Wiwa, a member of the Ogoni people whose lands in the Niger Delta were the 
site of crude oil extraction, had led a non-violent campaign against 
environmental degradation through the oil industry, and in particular, against 
Royal Dutch Shell. He was arrested for this campaign and hanged in 1995 after a 
hasty military trial. Other leaders and members of the protest were also killed. 
Shell was accused of having requested Nigerian soldiers and police to clamp 
down on the protests, and of having provided monetary and logistical support to 
the Nigerian state forces, even though they were aware of the brutal methods of 
the Nigerian forces.
12
 
 
Corporations have also been implicated in human rights violations of 
governments. So for instance, several multinational oil companies undertook a 
joint venture with the Burmese state-owned oil company Myanma Oil and Gas 
                                                             
11
 Among other, the petroleum hydrocarbons which enter people’s bodies are thought to cause 
cancer and neurotoxicity over the medium and long run. See Amnesty International, The True 
‘Tragedy’ – Delays and Failures in Tackling Oil Spills in the Niger Delta (2011), pp.11-12, at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/the-true-tragedy-delays-and-failures-in-tackling-oil-
spills-in-the-niger-delta. 
12
 In 1996, the US NGO Center for Constitutional Rights and Earth Rights International (ERI) 
and  a group of human rights attorneys brought a series of cases under the Alien Tort Statute and 
the Torture Victim Protection Act; however, before the scheduled trial in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York, the company Shell agreed to pay an out-of-
court settlement of $15.5 million to victims’ families in June 2009. 
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Enterprise (MOGE). MOGE was in charge of providing labour and security for 
the construction of a gas pipeline as part of the joint project. It later emerged that 
MOGE had employed forced and child labour to build the pipeline, and that 
other violations like torture and forced relocation were committed in clearing 
and ‘securing’ the area. In this case, the main Western partner, UNOCAL, did 
not directly carry out violations however benefitted from cheap labour and the 
‘security’ granted for the plant.13  
 
In some instances, companies have supplied regimes with the materials and 
services needed to commit killings – as in the case of van Anraat,14 a Dutch 
manufacturer who directly and knowingly delivered the chemicals required to 
produce mustard gas to Saddam Hussein. 
 
Corporations have also been criticised for operating in countries with abusive 
governments, and for fuelling abusive regimes or ongoing violent conflicts. So 
for instance, US and European companies have been criticized for trading 
weapons, diamonds and timber from conflict states like Angola, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia.
15
 Similarly, 
the diamond industry has been criticized for financing violent conflict in some 
African countries as warlords use their revenues for armed operations. 
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 Danish Centre for Human Rights, ‘Defining the Scope of Responsibility for Human Rights 
Abroad’ (2000), http://business-humanrights.org/en/danish-centre-for-human-rights-business-
project-1#c18936 .  
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 Public Prosecutor v Frans Cornelius Adrianus van Anraat, District Court of The Hague, 23 
December 2005, Case No. AX6406 and Court of Appeal of The Hague, 9 May 2007, Case No. 
BA6734. 
15
 Wolfgang Kaleck and Miriam Saage-Maass, ‘Corporate Accountability for Human Rights 
Violations Amounting to International Crimes: the Status Quo and Its Challenges’, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 8.3 (2010), 699-724. 
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Pharmaceutical companies have come under scrutiny for the way in which they 
protect their patents, driving up the price of life-saving medicines for millions of 
people in the developing world.
16
  
 
Commentators have also called for business-human rights-accountability where 
corporations take on functions that have traditionally been the exclusive domain 
of states.
17
 A commonly cited type of example in this context concerns abuses by 
private military and security companies (PMSCs) that play an increasing role in 
providing services to states in conflict zones around the world.
18
 One case that 
gained particular attention by human rights activists and other commentators was 
the ill-treatment and torture of inmates of Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in which 
contractors from two companies, Titan Corp. and CACI, were deeply 
implicated.
19
 And businesses have not only assumed state-like functions in 
conflict contexts. Private companies have been charged by governments to fulfil 
functions ranging from the provision of health care, education, or the operation 
of detention facilities.
20
 In the United States, in some private residential areas 
(so-called ‘common-interest developments’) local government and police 
functions are effectively privatized and no longer exercised by the state.
21
 These 
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 See http://www.business-humanrights.org/Home for a comprehensive resource centre for 
reports and news items about companies’ human rights impacts worldwide.  
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 Philip Alston, ‘The ‘Not-a-Cat Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime 
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21
 Evan McKenzie, Privatopia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp.15-16; quoted after 
Clapham, ibid., pp.10-11. 
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are just a few of the most common examples that have attracted calls for 
business-human rights accountability. 
 
The debate surrounding the human rights obligations of business enterprises is 
very topical and has not only been of interest to scholars and human rights 
activists, but also been high up on the international policy agenda for a number 
of years. Perhaps most prominently in the last decade, John Ruggie was 
appointed as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
22
 in 2005 
and mandated to elaborate on the responsibilities of MNCs and other business 
entities. The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council endorsed the resulting 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (also the ‘Guiding 
Principles’ in the following) in 2011. While these Guiding Principles are not 
themselves legally binding, in the wake of their endorsement by the UN Human 
Rights Council there is currently an ongoing debate whether IHRL should be 
extended to directly apply to MNCs and other business entities,
23
 and some 
commentators have even called for the creation of a new world court of human 
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 He was first appointed by the UN Commission on Human Rights, UNCHR Res 69 (2005) UN 
Doc E/CN.4/RES/2005/69, ‘Human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises’. His mandate was renewed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2008, UNHRC Res 
8/7 (2008) UN Doc A_HRC_RES_8_7, ‘Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
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 In June 2014, two resolutions were adopted by the Council: one requesting to “establish an 
open-ended intergovernmental working group with the mandate to elaborate an international 
legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with 
respect to human rights” – UNHRC Res (2014) A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1, ‘Elaboration of an 
international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with respect to human rights’ and a second one “to launch an inclusive and 
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limitations of a legally binding instrument, and to prepare a report thereon and to submit it to 
the Human Rights Council at its thirty-second session” - UNHRC Res (2014) A/HRC/26/L.1, 
‘Human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’. 
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rights that would enforce human rights obligations not just for states, but also for 
non-state actors like businesses.
24
  
 
I argue in this thesis that despite much interest and attention, there are important 
issues which the current debate has not, or not sufficiently, addressed. In 
particular, I argue that commentators have tended to assume that the extension of 
IHRL to apply to MNCs and other business entities would be a natural and 
appropriate response to the growing influence of business enterprises, without 
considering 
 
(1) What implications the extension of IHRL to business entities would have 
for the role that IHRL currently plays as a specific area of international 
law; and  
 
(2) Whether IHRL would be a suitable tool to regulate businesses. Firstly, 
the question here is whether existing human rights standards would be 
suitable to be applied to business entities; and secondly, whether an 
extension of IHRL to business entities would indeed address the concerns 
that motivate calls for such an extension in the first place.  
 
I argue that these two questions are crucial to addressing the overarching 
question of this thesis, ‘Should international human rights law be extended to 
apply to multinational corporations and other business entities?’ – a question that 
I argue lies at the heart of the contemporary business–and-human rights debate. 
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 Martin Scheinin, ‘Towards a World Court of Human Rights’ (2009),  
http://www.udhr60.ch/report/hrCourt_scheinin0609.pdf . 
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2. THE ‘BUSINESS – AND - HUMAN RIGHTS DEBATE’ IN POLICY AND 
LITERATURE  
In the following, I provide an overview of what, as shorthand, I will also refer to 
as the ‘business-and-human rights debate’ in policy making and the scholarly 
literature in the past decades. Current developments toward legal duties for 
businesses, and more particularly for corporate duties under IHRL, are best 
understood in the context of a debate that has been ongoing for several decades 
and which not always focused on legally binding rules. However, it is 
nevertheless important to stress from the outset that in this thesis I am 
specifically concerned with the question of whether IHRL, as a distinct area of 
international law (defined in more detail in chapter 4A) should be extended. 
 
2.1 HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENTS OF THE POLICY DEBATE  
As early as the 1970s, there were some movements towards developing binding 
international rules to regulate the activities of transnational corporations. 
Triggered by the ‘ITTC case’ where the representative of Chile denounced the 
US International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITTC) for having 
interfered in Chilean internal politics at the 1972 meeting of the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the ECOSOC passed a resolution to 
appoint a group of experts to study the impact of multinational corporations. In 
the following, the UN Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of Conduct 
elaborated a draft UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations in the 
1970s and 1980s, presenting its final draft in 1990.
25
 While this Code of Conduct 
did not explicitly refer to human rights, the underlying concerns were already 
quite similar to some of the concerns that motivate calls for human rights 
accountability in the current debate – the Code aimed to “maximize the 
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 ECOSOC, E/1990/94 (1990) ‘Proposed Text of the Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations, U.N.’, quoted after Helen Keller, ‘Corporate Codes of Conduct and their 
Implementation: The Question of Legitimacy’, in Legitimacy in International Law, ed. by 
Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker Röben (Berlin: Springer, 2008), pp.219-289 (p.227).   
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contributions of transnational corporations to economic development and growth 
and to minimize the negative effects of the activities of these corporations.”26 
While the Soviet Bloc supported the draft, most industrialized countries did not 
and the negotiations were formally abandoned in 1992.
27
  
 
Early voluntary initiatives  
In the following decades, a number of soft law or voluntary initiatives were 
adopted to guide the activities of multinational corporations: in 1976 the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted its 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
28
 and in the following year the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted a Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises.
29
 The OECD Guidelines were 
aimed, among others, at “encouraging the positive contributions of multinational 
enterprises to economic and social progress and minimizing or resolving 
difficulties that may results from their activities”.30 While these early initiatives 
did not propose an extension of international human rights duties as such,
31
 they 
already addressed several of the topics that would later be referred to as 
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 Ibid. (p.227).   
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 Ibid.; also see John G. Ruggie, ‘Business and Human Rights – the Evolving International 
Agenda’, American Journal of International Law, 101.4 (2007), 819-840 (at p.821). 
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31
 The OECD Guidelines did not mention the concept of ‘human rights’ at all, whereas the ILO 
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Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977), 17 I.L.M.422, para 6 (1978), available at 
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‘business-and-human rights issues’, such as the recommendation to respect the 
rights of their employees to be represented by trade unions and engage in 
collective bargaining, to observe standards of employment and industrial 
relations, including security of employment for employees, the provision of 
adequate wages, the observance of health and safety standards and provision of 
adequate conditions of work, to avoid discrimination based on race, colour, sex, 
religion, political opinion, nationality or social origin in hiring, discharge, pay, 
promotion or training, and to “consider[..] changes in their operations which 
would have major effects upon the livelihood of their employees”.32 
 
In 2000, the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC),
33
 a voluntary initiative by 
the United Nations to engage with companies and civil society groups that are 
“committed to aligning their operations with […] human rights principles”, 
started functioning.
34
 The objective of the UNGC is to diffuse norms and 
disseminate practical tools or know-how to companies and civil society to help 
in the implementation of the principles; and it currently is the largest corporate 
social responsibility initiative in the world.
35
 
 
Around the same time, major international human rights organizations, such as 
Human Rights Watch (HRW)
36
 and Amnesty International,
37
 also started taking 
an interest in the activities of multinational corporations and other business 
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 Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (1976),  pp.16-17; Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977), paras 13-55. 
33
 http://www.unglobalcompact.org/  
34
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 For Amnesty International’s website dedicated to corporate abuses, see 
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entities and started researching and “highlight[ing] human rights abuses in which 
companies are implicated” 38  and in 2003 the Business & Human Rights 
Resource Centre was established as an NGO explicitly dedicated to growing 
awareness of “human rights responsibilities of business” and to “promote human 
rights in business”.39 The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre documents 
abusive behaviour of businesses drawing on a range of sources worldwide, 
including reports of NGOs and community groups, journalists, companies, 
international agencies, academics and governments and reports them on its 
website.
40
 
 
Towards an extension of IHRL - the UN Draft Norms  
After a mounting number of reports documenting abusive corporate behaviour, 
not least in the extractive sector and the footwear and apparel industries, the UN 
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
41
 (also the 
Sub-Commission in the following) established a working group on business and 
human rights in 1998, “to establish, for a three-year period, a sessional working 
group of the Sub-Commission, composed of five of its members […] to examine 
the working methods and activities of transnational corporations”.42 The first 
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explicit step in the international policy debate towards an extension of IHRL as 
such was taken with the so-called Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights (also referred to as Draft Norms in the following).  
 
Issued in 2003, the Draft Norms suggested a full extension of IHRL to business 
entities, in other words, that corporations should essentially be assigned the same 
legal human rights duties that currently fall on states. While the Draft Norms 
observed that the primary responsibility for the realization of human rights 
rested with states,
43
 they made no principled distinction between the nature and 
content of the duties of states and the duties of business enterprises for human 
rights, and stipulated that business entities had the same duties to “promote, 
secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of, and protect human rights”44 
that have traditionally only applied to states. The only difference between state 
and business duties, according to the Draft Norms, would have been that 
business obligations would be delineated by their “respective spheres of activity 
and influence” 45  - although the Draft Norms did not define the spheres of 
activity and influence of business further, leaving the intended scope of business 
obligations vague. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
activities of transnational corporations on the enjoyment of human rights’, among others to 
“[c]ontribute to the drafting of relevant norms concerning human rights and transnational 
corporations and other economic units whose activities have an impact on human rights”. 
For a very detailed drafting history of the Norms of the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, see Weissbrodt and 
Kruger, ‘Current Developments: Norms on the Responsibilities of TNCs and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’, pp.901-922. 
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 UNSUBCOM, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003), ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’, 
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While the Draft Norms were greeted enthusiastically by the NGO community 
and other commentators in the debate, they met a lot of resistance not only from 
the business community but also by states who for the most part expressed 
reservations and stressed that the Draft Norms departed too radically from the 
traditional, state-centred framework of international law.
46
  
 
The search for consensus - the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights 
After a period of controversy, the Draft Norms were therefore abandoned and 
John Ruggie was appointed, following a request from the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, as the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative for 
Business and Human Rights in 2005. Ruggie’s mandate included the task “to 
identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility and accountability for 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human 
rights”.47  
 
In March 2011, Special Representative Ruggie and his team issued the final text 
of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
48
 for the consideration 
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of the UN Human Rights Council; and the Council endorsed them in June 2011, 
signaling its political support of the Guiding Principles.
49
 The Guiding Principles 
have since been much cited and discussed in international policy debates; among 
others, they were incorporated in the 2011 update of the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises,
50
 in 2011 the European Commission endorsed the UN 
Guiding Principles in its new corporate social responsibility strategy,
51
 and in the 
following, a number of EU member states have adopted so-called national action 
plans to implement the GPs domestically.
52
 
 
While the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights suggest that all 
human rights might potentially be ‘impacted’ by business enterprises,53 they also 
stress that not all the duties that IHRL gives rise to should apply to business 
corporations. The Guiding Principles explicitly emphasize that the duties that 
business has with regard to human rights are complementary to state duties, and 
that business duties should be limited to what the Principles call the 
‘responsibility to respect’ – they suggest only applying negative human rights 
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duties to business entities, i.e. such duties that are about not harming important 
interests. In the wording of the GPs, 
 
“[Business enterprises] should avoid infringing on the human rights of 
others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which 
they are involved.”54 
 
I should also mention that the Guiding Principles are not in effect legally,
55
 nor 
do they explicitly suggest, at least for the time being, an extension of direct 
human rights duties for business under international human rights law. They 
state that “[n]othing in these Guiding Principles should be read as creating new 
international law obligations […]” and note that “[t]he responsibility of business 
enterprises to respect human rights is distinct from issues of legal liability and 
enforcement, which remain defined largely by national law provisions in 
relevant jurisdictions.” Instead of proposing the extension of legal obligations to 
business, the Guiding Principles describe the responsibility to respect human 
rights as “a global standard of expected conduct”56 for business corporations.  
 
However, even if the GPs currently do not purport to legally extend IHRL, it is 
not too far-fetched to assume that they may at some point provide the basis for 
such an extension. In a written statement from January 2014,
57
 John Ruggie, the 
principal author of the Guiding Principles, strongly suggests that it was for 
pragmatic, rather than principled, reasons that he did not propose an extension of 
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direct legal obligations to business. He writes that his reasons for not proposing 
new international legal obligations for business enterprises were that on the one 
hand, this was not part of his mandate, and one the other hand, it may have 
undermined the consensus of stakeholders, and in particular states and business 
entities, for the Guiding Principles. He therefore preferred to “emphasiz[e] 
measures that states and businesses could adopt relatively quickly”.58  
 
Current developments towards an extension of IHRL  
And – despite Ruggie’s affirmations to the contrary - the endorsement of the 
Guiding Principles by the UN Human Rights Council has, if anything, further 
fuelled the debate about an extension of IHRL to business entities. At the UN 
Human Rights Council session of September 2013, the government of Ecuador 
led a number of governments
59
 in issuing a statement in favour of a legally 
binding international instrument on business and human rights to be concluded 
within the UN system.  Such an instrument would "clarify the obligations of 
transnational corporations in the field of human rights" and "provide for the 
establishment of effective remedies for victims in cases where domestic 
jurisdiction is clearly unable to" provide them.
60
  The initiative was supported by 
more than a hundred civil society organisations and social movements that 
issued a joint public statement on the eve of the UN Forum on Business & 
Human Rights in December 2013, calling for states to start taking concrete steps 
towards establishing a binding international treaty to deal with corporate human 
rights abuses.
61
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And, even more recently, at the June 2014 session of the UN Human Rights 
Council, two resolutions were adopted: the first one was a resolution drafted by 
Ecuador and South Africa and co-signed by Bolivia, Cuba and Venezuela, 
requesting "to establish an open-ended intergovernmental working group with 
the mandate to elaborate an international legally binding instrument on 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to 
human rights."
62
  
 
The other resolution was led by Norway and supported by 22 other countries 
from all regions, requesting the UN Working Group to draft a report considering, 
among other things, the benefits and limitations of legally binding 
instruments.
63
  So in other words, the debate over a possible extension of IHRL 
to MNCs and other business entities is – despite the approach of the Guiding 
Principles which constituted somewhat of a step back compared to its 
predecessor, the Draft Norms – again high up on the international policy agenda. 
 
The policy debate over an extension of international human rights law has not 
just been led at UN level - in 2011 a group of human rights lawyers and 
specialists had already put forward a proposal that was sponsored by the Swiss 
government and advocated for the creation of a world court of human rights 
which could take binding decisions on human rights violations committed by 
state as well as non-state actors, including corporations.
64
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2.2 THE ‘BUSINESS-AND-HUMAN RIGHTS DEBATE’ IN THE LITERATURE 
Alongside calls for non-state actor responsibility by practitioners, such as 
representatives of the UN, civil society organizations, and international lawyers, 
the topic of human rights obligations for businesses has also been discussed by 
authors from different scholarly backgrounds. In particular, the subject has been 
discussed in the disciplines of international law and international legal theory on 
the one hand, and moral-political theory on the other hand.  
 
Arguments in international legal theory 
Discussions of international legal scholars have classically centred on the legal-
doctrinal implications that an extension of international human rights law to 
MNCs and other business entities would have. International human rights law, as 
an area of public international law, has traditionally only applied to states, and so 
one question has concerned whether corporations can be thought of as having the 
required ‘international subjectivity’. Subjectivity, for the purposes of 
international law, has classically been defined as the capability of an entity to 
possess international rights and duties and of having the capacity of bringing 
international claims to maintain its rights.
65
 Whether or not business entities are 
international subjects in this way has been a topic of much controversy;
66
 while 
business entities are recognized to have at least some international rights it has 
been more contested whether they can also be assigned direct duties and if so, 
what the consequences of this would be from a legal-doctrinal standpoint. One 
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 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
pp.57; cited after Merja Pentikäinen, ‘Changing International ‘Subjectivity’ and Rights and 
Obligations under International Law – Status of Corporations’, Utrecht Law Review, 8(1) (2012), 
145-154 (p.145).  
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 Brownlie, ibid., p.66; Menno Kamminga and Saman Zia-Zarifi (eds.) Liability of 
Multinational Corporations under International Law, ed. by (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International), p.4. Stephen Tully, Corporations and International Lawmaking (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2007), p.323. All cited after Pentikäinen, ibid., p.147. Note that there have been parallel 
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insurgents, see Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors, in particular 
chapters 4, 5, and 7 for an extensive discussion. 
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argument that has been made, for instance, is that an expansion of direct duties 
under international law to business entities (or other non-state actors for that 
matter) would entail a recognition of these entities as potential authors of 
international law and thereby accord them undue powers in the international 
system.
67
 This line of argument, and indeed the usefulness of the concept of 
‘subjectivity’, has been criticized by other scholars.68 
There have also been discussions beyond the question of the possible 
international subjectivity of business entities that have addressed whether 
international human rights law could perhaps already be interpreted as imposing 
obligations on non-state actors like companies.
69
 While I will briefly address this 
debate,
70
 this thesis does not propose a classic legal analysis of whether IHRL 
can properly be interpreted as imposing duties on business entities or not. While 
the overarching question I address in this thesis is whether international human 
rights law should be extended to MNCs and other business entities, the answer to 
this question will turn on normative considerations concerning the purpose, or 
role, of IHRL as an area of law. One specific contribution that this thesis offers 
to the current debate is of a methodological nature - in chapter 2, I will put 
forward what I call the ‘functional role’ approach to thinking about the role of an 
area of law, and in particular IHRL. I will also address some pragmatic 
considerations regarding the effectiveness of such an extension.  
Given these normative and pragmatic considerations, I will make an argument as 
to whether an extension of IHRL to business entities would be desirable. I will 
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University Press, 1987); Peter Muchlinski, ‘Human Rights and Multinationals: Is there a 
Problem?, International Affairs, 77.1 (2001), 31-48 (p.41). 
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 For a comprehensive discussion, see Clapham, ibid. 
70
 In chapter 4B, section 5 below. 
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not, by contrast, take a stand on whether, legally speaking, IHRL can or cannot 
be interpreted as imposing obligations on business entities directly. 
I should stress that discussions of ‘business-human rights-responsibility’ by 
international legal scholars have not always focused on international human 
rights law as such. The term ‘human rights duties’ or ‘human rights 
responsibility’ has often been used more broadly and there have been different 
debates that have focused on other legal accountability mechanisms for 
businesses. Most commonly, these debates include the debate of the application 
of extraterritorial tort legislation,
71
 or the extension of international criminal 
law
72
  to business enterprises
73
 and to what extent these bodies of law can be 
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used to hold business entities to account for abusive behaviour. Commentators 
sometimes explicitly consider extra-territorial tort law or international criminal 
law as part of ‘international human rights law’.74 I call such views ‘contribution 
                                                                                                                                                                    
for Rwanda (ICTR) are also important sources of ICL. See Antonio Cassese, International 
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and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law’, in The Philosophy of International Law, ed. 
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views’ of international human rights law because they consider any area of law 
that somehow contributes to the protection of important human interests as 
‘human rights law’. It should become clear throughout this thesis why I reject 
such a view of IHRL which conflates this area of law with other areas of law like 
ICL or extra-territorial tort legislation: this thesis develops an account of the 
distinct role of IHRL and why there is a value in keeping areas of law separate 
when they can be understood to play distinct and valuable roles. I argue against 
thinking of areas of law solely in terms of the consequences they promote, and 
the contribution view does exactly that.
75
  
 
But while I reject this broader view of IHRL proposed by the contribution view, 
it nevertheless needed to be mentioned here to clarify that in the current debate 
on ‘business-and-human rights’, the usage of ‘human rights’ and ‘human rights 
responsibility’ is not always confined to IHRL. In this thesis, however, the 
particular focus is on whether IHRL proper
76
 should be extended to business 
entities, and not on whether business entities should have international criminal 
responsibilities, whether they should be held accountable under extra-territorial 
tort provisions, or whether they should be have any legal obligations at all.  
While I will draw on these debates in the concluding chapter 7 when discussing 
possible alternatives to an extension of IHRL, the explicit focus of this thesis is 
on the question regarding an extension of IHRL as a distinct area of international 
law. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
by Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.569-588 
(p.574).   
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 I will define IHRL in more detail in chapter 4A below. 
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Arguments in moral and political theory  
The question whether business entities, and indeed any non-state actor 
(including individuals), have duties correlating to human rights has also been a 
topic in moral-political theory. Questions here have been, for instance, about 
whether human rights are fundamentally about the state-citizen relationship 
(such views are known as political conceptions of human rights) or whether 
human rights are universal claims that individuals hold against any actor.
77
 
Among others, the differences between political and non-political conceptions of 
human rights turn on methodological disagreements between theorists as to the 
general objective of human rights theory and what role, if any, ‘human rights 
practice’ plays in it.78 Theorists who argue that our understanding of the concept 
of ‘human rights’ should be developed by observing how human rights are used 
in contemporary discourse and practice – of which international human rights 
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 Beitz, for instance, suggests to develop an understanding of human rights by “attend[ing] to 
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 40 
 
law is arguably a significant part – are more likely to consider human rights as 
particularly concerned with state-citizen relationships than those who argue that 
human rights theory, as a matter of principle, should be independent of practice. 
I should emphasize that while the political views of human rights mentioned 
focus exclusively on state obligations, they do so principally from the 
perspective of other states in the international sphere deciding whether or not to 
intervene in the internal affairs of another state. In my analysis of IHRL 
standards, by contrast, there will be nothing inherent to those standards that 
necessitates that they are about other states intervening. IHRL jurisprudence and 
principles entail international human rights institutions that hold states 
accountable to their citizens (how these institutions hold states accountable will 
be the subject of more detailed discussion in chapter 6, section 3) but the 
jurisprudence of IHRL as defined in this thesis never asks whether the human 
rights standards in question would be sufficient for other states to intervene as a 
test for whether there has been a violation.
79
  
 
While I argue in this thesis that the legal project of extending, or not, IHRL to 
apply to business entities should be informed by normative considerations as to 
the role of that area of law, and so make the case for a contribution that 
normative theory can make to legal practice, I do not take a stand on the 
relationship between moral theories of human rights and (international) human 
rights law more generally,
80
 nor do I engage with discussions on what is the best 
moral account of human rights. 
 
                                                             
79
 It could be argued that the views taken by scholars like Raz, ‘Human Rights Without 
Foundations’, or Beitz, ibid., imply this. 
80
 For such discussions, see, for instance, Part I on ‘The Limits of Law’ in Saladin Meckled-
García and Başak Çalı (eds.) The Legalisation of Human Rights: Multidisciplinary Perspectives 
on Human Rights and Human Rights Law, (Oxford: Routledge, 2006), pp.9-59. 
 41 
 
Triggered by the observation that there has been a proliferation of the use of 
human rights language in international discourse and practice in past years, there 
has also recently been an increased interest by moral and political theorists in the 
question of who bears the corresponding duties for human rights,
81
 including as 
to what duties, if any, business entities have in this regard. These debates focus 
on the substantive moral duties that business enterprises have with regard to 
fundamental human interests, and on what, as a matter of justice, they owe to 
individuals.
82
 One related question here is what role an agent’s capacity should 
play when determining his or her human rights duties. This is a question that is 
also at the core of the contemporary debate on business entities and human 
rights. As I argue in more detail in section 3 below, both moral theorists and 
practitioners have been motivated by the observation that MNCs and other 
business entities as one type of non-state actor, are increasingly capable of 
affecting important human interests, both positively through their immense 
wealth, but also negatively through their increasing powers and reach 
worldwide.
83
 
 
While moral and political theorists have primarily been concerned with 
developing principles for allocating responsibilities, if any, to non-state actors 
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like businesses,
84
 in this thesis I am not concerned with the precise substantive 
responsibilities that business entities do or do not have with regard to important 
human interests. I take it as a given that business entities have more than just 
responsibilities to make profit for their shareholders
85
- they certainly do have 
moral responsibilities not to harm important human interests and in many 
situations a plausible argument can surely be made that they also have 
responsibilities to positively contribute to the realization of important human 
interests.
86
 However, I also argue in this thesis that states, given their particular 
institutional role, have duties that are relevantly different from those than 
businesses have.
87
 Rather than making a case for or against a particular division 
of labour between states and business entities, that is, rather than trying to 
determine the substantive content of responsibilities that states and business 
entities have with regard to important human interests, I am interested in this 
thesis in the form that duties should take, and more precisely, with whether an 
extension of direct duties for business entities under IHRL would be a desirable 
development. 
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3. WHY EXTEND IHRL TO BUSINESSES?  
The preceding sections have highlighted some of the most prominent policy 
initiatives on business and human rights, and debates in moral-political theory 
and international law. What has motivated these initiatives, and in particular, 
what motivates current calls for an extension of IHRL to business?  
 
3.1 THE CAPACITY VIEW OF BUSINESS RESPONSIBILITY  
Commentators, from scholars to activists, civil society representatives and policy 
makers, share a common starting point: when making the case for an extension 
of IHRL to business entities, they all tend to affirm that what necessitates human 
rights obligations for businesses are the significant, and increasing, capacities of 
business entities to impact on the interests protected by IHRL. The following 
quotes are only a small selection of manifestations of the capacity view in the 
literature: 
 
“The economic power of transnational corporations (TNCs) is 
undoubted. They are the driving agents of the global economy, 
exercising dominant control over global trade, investment, and 
technology transfers. Flowing directly from such positions of economic 
influence, TNCs also manage to exercise considerable political 
leverage in both domestic and international spheres. […] By virtue, 
specifically, of their economic and political muscle, TNCs are uniquely 
positioned to affect, positively and negatively, the level of enjoyment of 
human rights. On these bases there are abundant reasons why the legal 
regulation of TNC’s activities at all levels of impact is sought, ought to 
be sought, and is sometimes achieved. This article is concerned with 
developing the arguments for […] such regulation with respect to the 
human rights obligations of corporations at the level of international 
law.”  
 
“Today, however, at least a subset of non-state actors has suddenly 
become a force to be reckoned with and one which demands to be 
factored into the overall equation in a far more explicit and direct way 
than has been the case to date. As a result, the international human 
rights regime’s aspiration to ensure the accountability of all major 
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actors will be severely compromised in the years ahead if it does not 
succeed in devising a considerably more effective framework than 
currently exists in order to take adequate account of the roles played by 
some non-state actors.”88 
 
“[W]e definitely need to reorient duties and duty holders in view of the 
pervasive role of, and extensive power enjoyed by, companies in society 
at this point of time. In fact, from a human dignity point of view, every 
entity that could violate human rights ought to have corresponding 
obligations – the focus should be on the bearers of rights and not on 
violators, because it matters little for victims whether their rights and 
their dignity are infringed by states or other non-state actors.”89 
 
“This traditional (i.e. state-focused) human rights law approach no 
longer responds to the actual threats to human rights in the globalized 
world of the 21st century. There are many reasons why human rights 
abuses by non-state actors are on the increase. Policies of deregulation 
and privatization have led to an erosion of governmental power and 
responsibilities and the taking over of essential governmental functions 
by private business, such as in the fields of education, health services, 
water management, social security, internal security, policing or prison 
administration. Transnational corporations operate on budgets which 
by far exceed those of smaller states and are so powerful that they can 
no longer be effectively controlled by governmental authorities of the 
home state or the states in which they operate. […] International 
[human rights] law, therefore, must move from the model of exclusive 
state responsibility to a 21
st
 century approach of shared responsibility. 
Shared responsibility means, first of all, that non-state actors can be 
held directly accountable for actions that violate human rights. If a 
transnational corporation, for example, violates international labour 
standards, resorts to forced labour, child labour, forced evictions of the 
local population or arbitrary killings by private security forces, it 
should be held directly accountable, not only under international 
criminal law, but also under other fields of international law. […] But 
responsibility also includes positive actions aimed at progressively 
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fulfilling human rights. If a transnational corporation engages in 
business in an area where the local population is starving and living 
under conditions of extreme poverty, it has a responsibility to address 
this situation. This could be done, for example, by means of community 
development projects in the fields of education, health care or food 
production.
90
   
 
 
It is argued that business entities can increasingly impact on fundamental human 
interests. I call this the ‘capacity argument’ for an extension of IHRL to MNCs 
and other business entities as the capacities of businesses to affect the interests 
protected by IHRL are taken to justify an extension of international human rights 
law to those entities. 
 
I should say that the capacity view is of course only a core account of what 
motivates commentators to call for business duties under IHRL rather than a 
comprehensive or detailed one. In other words, the capacity view is an account 
of the central rational commitment that leads commentators to argue in favour of 
human rights obligations for business entities. However, in addition to the 
observation that business enterprises increasingly have capacities to harm, there 
is a sense that national governments have failed or not been able to regulate 
businesses,
91
 and that voluntary codes of business conduct have not had the 
desired effect either and that we therefore need ways of more directly addressing 
violations of private actors like business entities.
92
 I will discuss the underlying 
motivations for extending IHRL to business entities in more detail in chapter 6. 
However, the argument from capacity generally lies at the heart of arguments in 
                                                             
90
 Swiss Confederation et al., ibid., p.15.  
91
 Buergenthal, ‘The Normative and Institutional Evolution of International Human Rights’, 
p.718; Eric De Brabandere, ‘Human Rights and Non-State Actors in a State-Centric Legal 
System’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 22 (2009), 191-209 (p.2); Amnesty International, 
The True ‘Tragedy’ – Delays and Failures in Tackling Oil Spills in the Niger Delta, p.28. 
92
 Steven Ratner, ‘Business’, in Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, ed. by 
Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
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favour of an extension of IHRL, and as I argue in the following, it has important 
implications for the understanding of the role of IHRL and the view that we take 
on whether or not IHRL should be extended to business entities. 
 
3.2 THE INTEREST VIEW OF IHRL 
More or less implicit in arguments from capacity is a particular understanding of 
IHRL: the assumption is that the function of IHRL is to ‘protect important 
human interests against anyone who can significantly affect these interests’. This 
view is of course at odds with the current legal state of IHRL - since the first 
legally binding IHR treaties came into effect after World War Two, IHRL has 
only directly applied to states.
93
 However, the argument commonly made by 
proponents of the capacity view is that there never was a principled reason to 
limit the applicability of IHRL to states in the first place. They argue that the fact 
that IHRL only applies to states is a matter of historical contingency: at the time 
that the first IHRL treaties were conceived and drafted, that is in the wake of 
World War II, states seemed to pose the most immediate and obvious dangers to 
the important interests protected by IHRL and so it seemed to make sense to 
concentrate international legal obligations for human rights on states.
94
 We can 
call this the ‘argument from historical contingency’. In a similar vein, 
commentators also often refer to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that 
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there is a need to respond to the growing powers of private enterprise, which affects the lives of 
millions of people around the world.” Also see Amnesty International, The True ‘Tragedy’, 25. 
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preceded the first legally binding international human rights treaties
95
 and that 
did not seem to limit human rights duties to states.
96
   
 
Today, the argument continues, we live in a world where non-state actors, 
including in particular MNCs and other business entities, exercise much greater 
powers and have much greater capacities than they used to. In some contexts, 
business enterprises have budgets that exceed those of states.
97
 And in some 
cases, businesses are even taking over functions that states originally fulfilled, 
such as the provision of military and security services or the running of hospitals 
and prisons.
98
 In this current context, the argument from historical contingency 
concludes, it only makes sense to impose direct international human rights duties 
on business entities. In other words, the traditional state-focus of IHRL is 
described as rendered obsolete by the current realities where MNCs and other 
business entities have the powers that they do.  
 
I call this view of IHRL, i.e. the view that the function of this area of 
international law is to protect important human interests against anyone who can 
                                                             
95
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted by the UN General 
Assembly on 10 December 1948. It is not itself legally binding.  
96
 In particular, see the Preamble of the UDHR that states that “every individual and every organ 
of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to 
promote respect for these rights” and Article 30 that stipulates that “[n]othing in this 
Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in 
any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set 
forth herein.” Note that all the legally binding international human rights treaties that followed 
the UDHR have, however, focused on states. 
97Kinley and Tadaki, ‘From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for 
Corporations at International Law’, pp.931-1023; Beyond Voluntarism: Human rights and the 
developing international legal obligations of companies, p.10; Swiss Confederation, Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights, Protecting Dignity: An Agenda for Human Rights, 15; www.amnestyusa.org/our-
work/issues/business-and-human-rights/corporate-accountability. 
98
 See, for instance, Philip Alston, ‘The ‘Not-a-Cat Syndrome: Can the International Human 
Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?’, pp.9-10. 
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significantly affect these interests, the ‘interest view’ of IHRL.99 On this view, it 
seems only logical to extend IHRL to corporations and business entities (or 
indeed any other actor) if they have significant capacities to harm the interests 
protected by IHRL.  
 
In this thesis, I will argue that the interest view of IHRL, which implicitly or 
explicitly underlies most arguments in favour of an extension of IHRL to MNCs 
and other business entities, is problematic. The interest view is what we can call 
a consequence-based, or consequentialist, understanding of IHRL. If the sole 
point one attributes to a body of law is protecting and advancing certain interests 
(i.e. promoting certain consequences) then there is no principled basis for 
limiting that body of law to regulating only one kind of agent. It would, if it were 
consistent, regulate any and all agents affecting such interests that it practicably 
can. It would, of course, regulate such agents in light of their capacities to affect 
such interests. So the capacity view follows from the interest view.  
 
In chapter 2, I make the general case for why we should not, or not only, think of 
areas of law in terms of the consequences they bring about. I will argue why, 
                                                             
99
 There are some obvious parallels with so-called ‘interest theories’ of human rights, or of rights 
more generally, in moral-political theory. Proponents of interest theories of (human)  rights hold 
that the function of a (human) right is to further the interests of the person who holds the right – 
see, for instance, Neil MacCormick, ‘Rights in Legislation’, in Law, Morality and Society: 
Essays in Honour of H.L.A Hart , ed. by Peter Hacker and Joseph Raz (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), pp. 189–209; Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), p.166; Leif Wenar, ‘The Analysis of Rights’ in The Legacy of H.L.A. 
Hart: Legal, Political and Moral Philosophy , ed. by Matthew Kramer, Claire Grant, Ben 
Colborn and Antony Hatzistavrou (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp.251-273; 
Matthew Kramer, ‘Getting Rights Right’, in Rights, Wrongs, and Responsibilities , ed. by 
Matthew Kramer (London: Macmillan, 2001), pp. 28–95.  
However, as my discussion is specifically of the view as an account of the special role of IHRL, 
rather than as a political theory tout court, I will not need to discuss the cogency of the moral 
theory as such. In other words, I will not discuss the general merit of interest theories of rights in 
explaining the function of rights here – my discussion will be limited to a more narrow analysis 
of whether understanding IHRL as protecting important interests against anyone is a good 
understanding of IHRL, and whether we should therefore extend IHRL to non-state actors like 
business enterprises. 
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before advocating an extension of IHRL to business entities, we should ask 
whether there is a principled reason that IHRL has only applied to states and 
consequently, whether anything of value might be lost if IHRL was extended to 
non-state actors like business entities. 
 
4. THESIS OUTLINE 
In this thesis, I take an inter-disciplinary approach: I draw on legal and political 
theory, but also engage with the pragmatic question of what would be some of 
the practical challenges and implications of extending international human rights 
law to business enterprises. My argument in this thesis is twofold. I first make 
the case that calls for business accountability under IHRL misunderstand the role 
of IHRL. Most proponents of an extension of IHRL to businesses suggest that 
the point of IHRL is to protect important human interests against anyone who 
has the capacity to harm these interests. Drawing on political and legal theory 
literature, I argue that such an understanding of IHRL is problematic, and why 
we need a more principled understanding of the role that IHRL plays. I propose 
a methodology for how to think about the role of IHRL, and applying this 
methodology, I then argue that IHRL is best understood as holding states 
accountable for the performance of their institutional duties. In other words, I 
argue that IHRL should be understood as distinctly concerned with the 
regulation of political authority, with regulating the relationship between 
individuals and the governments under whose jurisdiction
100
 they find 
themselves.  
                                                             
100
 The concept of ‘jurisdiction’ is a contested one. For the purposes of this thesis, I will 
understand ‘jurisdiction’ to denote the de jure and de facto control or authority of a state – in 
other words, an individual is under the jurisdiction under a certain state if that state exerts 
effective control over that individual. Typically, this will be the case if the individual finds 
herself in the territory of that state although there are cases where states exercise extra-territorial 
jurisdiction, such as when a state exercises effective control over an area outside its national 
territory as a consequence of (lawful or unlawful) military action.  
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On the one hand, what this means is that an extension of IHRL to non-state 
actors like business enterprises would undermine the specific focus of IHRL on 
regulating political authority. Currently, the judgment that a human rights 
violation has taken place not only implies that an important interest has been 
harmed, but that in addition this harm was either done by a state agent directly or 
that the state did not meet its institutional duties to either prevent or respond 
appropriately to the harm. In other words, it signifies not only that harm was 
done, that an interest was infringed, but that there was an additional element of 
official disregard for the victim, or that the violation was even done under the 
colour of law.  If business entities became potential human rights violators under 
international law, the finding of a human rights violation would no longer 
connote that the harm was done by, or with the acquiescence of, the state. 
Instead, it would be reduced to a statement about negative consequences. I argue 
that given the particular normative status and responsibilities of states and 
individuals, it would impoverish our legal vocabulary if we were no longer able 
to express the distinction between state harm and harm done by private actors.  
 
And on the other hand, the fact that the state-focus has shaped many principles 
and features of IHRL means that IHRL would need to be profoundly changed to 
be applicable to business entities. I argue that currently, IHRL is not suitable to 
address businesses: the ways in which responsibility is established, what duties 
correspond to each right, and how responsibility is implemented are three areas 
in which profound changes would have to be made in order for IHRL to be 
applicable to business enterprises. This, in turn, would threaten the very identity 
and coherence of IHRL as a distinct body of law; IHRL would no longer be able 
to play the distinct role that it can currently be understood to play. 
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I will then address the pragmatic question of whether an extension of IHRL to 
corporations would indeed be able to contribute to the regulation of business 
enterprises. I argue that while we clearly need much better accountability 
mechanisms, including legal accountability mechanisms, for businesses for the 
kind of harmful behaviour described by proponents of business human rights 
accountability, the contribution that IHRL – at least in its current form – can 
make to this end is limited. I identify some of the primary concerns, or 
motivations, that underlie calls for business HR accountability. I then argue that 
IHRL is not well-placed to respond to many of these motivations.  In sum, I 
argue that an extension of IHRL would not be, both for principled and for 
pragmatic reasons, the solution that it is taken to be by many commentators in 
the current debate. In the following, I provide a more detailed outline of the 
arguments made chapter by chapter. 
 
In chapter 2, I develop a methodology for thinking about what distinctive role is 
played by international human rights law, if any. I argue that the view that 
underpins much of the business-and-human rights debate is that business 
organisations should become direct duty bearers under IHRL because of their 
(increasing) capacities to impact, or harm, the interests protected by IHRL (I 
called this the capacity view above). As I argued, this view implies a specific 
view of IHRL: the interest view that holds that the point of international human 
rights law is to protect those interests that give rise to rights under IHRL against 
anyone who may affect them. In chapter 2, I make the case for not thinking 
about areas of law only in terms of the interests they seek to further, that is, in 
terms of the consequences they aim to bring about – as suggested by the interest 
view of IHRL. All legal regulation is of course also about bringing about certain 
consequences – the reason for having law at all is to guide or control how 
individual actors act and interact in society. However, I argue that beyond that, 
the existence of different areas of law allows us to differentiate between different 
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ways that agents can be responsible, and between distinct reasons for holding 
agents responsible. In other words, different areas of law can play distinct 
functional roles in the legal regulation of agents, and in particular, they can 
express different types of agent liability. 
 
Call these two ways of thinking about areas of law ‘consequence-based 
approach’ and the ‘functional role approach’.  I explain why it is not only 
possible, but indeed valuable, to understand areas of law in terms of the 
particular type of responsibility they establish, rather than merely in terms of the 
types of interests they protect. To do so, I draw on domestic legal theory, which 
has a stronger tradition of theorizing of specific areas of law than international 
law does and, I argue, holds some insights for thinking about international law 
and international human rights law in particular. 
 
Having made the case for a functional role approach to thinking about areas of 
law, I will provide a methodology for how to determine the functional role of an 
area of law. I will then argue that before extending IHRL duties to business 
organisations, we need to have a better understanding of the functional role of 
IHRL: of whether IHRL can be understood as establishing a distinct type of 
agent responsibility that would be rendered incoherent or undermined by 
extending it to different kinds of agents. 
 
In chapter 3, I will discuss and refute a number of possible objections to the 
functional role approach that I proposed in the previous chapter. Firstly, I will 
consider the objection from a consequence-based approach to law which agrees 
in principle that we can think of areas of law in terms of particular purposes but 
rejects the idea that different areas of law should be understood as establishing 
distinct kinds of agent responsibility, as the functional role approach suggests. I 
will then consider six possible objections that reject the very idea that we can 
 53 
 
sensibly think of areas of law in terms of particular ‘roles’ or ‘purposes’ at all: 
the objection from arbitrariness, which argues that areas of law come about by 
such arbitrary processes of law-making that it is futile to try and make sense of 
areas of law in terms of the distinct role(s) they play; and the related objection 
from disagreement, which rejects the idea of functional role because theorists are 
unlikely to ever agree on the respective functional roles of areas of law. In 
response, I argue that despite some degree of ‘messiness’ of the law we can 
nevertheless make sense of (at least some) areas of law in terms of distinct 
functional roles and that in order to engage critically with the law we must 
appeal to these functional roles. I will clarify that the functional role approach is 
neither committed to the view that all moral categories of responsibility are 
captured in different areas of law, and neither to the view that the answer to the 
question of what role an area of law plays needs to necessarily turn on morality 
at all.  
 
I will then address three different objections that take issue with the 
methodology I propose for arriving at an interpretation of the functional role of 
an area of law. The objection from moralising the law stems from a positivist 
understanding of the law and is concerned that the functional role approach 
unduly imposes moral values on the law. In response, I argue that the 
interpretivist account of the functional role is reconstructive of what laws and 
principles are in place, and does not prescribe what the law should look like. The 
ideal world objection is diametrically opposed to the positivist objection and 
holds that the problem with the interpretivist approach is that it is too 
constrained by actual legal practice. Without taking a stand on the merit of ideal 
world approaches to legal (or moral) theory in general, I argue that given this 
thesis’ interest in a question about reform of existing IHRL – namely the 
question of whether IHRL should be extended to business entities – it is most 
appropriate to ask what functional role, if any, IHRL plays as it currently stands 
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and whether this role might be threatened by an extension of this area of law to 
businesses. Finally, I address the objection from human rights discourse which 
proposes to interpret the role of IHRL based on current discourse about business 
responsibility for human rights. I argue that this method does not offer a viable 
way of resolving disagreement in current discourse.  
 
Chapter 4 has two parts, A and B. In 4A, I define ‘international human rights 
law’ for the purposes of this thesis. The terms ‘human rights law’ or 
‘international human rights law’ are not always used consistently. Firstly, there 
is no one overall regime of human rights obligations at the international level as 
international human rights law comprises a number of different regional and 
global regimes based on distinct treaties and implemented by distinct 
institutions. And secondly, in particular in the current business-and-human rights 
debate, commentators sometimes include international criminal law and 
extraterritorial tort mechanisms in their understanding of (international) human 
rights law. To avoid confusion, chapter 4A will clarify the understanding of 
IHRL that this thesis relies on and outline the different sources of IHRL that this 
thesis will draw upon in its interpretation of the functional role of IHRL. 
 
Chapter 4B applies the methodology proposed in chapter 2 to the particular case 
of IHRL and develops an interpretation of the role of international human rights 
law. Starting from the existing practice of IHRL (as defined in 4A) I will 
identify some of the core principles that I take to be paradigmatic of IHRL and 
develop a theory of what normative values, if any, make sense of international 
human rights law.
101 
I will argue that a consequentialist understanding of IHRL 
as proposed by the interest view cannot make sense of these norms. IHRL, I 
argue, has not simply been about ‘protecting important interests’. I will argue 
that given how the scope of human rights duties has been interpreted in 
                                                             
101
 For a more detailed discussion of my method, see chapter 2 below. 
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international human rights law and jurisprudence, and given how responsibility 
for human rights violations is generally determined, IHRL is best understood as 
distinctly concerned with the regulation of political authority; with regulating the 
relationship between individuals and the governments under whose jurisdiction 
they find themselves.  
 
This argument goes beyond the descriptive observation that states have been the 
sole duty-bearers under IHRL to date. Not only have states been the sole duty-
bearers of IHRL, but this focus on states has profoundly shaped the identity of 
IHRL: firstly, it has shaped the content of human rights duties – in other words, 
it has determined how human rights duties have been interpreted by international 
human rights institutions. Secondly, it has also shaped some of the core 
substantive principles of IHRL, including the rules on how responsibility is 
established under international human rights law.  
 
Chapter 5 asks whether there are any good reasons to keep the state focus of 
IHRL described in chapter 4. I will present both a principled and a pragmatic 
argument against extending international human rights law to business entities. 
Firstly, I will argue that an extension of human rights duties to corporations 
would undermine the distinct identity of IHRL – I call this the principled case 
against direct duties for business under IHRL. This argument draws on chapter 
2, where I argued for the value of having distinct areas of law to reflect distinct 
types of responsibility, and against a view of areas of law that understands it 
merely in terms of the interests it protects. It also develops further the idea that I 
introduced in chapter 4B that states are agents that are in principle distinct from 
business entities – they fulfil a particular role and therefore have particular 
powers and responsibilities that business corporations do not have.  
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I then discuss a number of practical issues that an extension of direct duties for 
business entities under IHRL would raise. I argue that firstly, it is not clear how 
the rights focused on government functions would translate into duties for 
business enterprises and that even for those human rights that seem more readily 
applicable to businesses, new jurisprudence would need to be developed to 
address the specific duties of business enterprises. In other words, I argue that 
for human rights duties to be applicable to businesses, international human rights 
institutions would first need to translate such duties for businesses. I will 
consider what I call the objection from a partial extension which argues that at 
least some human rights duties, namely duties to respect human rights, could 
straightforwardly be extended to business entities. I argue that even supposedly 
‘negative’ duties to respect human rights would need to be reinterpreted for 
businesses. I then argue that beyond a translation of the substantive content of 
human rights duties, a number of other core principles of IHRL would need to be 
changed for IHRL to be suitable to regulate businesses and explain why this 
would be problematic. 
 
In chapter 6, I discuss whether IHRL, even if it was extended to apply to 
business entities directly, would be able to address the concerns that have 
motivated calls for such an extension in the first place. I argue that one 
overarching concern that has motivated calls for business-human rights-
responsibility is the observation that states often fail to regulate businesses 
sufficiently to prevent or punish harmful corporate activities. I will identify some 
of the most commonly discussed reasons for this failure of national level 
regulation, and then ask whether an extension of IHRL to business entities 
would be able to provide a solution. I will discuss how IHRL is implemented 
and argue that while an extension of duties under IHRL to business entities 
would allow international human rights institutions to name and shame business 
entities directly, it would not lead to a straight enforcement of human rights 
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duties by international human rights institutions. This is because IHRL relies for 
its implementation on state action. In other words, an extension of IHRL to 
businesses would not provide an immediate solution to national enforcement 
gaps where states are unable or unwilling to regulate companies. 
 
I will then identify a number of other motivations that underlie calls for 
‘business-human rights-accountability’. Drawing on typical situations in which 
business entities have been found to harm human rights, from violations of 
labour standards to cases where pharmaceuticals have been criticized for driving 
up the prices of life-saving medicines, I will argue that in some cases, 
commentators draw on IHRL because IHRL provides international minimum 
standards that offer a frame of reference where national standards are lacking. 
Calls for human rights accountability of businesses can also be calls for material 
compensation for damage caused by corporate activities; or calls to punish 
corporate actors for wrongdoing, to prevent impunity for abusive behaviour 
where national criminal laws are not enforced. Finally, calls for corporate human 
rights accountability can also be calls not for legal accountability but for 
‘corporate social responsibility’ more broadly speaking, for businesses to 
positively use their powers and capacities to contribute to the realization of 
important human interests. For each of these, I will discuss to what extent IHRL 
is suitable to address these distinct motivations. I will argue that IHRL may 
provide a useful starting point for developing legal obligations for business 
entities, even though existing international human rights jurisprudence would 
need to be reinterpreted to apply to business entities (as opposed to states, as it 
has to date). However, as IHRL neither has a strong compensatory component, 
nor does it fulfil a punitive function, it is arguably less suited to address concerns 
from material compensation or the punishment of corporate wrongdoing.   
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Chapter 7 concludes that in the current debate the practical advantages of an 
extension of direct duties for business entities under IHRL may have been 
exaggerated – contrary to what commentators often suggest such an extension 
would not automatically result in greater accountability of business entities. At 
most, IHRL can provide some guidance for the development of duties for 
businesses in the future; however, enforcement mechanisms other than the ones 
currently offered by IHRL would need to be developed for an effective 
implementation of such duties. I therefore conclude that other avenues including, 
for instance, international criminal law and extra-territorial tort mechanisms, or 
the strengthening of states’ human duties, might be more suitable and promising 
to pursue the better regulation of multinational corporations and other business 
entities. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE FUNCTIONAL ROLE APPROACH 
1. INTRODUCTION  
In this chapter I develop a methodology for thinking about what distinctive role 
is played by international human rights law, if any. The view that underpins 
much of the business and human rights debate is that business organisations 
should become direct duty bearers under IHRL because of their increasing 
capacities to impact, or harm, the interests protected by IHRL (I called this the 
capacity view
102
). As I argued, this view implies a specific view of IHRL that I 
labelled the interest view of IHRL.
103
 To recall, the interest view holds that the 
point of international human rights law is to ‘protect the most fundamental, or 
important, human interests’– namely those interests that give rise to rights under 
IHRL. I argued that the interest view and the capacity view are logically related. 
If the sole point one attributes to a body of law is protecting and advancing 
certain interests, then there is no principled basis for limiting that body of law to 
regulating only one kind of agent - it should logically apply to any agent who 
has capacities to affect the interests in question. In the particular case of IHRL 
and business entities, if the latter can impact the interests protected by IHRL, it 
seems only logical to argue and campaign for an extension of IHRL to MNCs 
and other business organizations. 
 
In this chapter I argue that we should not think about areas of law only in terms 
of the interests they seek to further, that is, in terms of the consequences they 
aim to bring about – as suggested by the interest view of IHRL. All legal 
regulation is of course also about bringing about certain consequences – the 
reason for having law at all is to guide or control how individual actors act and 
interact in society. However, I argue that beyond that, the existence of different 
                                                             
102
 In chapter 1, section 3.1 above. 
103
 In chapter 1, section 3.2 above. 
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areas of law allows us to differentiate between different ways that agents can be 
responsible, and between distinct reasons for holding agents responsible. In other 
words, different areas of law can play distinct functional roles in the legal 
regulation of agents, and in particular, they can express different types of agent 
liability. 
 
Call these two ways of thinking about areas of law ‘consequence-based 
approach’ and the ‘functional role approach’. I explain why it is not only 
possible, but indeed valuable, to understand areas of law in terms of the 
particular type of responsibility they establish, rather than merely in terms of the 
types of interests they protect. To do so, I draw on domestic legal theory, which 
as I argue has a stronger tradition of theorizing of specific areas of law than 
international law does and, I argue, holds some insights for thinking about 
international law and international human rights law in particular. 
 
Having made the case for a functional role approach to thinking about areas of 
law, I will provide a methodology for how to determine the functional role of an 
area of law. I will then argue that before extending IHRL duties to business 
organisations, we need to have a better understanding of what I call the 
‘functional role’ of IHRL: of whether IHRL can be understood as establishing a 
distinct type of agent responsibility that would be rendered incoherent or 
undermined by extending it to different kinds of agents.  
 
1.1 DEFINING THE FUNCTIONAL ROLE OF AN AREA OF LAW 
I understand the ‘functional role’ of an area of law as providing an answer to the 
normative question ‘what special function, if any, does this area of law play in 
the regulation of agents?’ I will also use the terms ‘social role’, ‘point’, or 
simply ‘role’, to refer to the functional role of an area of law.  In domestic legal 
theorizing, the area of theoretical enquiry that is, among other things, concerned 
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with the functional role of an area of law in this sense has sometimes been 
referred to as ‘special jurisprudence’. 104  Special jurisprudes are interested, 
among other things, in the normative question of what specific role, if any, a 
given area of law should be understood to play;  they ask questions such as 
‘What is the role of the criminal law?’; ‘What function does the criminal law 
play in the regulation of agents?’; ‘What justifies holding an agent criminally 
responsible?’105 One functional role that is typically ascribed to the criminal law, 
for instance, is that it is to morally condemn and/or punish offenders for 
wrongdoing and to do so on behalf of society.
106
 
                                                             
104
 Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.1-2. Note that Besson and Tasioulas consider international 
law as a whole as a province of law, and therefore philosophies of international law as ‘special 
jurisprudence’, whereas in this thesis I look at IHRL as one province of international law. Besson 
and Tasioulas provide an indicative list of important works in the field of special jurisprudence, 
including Herbert L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968); Charles 
Fried, Contract as Promise (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981); Joel 
Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, vols. 1-4 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984-88); 
Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Property (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Jules 
L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Ernest J. 
Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995); 
Ronald M. Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996); Antony Duff, Answering for 
Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007).  
105
 For an extensive discussion of what sort of conduct might rightly be criminalized, see 
Feinberg, ibid. For a discussion of the development of ideas of responsibility in criminal law and 
criminal processes, see Nicola Lacey, ‘Responsibility and Modernity in Criminal Law’, Journal 
of Political Philosophy, 9.3 (2001), 249-276. Also see the discussions of the normative 
foundations of the criminal law in Andrew Ashworth, ‘Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?’, Law 
Quarterly Review, 116 (2000), 225-256; Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003); Christine T. Sistare, Responsibility and Criminal Liability 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989); John Gardner, Offences and Defences – Selected Essays in the 
Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Grant Lamond, ‘What is a 
crime?’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 27.4 (2007), 609-632 (pp.615-620); Antony Duff (ed.) 
Philosophy and the Criminal Law – Principle and Critique (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998) and Duff, ibid., p.231. 
106
 See, for instance, Andrew Ashworth, ‘Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?’, ibid., where he 
writes “Perhaps the principal function of the criminal law is to censure persons for wrongdoing. 
The censuring elements consist of the conviction itself, together with the sentence of the court 
(which usually constitutes a punishment)”. Note, however, that there is a debate concerning the 
relationship between the criminal law and punishment, and whether or not the role of the 
criminal law primarily is to morally censure individuals – for discussions see, for instance, John 
Gardner, ‘The Functions and Justifications of Criminal Law and Punishment’, in ibid.; Peter 
Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002); Larry Alexander, 
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In contrast to theories of ‘general jurisprudence’,107 which are concerned with 
the nature of law as such and address normative and conceptual questions 
relating to the law in general,
108
 special jurisprudence is focused on specific 
areas, or provinces
109
 of domestic law – examples of such areas of law would be 
criminal law, tort law, contract law, land law, or property law. As I argue in the 
following, the answer to ‘What special function does a certain area of law play?’ 
is explicitly not just about the interests that area of law protects but provides a 
richer account of what justifies the existence of this area of law as a distinct area 
of law. This means that the interest view does not offer an account of the 
functional role. 
 
1.2 DOMESTIC LEGAL THEORIES AND THE FUNCTIONAL ROLE APPROACH 
One reason I largely draw on domestic legal theory in the following discussion is 
that there has been comparatively little theoretical engagement with the special 
jurisprudence of international law.
110
 Scholars have addressed questions 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Kimberley Kessler Ferzan (with contributions by Stephen J. Morse), Crime and Culpability – A 
Theory of Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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 Again, Besson and Tasioulas, The Philosophy of International Law, provide a list of 
important works in this area – while explicitly not comprehensive, this list includes H.L.A. Hart, 
The Concept of Law (1961; rev. edn., Oxford: Clarendon, 1994); Lon Luvois Fuller, The 
Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law 
(1979; 2
nd
 edn., Oxford: Clarendon, 2009); John M. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1980); Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986; Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
repr.1998); Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994); Jules L. 
Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 2001). 
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 General jurisprudes typically aim to give an account of the general features of law and of 
what characterizes the law as a distinct social practice. One important area of theoretical 
engagement, for instance, revolves around questions such as ‘What are essential characteristics 
of a legal system?’, or ‘When can a polity be said to have a legal system?’. Theorists of general 
jurisprudence have also been interested in the question of how the law relates to other social 
practices, like morality. For references, see the list provided ibid. 
109
 I will use the terms ‘area of law’ and ‘province of law’ interchangeably in the following. 
110
 Indeed, a number of scholars have noted that there has been a general neglect of international 
law by legal theorists. For a discussion of this neglect of theory by international lawyers (and an 
argument in favour of the importance, and indeed necessity, of a theoretically informed 
understanding of international law to justify any description of international law and to resolve 
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concerned with the nature of international law and engaged with questions as to 
the role, or purposes and objectives of international law as a whole.
111
 There has 
only been limited theoretical engagement, however, with the normative 
foundations, or roles, of specific areas of international law, such as IHRL, in the 
way in which domestic legal scholars have engaged with specific areas of 
domestic law.
112
 Debates that address international human rights law have often 
                                                                                                                                                                    
disagreements about fundamental questions that inevitably arise for international lawyers) see 
Patrick Capps, ‘Incommensurability, Purposivity and International Law’, European Journal of 
International Law, 11.3 (2000), 637-661 and Patrick Capps, Human Dignity and the Foundations 
of International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), in particular chapter 1 on ‘Philosophical 
Problems for International Lawyers’, pp. 9-21. Also see Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas, 
‘Introduction’, in The Philosophy of International Law, ed. by Samantha Besson and John 
Tasioulas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.2. 
111
 A selective list of authors who have addressed related questions – albeit from different 
methodological backgrounds, asking very different questions, and coming to radically different 
conclusions – includes Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Capps, Human Dignity and 
the Foundations of International Law, ibid.; Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law 
and Institutions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle 
Civilizer of Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Alan Buchanan, Justice, 
Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004); Steven Ratner, ‘Is International Law Impartial?’, Legal Theory, 11(1) 
(2005), 39-74.; Mortimer N.S. Sellers, Republican Principles in International Law: The 
Fundamental Requirements of a Just Word Order (New York: Pargrave Macmillan, 2006); 
William Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
112
 Perhaps a notable exception to this is international criminal law that has attracted a lot of 
scholarly interest in recent years. For an argument in favour of the need to examine and rethink 
the theoretical assumptions upon which ICL is based, to avoid “contradictory assumptions and 
methods of reasoning” by international criminal courts, see Darryl Robinson, ‘The Identity 
Crisis of International Criminal Law’, Leiden Journal of International Law, 21 (2008), 925-963 
(p.925). For discussions of the theoretical foundations of international criminal law, see for 
instance Larry May’s four-volume series addressing the moral foundations of international 
criminal law: Crimes Against Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), War 
Crimes and Just War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Aggression and Crimes 
against Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), and Genocide (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); Bill Wringe, ‘War Crimes and Expressive Theories of 
Punishment: Communication of Denunciation?’, Res Publica, 16 (2010) 119-133; Antony Duff, 
‘Authority and Responsibility in International Criminal Law’, in The Philosophy of International 
Law, ed. by Besson and Tasioulas, pp. 589-604; David Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: 
Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law’, in The Philosophy of 
International Law, ed. by Besson and Tasioulas, pp.569-588; Larry May and Zachary Hoskins 
(eds.) International Criminal Law and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010). 
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centred on questions of the sources of international human rights,
113
 the status 
and nature of international human rights obligations or the implementation of 
international human rights law.
114
 However, little has been written on the 
question of what particular role, if any, IHRL plays as a distinct area of 
international law, and in particular, whether there are any principled reasons to 
limit IHRL to states.  
 
There might be a number of possible causes for the relative neglect of special 
jurisprudence in legal philosophy – some of which may overlap with the causes 
that Besson and Tasioulas identify for a relative lack of engagement with 
international law more generally by legal philosophers:
115
 they argue it may 
simply be a result of intellectual prudence of philosophers who prefer to 
approach questions of legal philosophy in the context of more familiar and 
highly developed domestic legal systems before advancing to international law. 
Other, related, reasons they propose are that international law is still generally 
somewhat marginalized as a field within legal studies, that there is still 
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 As a branch of public international law, IHRL draws on the classic sources of such law, as 
defined in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, i.e. custom, treaties, and 
general principles, complemented by precedents and scholarly writings. However, given that 
customary law is primarily determined by state behaviour, and human rights are much violated in 
state practice, there have been debates as to what role customary law plays for international 
human rights law. See Frédéric Mégret, ‘International Human Rights Law Theory’, in Research 
Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law, ed. by Alexander Orakhelashvili 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), pp.199-231, for a discussion of different strands 
of theoretical engagement with international human rights law. For discussions of the sources of 
international human rights law see, for instance, Bruno Simma and Philip Alston, ‘The Sources 
of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles’, Australian Yearbook of 
International Law, 12 (1988), 82-108; Jordan J. Paust, ‘The Complex Nature, Sources and 
Evidences of Customary Human Rights’, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative 
Law, 25 (1995), 147-164; both quoted after Mégret. 
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 As Mégret, ibid., summarises, international human rights obligations differ from other 
international legal obligations in at least three ways – their beneficiaries are individuals rather 
than states, they primarily apply domestically as opposed to other international legal obligations 
that apply primarily internationally, and they are often considered as hierarchically superior to 
other international norms. Also see Mégret for references to the different debates this has given 
rise to. 
115
 Besson and Tasioulas, The Philosophy of International Law, pp.2. 
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widespread scepticism regarding the status of international law as real law
116
 and 
that it may therefore not be considered worthy of normative inquiry, and that the 
comparative dearth of empirical investigation of international law complicates 
any doctrinal or philosophical engagement with international law.
117
 Whatever 
may explain the relative lack of international legal theorizing, as I show in the 
following, insights from domestic legal theory can usefully inform the way in 
which we should think about international law and international human rights 
law in particular.  
 
2. INTERPRETING THE FUNCTIONAL ROLE OF AN AREA OF LAW 
How to go about interpreting the functional role of an area of law? Typically, 
normative theories about the role of an area of law proceed from an analytical 
account describing what we may call the core features of the area of law in 
question.
 118
 The core features, on the one hand, encompass the substantive 
norms of that area of law; on the other hand, they include its structural 
features.
119
 These can also be referred to collectively as the core principles for a 
body of law. The substantive norms of an area of law include rules on how 
responsibility is established under the given area of law. One core substantive 
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 This argument generally turns on the observation that there are no central enforcement 
mechanisms in international law with the power to ensure the implementation of international 
legal provisions. For a discussion of this kind of scepticism about international law, see Capps, 
Human Dignity and the Foundations of International Law, pp.16-18, where he traces early 
discussions of ‘whether international law is really law’ back to John Austin, The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined (1832; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Also see 
Anthony D’Amato, ‘Is International Law Really “Law”?’, Northwestern University Law Review, 
79 (1985), 1293-1314. 
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 Besson and Tasioulas, The Philosophy of International Law, pp.2. 
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 Jules Coleman and Gabriel Mendlow, ‘Theories of Tort Law’, Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (2003, rev. 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tort-theories/, write that analytical 
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norm of the criminal law, for instance, would be that in order to be found guilty, 
a defendant must typically have committed the wrongful act intentionally, that 
is, in order to attract criminal responsibility, the defendant must not only have 
committed the criminal act (actus reus), but he must have done so with criminal 
intention (mens rea). 
 
The structural features are those procedures or mechanisms that implement the 
substantive norms. A core structural feature of most domestic criminal systems, 
for instance, is that criminal charges are initiated by the state, through a public 
prosecutor, rather than by the victims of the crime or other citizens. Another 
paradigmatic structural feature of the criminal law would be that individuals 
convicted of a crime are typically punished through imprisonment.
120
  
 
Based on this analytical account of what are taken to be the core (we may also 
call them ‘paradigmatic’) norms and features of the given area of law, a 
normative theory of that area of law is developed – i.e. theorists provide an 
account of whether and how the particular area of law in question can be 
justified, and what added value it brings to the legal system. 
 
The method commonly employed by special jurisprudes is similar to Dworkin’s 
method of ‘constructive interpretation’.  The aim of constructive interpretation 
famously is to “impos[e] purpose on an object or practice so as to make of it the 
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 These features are considered so characteristic of the criminal law that the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) uses these features as criteria to decide whether legal proceedings in a 
member state should be considered as criminal, regardless of whether these proceedings are 
called ‘criminal’ or ‘civil’ in the given state. If the proceedings are a) brought by a public 
authority, and b) have culpability requirements (e.g. in requiring a finding of “culpable neglect” 
or “wilful default”, or c) have potentially severe consequences (such as imprisonment), the Court 
will consider them as criminal for the purpose of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR). (This is significant insofar as Article 6 of the ECHR confers special procedural rights 
on any person who has been charged with a criminal offence, such as the presumption of 
innocence, the right to legal aid, the right to confront witnesses, or a right to an interpreter if 
necessary.) See Benham v The United Kingdom, Grand Chamber, Reports 1996-III, para 56, 
following Engel and Others v The Netherlands, A/22 (1976). 
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best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong.”121 
Constructive interpretation also sets out by describing the practice in question. 
Rather than trying to account for the practice as broadly as possible, an 
interpretivist approach aims to make sense of the paradigms of the practice only. 
This stage corresponds to what I called the analytical stage above, where the 
core structural features and substantive principles of the area of law in question 
are described. At what Dworkin calls the interpretive stage, a characterization of 
the accepted point or aim of the practice is proposed. This may be taken to 
correspond to the normative work that special jurisprudes engage in when they 
aim to answer questions about what justifies the area of law in question, 
including ‘What function does the criminal law play in the regulation of agents?’ 
 
Note that there are other approaches to special jurisprudence, too – some of 
which will be addressed in the possible objections below. So I certainly do not 
intend to suggest that all special jurisprudes are Dworkinian interpretivists. 
However, the method taken by many special jurisprudes – often implicitly – 
bears some obvious similarities with the Dworkinian method: (i) theorists start 
from existing practice; (ii) they tend to focus on the paradigms (or core 
principles) of the practice rather than aiming to explain every single rule that 
falls under the area of law in question; (iii) and they then develop a theory of 
what normative values, if any, make sense of the practice (as well as what parts 
of the practice may need to be changed because they cannot be normatively 
justified). 
 
I will take such an interpretivist approach in the following chapter. I will outline 
the most important principles that have shaped the duties that states have under 
IHRL, as well as how responsibility is established under IHRL and how the 
substantive norms of IHRL are implemented. The method I will employ to 
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 Dworkin, Law’s Empire, p.52. 
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identify such structural features, or core principles, will be to first employ 
standard legal sources arguments for determining the doctrines that are present 
in a body of law (or recur in such bodies of law when they are distinguished 
from others in a legal system). In other words, I will appeal to legal materials, 
such as international human rights treaties and case law (I will outline what these 
materials are in detail in chapter 4A), identify what I take to be core principles 
and look at what support there is in the legal materials for taking any such 
principle to be paradigmatic of IHRL. 
 
Based on this analytical account of the core features of IHRL, I will develop an 
account of what functional role IHRL can be understood to have; what particular 
role, if any, IHRL can be understood to play as a distinct area of international 
law. In other words, I will try and make the best sense of what – given its 
particular norms and features - justifies IHRL being the way it is.  
 
I should stress that while the method employed here can be described in terms 
similar to the ones of Dworkin’s method of constructive interpretation, Dworkin 
developed his method in a different context and for different purposes. Firstly, 
Dworkin was concerned with domestic rather than international law, and with 
the law as a whole, rather than with individual areas of law. His interest is in 
what distinguishes the practice of law from other practices, such as policy-
making, or morality more widely, and so he is not concerned with differentiation 
within the law itself. So the scope of the legal practice to be interpreted is quite 
different. Furthermore, Dworkin employed his method of constructive 
interpretation in developing his theory of the nature of law that responds to the 
question of what determines legal rights and duties, i.e. with the question of what 
makes is the case that the law requires what it does. This is not my aim here. I 
am not concerned with the question of whether or not international human rights 
law already establishes duties for business entities or not. In other words, I am 
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not engaged in the debate of whether IHRL, as it currently stands, is best 
interpreted as recognizing duties for business entities. Rather, I am interested in 
the functional roles of international human rights law in order to answer the 
question of whether or not it would be good legal policy to extend international 
human rights law to non-state actors or not.  
 
Whether we can distinguish paradigmatic principles and features of international 
human rights law as a distinct area of international law remains, of course, to be 
shown – it cannot be taken as a given.122 Consequently, it remains to be seen 
whether we can identify a specific role for international human rights law. But if 
– as the next chapter aims to show – we can identify paradigmatic substantive 
norms and structural features of IHRL, and if furthermore, IHRL can be 
understood to play a distinct and valuable functional role, the argument is that 
this should inform the debate on whether or not to extend IHRL to business 
entities. 
 
How do we decide whether an area of law as we find it plays a distinct 
functional role? The method I propose to use begins by surveying a candidate 
distinct body of law and asking whether there are any discernible principles at 
the heart of that legal practice – i.e. what I called the core principles of a body of 
law.  
 
So, for example, the kind of core principles associated with criminal law, such as 
mens rea or nulla poena sine lege, can be taken to be candidates for the 
definition of that body of law. Different types of law will appeal to different core 
principles. The important point, however, is that to confirm that principles 
discernible in a body of law (or their interpretation for that matter) do distinguish 
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 On this point also see Nicos Stavropoulos ‘Interpretivist Theories of Law” (2003), Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/law-interpretivist/ 
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that body and should keep on distinguishing that body, they have to be justifiable 
in terms of some distinct functional role. Without a normative case in terms of 
its role, a candidate core principle might be seen as contingent, accidental, or a 
dispensable part of that body of law. Of course, what it takes to dispense with 
such an element of a body of law (legislation, legal interpretation) is a separate 
matter. My concern in this thesis is only with what is there as a distinguishing 
element and what belongs there, and these are both explained by the functional 
role. 
 
One way to justify the existence of an area of law, as a separate area of law, is to 
show that firstly, it fulfils a special role that distinguishes it from other areas of 
law and secondly, that this functional role adds value to the system of legal 
regulation overall. This is why special jurisprudes, when analysing and 
discussing the particular role of an area of law, often contrast the specific area of 
law with which they are concerned with other provinces of law.
123
 So for 
instance, there are a number of crucial differences between tort law and criminal 
law with regard to how responsibility is established and what consequences 
responsibility under these respective areas of law has. For instance, a core 
structural feature of most domestic criminal systems is that criminal charges are 
initiated by the state, through a public prosecutor, rather than by the victims of 
the crime or other citizens. Another paradigmatic structural feature of the 
criminal law would be that individuals convicted of a crime are typically 
punished through imprisonment. A core substantive norm of criminal law, for 
instance, would be that in order to be found guilty, a defendant must typically 
have committed the wrongful act intentionally. In other words, in order to attract 
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 See, for instance, the following quote by Stephen Perry, ‘The Moral Foundations of Tort 
Law’, Iowa Law Review, 77 (1992), 449-514: “In order to understand what tort law involves, it 
is necessary to distinguish tort from other branches of the law, and in so doing to discover how 
the aims of tort differ from the aims of other areas of law such as contract or criminal law.” 
 71 
 
criminal responsibility, the defendant must not only have committed the criminal 
act (actus reus), but he must have done so with criminal intention (mens rea). 
 
Contrary to criminal law tort law typically does not establish a requirement of 
mens rea. Agents can be held accountable for negligent behaviour, they do not 
consciously have to commit the particular act or omission which resulted in the 
tort. Whether or not an agent is liable in tort will turn on whether the defendant 
breached his general duty of care; whether the action (or omission) was 
committed purposefully or simply negligently will generally not matter for 
determining liability.
124
 And contrary to criminal law, tort proceedings are 
typically initiated by the party harmed rather than by the state – so tort law is 
concerned with claims by private individuals against other individuals or legal 
persons.
125
 This means that where the damaged party decides not to proceed with 
legal action no case will be brought, while criminal charges are typically 
initiated by the state independently of the victim (or the victim’s family). 
Furthermore, an individual liable in tort will generally have to pay damages to 
the party harmed, while the consequences of criminal responsibility will 
typically be imprisonment. While in criminal law the offender is personally held 
responsible for what he has done this is not always the case in tort. It is possible 
to insure against liability in tort with regard to many activities – for instance, 
manufacturers can insure against harm caused by their products. Employers can 
insure to cover employees. And motorists are actually legally required to insure 
against liability for injuries to third parties and passengers. 
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 Also see Vivienne Harpwood, Modern Tort Law (6
th
 edn., London: Cavendish Publishing, 
2005), in particular ch.1. 
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 Peter Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002), p.272, 
argues that the “archetypal proceeding for the enforcement of civil law responsibility is the claim 
for damages by one citizen against another. The archetypal proceeding for enforcing criminal 
law responsibility is the prosecution of a citizen by the state.”  
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Theorists of tort law tend to stress that tort law focuses on compensation for 
losses and regulates who should bear the cost of accidents
126
  – as opposed to the 
criminal law, which is concerned with the punishment of offenders or signalling 
transgressions that are unacceptable in a society.
127
 Analysing the existence of 
tort and criminal law as two distinct areas of law allows us to differentiate 
between different kinds of agent responsibility, to distinguish between different 
types of (moral) reasons of holding agents legally to account.  
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 See, for instance, Cane (ibid.) who argues that the “main social function of principles of 
responsibility under the civil law paradigm is to prevent and repair harm to individuals.” 
(p.251) and that “[u]nder the civil law paradigm, vicarious liability is the basic rule because the 
focus of that paradigm is on reparation of harm, and vicarious liability increases the chance that 
harm will be repaired by providing the victim of a breach of civil law with an additional target.” 
(p.266).  
Just like for the case of the criminal law (see fn.105 and fn.106 above), this is not to say that the 
role of tort law has been uncontested. Theorists differ in their understanding of what purposes, if 
any, this area of law serves and/ or should serve, and few tort lawyers would argue that tort law 
exclusively serves the purpose of compensation. Scholars like Honoré, for instance, have argued 
that tort law, similarly to the criminal law, also plays a moral role and labels things as ‘not to be 
done or omitted or brought about’, though in a less stigmatic way than criminal law. Tony 
Honoré, ‘The Morality of Tort Law – Questions and Answers’, in Philosophical Foundations of 
Tort Law, ed. by David G. Owen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.73-98 (p.77). Also 
offering a moral reading of tort law, Weinrib has argued that tort law establishes corrective 
justice, thereby instituting a particular system of responsibility for human conduct. See Ernest 
Weinrib, ‘The Special Morality of Tort Law’, McGill Law Journal, 34 (1988), 403-413; Ernest 
Weinrib, ‘The Morality of Tort Law’ in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law, ed. by David G. 
Owen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.77. Also see Arthur Ripstein, ‘The Philosophy 
of Tort Law’, in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, ed. by Jules 
Coleman and Scott J. Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) where he argues that tort 
law articulates distinctive conceptions of responsibility and fairness between persons, and  
Arthur Ripstein, ‘Tort, The Division of Responsibility and the Law of Tort’, Fordham Law 
Review, 72 (2004), 1811-1844. For a critical discussion of the corrective justice account, see 
John Gardner, ‘What is Tort Law For? Part 1. The Place of Corrective Justice’, Law and 
Philosophy, 30 (2011), 1-50. 
By contrast, theories in the strand of the so-called economic analysis of tort law propose that the 
aim of tort law principally is to minimise the sum of the costs of accidents – see, for instance,  
Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little Brown, 1973) and Richard Posner, 
‘Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory’, Journal of Legal Studies, 8 (1979), 103–140. 
Also see Perry, ‘The Moral Foundations of Tort Law’, p.450 on the idea that tort law may 
incorporate both principles of reparations and norms of economic efficiency.  
However, despite such differences in understanding of the normative foundations of tort law, 
scholars widely agree that it is not the central function of tort law to censure or punish, but to 
provide a remedy to the victim for the invasion of protected interests. Usually, tort will result in 
damage payments, even though sometimes relief will be in the form of an injunction or other.  
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 Lamond, ‘What is a crime?’, pp.615-620. 
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Now criminal and tort law are both, in some sense, about ‘protecting human 
interests’. Whilst these areas do indeed affect interests, and often similar 
interests, that is not what is interesting or special about them. For instance, tort 
and criminal law in domestic law might be said to some extent to protect and 
affect similar interests: both are concerned, for instance, with the interests of 
‘property’, ‘life’ or ‘bodily integrity’. But understanding tort and criminal law 
purely in terms of the consequences that they promote with regard to these 
interests will not make sense of why we would entertain these two areas of law 
as distinct areas of law. Put differently, an interest-based understanding cannot 
account for the existence of criminal law and tort law as different areas of law.  
 
However, if we understand tort and criminal law in terms of the distinct 
paradigms of responsibility they establish in the legal regulation of agents
128
 - 
e.g. the criminal law paradigm that centres on moral responsibility for 
wrongdoing, and the civil law paradigm that centres on compensation for losses, 
we can make sense of the existence of these two areas of law as distinct areas of 
law with their distinct core principles. 
 
As an aside, I should clarify what I mean by responsibility and types of 
responsibility in law. I will use responsibility to refer to the duties and forms of 
accountability that can be expected from an agent, and a type of responsibility 
will identify the type of duties a body of law imposes on the types of agents it 
regulates as well as the kind of accountability to which those agents are held. 
Remedy is one type of accountability, so typically civil law remedies focus on 
costs, whilst in criminal law accountability takes the form of punitive or 
redemptory measures. 
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 I borrow the term ‘paradigms of responsibility’ from Peter Cane, Responsibility in Law and 
Morality (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002). 
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If in addition to arguing that an area of law serves a distinct role, we also 
establish that this distinct role adds value to the overall system of legal 
regulation, then we have established a case for treating this as a distinct area of 
law and moreover for maintaining it as such.
129
 So to justify the existence of the 
criminal law as a separate body of law, for instance, it would need to be argued 
that there is a value to being able to express moral reprimand
130
 through legal 
regulation.  
 
3. WHY THINK ABOUT AREAS OF LAW IN TERMS OF THEIR FUNCTIONAL 
ROLE? 
Why should we think about areas of law in terms of their functional role? Simply 
put, the answer is that the law is not just an arbitrary collection of social 
behaviours. The law works by imposing obligations on people and other types of 
agents, such as associations, and claims authority over its subjects. In the case of 
the criminal law, for instance, a finding of responsibility can have serious 
consequences, such as incarceration. The law is also a social institution that can 
be changed if thought to be in need of reform. As such, it is the kind of social 
practice of which we need to ask ‘Why should or shouldn’t we continue this 
practice?’ or ‘Is this practice rational and justified the way it is?’131  And, by 
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 See Saladin Meckled-García, ‘How to Think About the Problem of Non-State Actors and 
Human Rights’, Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy, 11 (2008), 41-60 where 
he develops a similar methodology for the conceptual definition of normative concepts in 
general, and ‘rights’ or ‘human rights’ in particular. He argues that any successful theory of 
rights must “capture[…] [the] distinct role of rights in our moral repertoire in the form of 
principle. It is from this additive point of having  a right”, he argues further, “that we can derive 
criteria of success for a theory of rights”. Note that while Meckled-Garcia develops this 
methodology for developing theories of moral concepts, he explicitly does not “distinguish the 
aim of explaining what counts as a legal right from explaining what counts as a moral right” 
insofar as he understands the “moral notion to illuminate the legal notion”. 
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 Or whatever else we identify as the distinct functional role of the criminal law. See fn.105 and 
fn.106 above for references to the debate over different justifications for criminal law. 
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 See John Gardner on the specific case of criminal law in ‘On the General Part of the Criminal 
Law’, in Philosophy and the Criminal Law – Principle and Critique, ed. by Anthony Duff 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 205-255 (p.206), where he writes that “the 
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extension, insofar as we can descriptively distinguish different areas of law, such 
as the areas of criminal law or tort law in domestic law, we need to ask whether 
and why it matters that we have such differentiation in law and what that 
differentiation means. In other words, we should ask whether there are good 
reasons to think that there are, and to maintain, distinct areas of law.  
 
There are both moral and practical reasons to identifying distinct areas of law as 
serving distinct roles. From a moral point of view, if a clear distinction is kept 
between criminal responsibility, which arises when the focus is on moral 
censorship, and tort liability, when the focus is on compensating the damaged 
party, then the labels ‘liable in tort’ and ‘criminally responsible’ will have 
different signalling functions. This is indeed the case in domestic law – for 
instance, the finding of criminal guilt is associated to a kind of social stigma 
which is generally not associated to civil liability as the latter does not imply any 
moral fault or intentional wrongdoing of the defendant.
132
 By distinguishing 
situations where agents are labelled ‘criminals’ and those where they are held 
liable under tort law, the legal system thus takes care to communicate the moral 
difference at stake. It allows us to clearly distinguish how we address situations 
where agents are held to account morally for violating standards of society 
                                                                                                                                                                    
criminal law should be rational and principled” because it “is a human institution that can be 
reformed and altered (whether ad hoc or systematically) by human hand. It is therefore precisely 
the kind of thing that answers to (practical) reasons and to (practical) principles.” He then 
clarifies that he does “not mean that every doctrine of the criminal law is already supported by 
reasons and principles, let alone by good reasons and sound principles” but that “it can always 
be asked, perhaps without much hope of a convincing answer, but at least without making a 
category mistake: ‘Why should we enact or retain a criminal law like this? For what reason? On 
what principle?’ That is the only test that needs to be satisfied to show that the criminal law is 
capable, in theory, of being rational and principled. Moreover, it is built into the very ideas of 
the rational and the principled that anything which is, in theory, capable of having these 
qualities ought to have them, the former unconditionally and the latter ceteribus paribus.” 
132
 Honoré, ‘The Morality of Tort Law – Questions and Answers’, pp.73-98; Ashworth, ‘Is the 
Criminal Law a Lost Cause?’, pp.225-256, writes in this regard that “The element of public 
censure remains a central feature of criminal liability, echoed in many social and professional 
spheres by the tendency to place significance on criminal convictions but not even to inquire 
about civil judgments against a person.” 
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purposely and situations where the reason we are holding an agent to account is 
that we want to compensate someone for harm he has incurred through the 
negligence of someone else.  The existence of these two areas of law, as distinct 
areas of law, allows for more nuance in the legal regulation of agents. 
 
As long as criminal offenses are limited to offenses considered morally 
blameworthy by society, the label ‘criminal’ can communicate precisely that. In 
other words, the criminal conviction of an individual then signals that he was 
legally held to account because his behaviour was such that it deserved moral 
reprimand by the state on behalf of society for actions that society prohibits, that 
his misconduct was sufficiently serious to attract criminal liability (and, by 
implication, may be punished by potentially severe consequences, such as 
incarceration).
133
  
 
Where, by contrast, criminal offenses encompass not only those classically 
thought of as crimes but a whole range of minor offenses, in other words, where 
criminalization becomes a means for regulating all kinds of areas of social life, 
this meaning of ‘crime’ is eventually undermined. The fact that someone has 
committed a ‘crime’ no longer signals that her behaviour was particularly 
serious, or deserving of censure from the side of society. If the criminal 
vocabulary is used to cover a whole range of areas of regulation, the boundaries 
between traditional crimes and other ‘wrongs’, such as those wrongs that would 
classically have been regarded as civil wrongs, becomes blurry; the currency of 
crime is inflated to the point that it loses its distinct value (i.e. the value of 
expressing those clear standards of what actions and intentions are absolutely 
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 I noted above (fn.107) that whether punishment is (always) associated with criminal liability 
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privileges, such as the right to liberty, may be withdrawn as a consequence to mark that the 
actions are prohibited (not just implying a cost like the paying of a fine for civil responsibility).  
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unacceptable in a society in such a way that people are aware of the moral 
censure that accompanies those actions).
134
 
 
Given that principled differences in the roles of different areas of law reflect real 
differences in what is being regulated, maintaining the distinction is also 
valuable for practical reasons. The existence of tort and criminal law as separate 
areas of law, with their distinct principles and features, allows lawyers to more 
easily decide in each given case what the appropriate rules are that should 
govern that case. It is, of course, possible to imagine a legal system which does 
not distinguish between different areas of law, but where, on a case-by-case 
basis, lawyers decide, depending on the circumstances of the case, what the 
standards of proof should be, what criteria should be fulfilled for responsibility 
to arise, and what kinds of penalties or consequences the finding of 
responsibility should have. However, the classification of rules into different 
areas of law makes this process much easier and likely fairer, as less discretion 
will be left to the lawyers in each particular case, and the outcome of cases will 
be more predictable. Coherent and clear distinctions between different areas of 
law also help legal practitioners to decide in each given case which area of law 
most appropriately addresses the situation. In this sense, there is not only a moral 
but also a practical value to legal categories reflecting different paradigms of 
responsibility. 
 
 
                                                             
134
 Indeed, it has been argued by scholars like Ashworth that domestic criminal law (in the UK) 
has lost its focus in precisely this way, and become something of a “multi-purpose tool” with no 
sense of what the particular social significance of the criminal law ought to be. He criticizes that 
politicians and other actors with influence in the legal policy making process tend to simply 
assume that the creation of new criminal offenses is the only way to deal appropriately with 
misconduct in society and that as a result the number of criminal offenses in UK law has grown 
in an uncontrolled and chaotic way, regardless of any consideration of the social significance of 
the criminal law. Ashworth, ‘Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?’, p.225. 
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4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ‘BUSINESS-AND-HUMAN RIGHTS DEBATE’  
If my above argument that different areas of law offer distinct ways to legally 
hold agents accountable, and that there is a value to entertaining these 
distinctions, were, at least in some cases right, then it would have important 
upshots for legal policy-making. Good legal policy making would be informed 
by an understanding of the roles of areas of law - the decision to legally regulate 
an agent for harming an interest should be informed by an understanding of 
 
i. What the moral justification and point of such regulation is, and  
ii. What area of law most appropriately addresses this concern.  
 
Consider this example from domestic law: when considering whether or not the 
dropping of chewing gum in the street should be made a crime, lawmakers 
should be able to justify this with regard to both the role of the criminal law, and 
the reasons for regulating this activity. In other words, lawmakers should ask 
‘What is the role of the criminal law?’, and ‘Does this role adequately reflect the 
reason(s) for holding people to account for the dropping of chewing gum?’ If, 
for instance, we support the view that the functional role of the criminal law is to 
morally condemn or punish offenders for their wrongdoing on behalf of society 
we need to consider whether dropping gum is the kind of behaviour that 
warrants moral condemnation or punishment on behalf of society.  Even though 
we might be convinced of the need to regulate the dropping of gum as 
undesirable type of behaviour, we might come to the conclusion that 
criminalization is not the appropriate response. For instance, if our primary 
concern is to avoid the costs related to the dropping of gum, we might find it 
more appropriate to make the dropping of gum a civil offense which gives rise to 
a fine, as opposed to a criminal conviction – otherwise, we risk undermining the 
very role of the criminal law.
135
  On the other hand, if there were a reason to see 
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dropping chewing gum as socially reprehensible—say if it endangered life, or 
promoted other criminal actions—there might be a case for regulating it as a 
criminal law concern.
136
 
 
Similarly, if my argument is correct then we need to ask what, if anything, the 
particular role of IHRL is, whether an extension of this area of international law 
to business entities is in line with this role, and if not, whether by changing the 
role of IHRL in this way we would lose anything of value. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In summary, then, the question that needs to be addressed, and that I argue has 
been neglected in the business and human rights debate, is whether IHRL is 
indeed best understood as encompassing the kind of responsibility that is 
appropriate to regulating the behaviour of business organisations and their 
effects on people’s interests. In this chapter, I proposed a methodology for 
thinking about what particular role, if any, is played by international human 
rights law. I argued that what identifies and helps us to determine whether an 
area of law has a distinct functional role is a set of core principles for that body 
of law, identifiable by both examining whether recognizable and repeated rules 
for legal reasoning are present in that body of law and whether those rules are 
justifiable by a value. I explained why it is important to understand the 
functional role of an area of law: firstly, the law, as the kind of social practice it 
is, imposes obligations on those subject to it. As such, the law is the kind of 
practice that invites questions about its justifiability – in other words, we need to 
have good normative reasons to interpret and maintain the law as it is (or else, 
abolish or change it). And secondly, by extension, for any area of law 
                                                             
136
 Note that I am not here concerned with the actual or desirable content of the criminal law in 
any jurisdiction, only on the difference it makes to regulation of a particular form of behaviour 
whether it is regulated under criminal or other types of provisions. 
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establishing distinct principles and features, we need to ask: does this area of law 
play a functional role that distinguishes it from other areas of law, and if so, does 
it add value to the overall system of legal regulation? The existence of distinct 
areas of law is valuable, I argued, as it allows us – among other things – to 
differentiate between different types of agent responsibility in the legal 
regulation of agents.  
 
So I made the case for not just thinking in terms of areas of law in general (and 
international human rights law in particular) in terms of the consequences they 
aim to bring about but ask whether they can be understood to embody distinct 
understandings of agent responsibility. I thereby proposed an alternative to what 
I argued to be a mainstream view of IHRL, in particular in the current business-
and-human rights debate, namely the interest view of IHRL which I argued tends 
to be at least an implicit understanding taken by proponents of an extension of 
IHRL to business entities. In the following chapter, I will consider and reject a 
number of possible objections before applying the methodology proposed here to 
IHRL in chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3: SOME POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO THE FUNCTIONAL 
ROLE APPROACH 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I discuss and refute a number of possible objections to the 
functional role approach that I proposed in the previous chapter. In chapter 2 I 
argued that before calling for an extension of IHRL to business entities we need 
a better understanding of what distinct functional role, if any, IHRL plays in the 
regulation of actors. I suggested that the existence of distinct areas of law is 
valuable as it allows us, among other things, to differentiate between different 
types of agent responsibility in the legal regulation of agents. Now there are a 
number of possible objections to the functional role approach that I should 
address.  
The first objection I will consider, the objection from a consequence-based 
approach to law, agrees in principle that we can think of areas of law in terms of 
particular roles or purposes. It rejects, however, the idea that different areas of 
law should be understood as establishing distinct kinds of agent responsibility, as 
the functional role approach suggests.  
I will then address two objections that reject the very idea that we can sensibly 
think of areas of law in terms of particular ‘roles’ or ‘purposes’ at all: firstly, the 
objection from arbitrariness, which argues that areas of law come about largely 
driven by arbitrary processes of law-making and that it is therefore futile to try 
and make sense of areas of law in terms of the distinct role(s) they play; and 
secondly and relatedly, the objection from disagreement, which rejects the idea 
of functional role because given a certain ‘arbitrariness’ of the law, theorists are 
unlikely to ever agree on the respective functional roles of areas of law. In 
response, I clarify that I do not take issue with the descriptive observation that 
law-making processes, and areas of law as a result, may to some extent be 
arbitrary. In other words, I do not suggest that areas of law are intentionally 
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designed to have the particular functional roles that one might ascribe to them 
following the methodology proposed here. It is also possible for areas of law to 
be compatible with different interpretations of what functional role they serve. 
However, I argue that despite some degree of arbitrariness we can nevertheless 
make sense of (at least some) areas of law in terms of distinct functional roles 
and that in order to engage critically with the law we must appeal to these 
functional roles. 
The objection from the relationship between moral and legal responsibility 
argues that the functional role approach unduly assumes that areas of law mirror 
moral categories of responsibility. In response, I clarify that the functional role 
approach is neither committed to the view that all moral categories of 
responsibility are captured in different areas of law, and neither to the view that 
the answer to the question of what role an area of law plays needs to necessarily 
turn on morality at all. 
I will then address three different objections that take issue with the 
methodology I propose for arriving at an interpretation of the functional role of 
an area of law. The objection from moralising the law stems from a positivist 
understanding of the law and is concerned that the functional role approach 
unduly imposes moral values on the law. In response, I argue that the 
interpretivist approach develops a stand on the functional role of an area of law 
by close reference to precisely the sources of law specified by the positivist. In 
other words, the account of the functional role is reconstructive of what laws and 
principles are in place, and does not prescribe what the law should look like. 
The ideal world objection is diametrically opposed to the positivist objection and 
holds that the problem with the interpretivist approach is that it is too 
constrained by actual legal practice. Without taking a stand on the general merit 
of ideal world approaches to legal (or moral) theory, I argue that given this 
thesis’ interest in a question about reform of existing IHRL – namely the 
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question of whether IHRL should be extended to business entities – it is most 
appropriate to start from existing practice and ask what functional role, if any, 
IHRL plays as it currently stands and whether this role might be threatened by an 
extension of this area of law to businesses.  
Lastly, I address the objection from human rights practice which proposes to 
interpret the role of IHRL based on current discourse about business 
responsibility for human rights. I argue that this method does not offer a viable 
way of resolving disagreement in current discourse.  
 
2. THE OBJECTION FROM A ‘CONSEQUENCE-BASED APPROACH’ TO LAW 
I have proposed a methodology for special jurisprudence that lies in not simply 
looking at consequences of law and legal policy. On this view, the legal 
regulation of agents is not simply about holding agents to account in a way that 
promotes a particular set of consequences (such as the protection of certain 
interests). A view, however, that takes the role of all areas of law and legal 
policy to be properly concerned with a specific set of consequences (a 
consequence-based approach) will deny that different bodies of law can be 
distinguished in principle. At best, it will take different areas of law to be 
distinguishable because they contribute, or should contribute, in different ways 
to the same consequences that matter. On this view, holding different agents 
responsible in different ways will only make sense if those are efficient ways of 
producing the right consequences. So, to claim that a particular body of law 
should be understood in distinction from another body in terms of each of their 
special roles, will not be sustainable in principle, only in practical terms. 
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RESPONSE TO THE OBJECTION FROM A ‘CONSEQUENCE-BASED’ APPROACH  
In response, I should stress that I do not aim to resolve the dispute surrounding 
consequentialism in the law more generally. There is a larger debate as to 
whether the law should primarily be used to bring about certain consequences,
137
 
and about what weight, if any, consequential arguments should carry in legal 
adjudication, i.e. whether jurists should take into account the situation-specific 
consequences of their respective judgments when making their decisions.
138
 
However, whilst I do not propose to resolve a dispute between a consequence-
based approach to special jurisprudence and an approach that focuses on agents 
and their special provinces, actions and powers, I should explain why the 
argument from consequentialism is not a significant threat to my project. 
 
Firstly, I argue that this view is unhelpful in interpreting and analysing actual 
legal practice. I already argued in the previous chapter that we cannot make 
sense of the difference between criminal and tort law purely in terms of the 
consequences they aim to bring about – while both areas of law are to some 
extent about protecting important human interests, such as life or physical 
integrity, these areas of law tie into distinct conceptions of responsibility 
(criminal law being more concerned with the moral reprimand or punishment of 
agents for moral wrongdoing, tort law being more focused on the compensation 
of losses) which explains and justifies why they exhibit distinct core principles. 
A legal consequentialist may want to argue that existing legal practice is flawed 
precisely because it does not take consequences seriously enough - it might 
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produce better overall consequences if the criminal law focused exclusively on 
preventing future crime rather than on signalling personal responsibility. In that 
case, we might want to abolish requirements of proving individual responsibility 
in the criminal process and make it easier to convict offenders.  But transforming 
criminal law into a purely consequence driven set of regulations would radically 
change the criminal law as it is currently known – in the criminal law as it exists 
in most places today, the criminal law is not just about consequences, but also 
takes into account values such as autonomy, choice, and fairness when assigning 
responsibility and is thus better interpreted, at least in part, as concerned with 
personal, or moral responsibility for chosen actions. 
 
Similarly, in this thesis I am not concerned with the question of whether IHRL – 
in an ideal world - should be all about bringing about good consequences or not. 
Rather, I ask whether – as IHRL currently stands – we can make sense of this 
area of international law in terms of a distinct understanding of responsibility 
that would make an extension of this area of law to business entities problematic. 
Put differently, I will ask whether there is any value to keeping the current state-
focus of IHRL.  
 
And as I will argue in chapter 4, IHRL has also explicitly not just been about 
promoting certain consequences, but it has focused on the particular powers and 
responsibilities that states, as a particular type of agent, have towards 
individuals.   
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3. THE OBJECTION FROM ARBITRARINESS 
I addressed an objection from consequence-based arguments above, but that 
objection accepted that areas of law can have a functional role, it is just that it 
held that all areas of law effectively play the same overarching role: namely that 
of promoting certain consequences. Here I deal with views that reject the idea of 
a functional role altogether. One such possible objection, call it the ‘objection 
from arbitrariness’, holds that there are no clear-cut boundaries between 
different provinces of law. The argument in favour of distinct functional roles of 
areas of law relies on descriptive distinctions between areas of law. In other 
words, it relies on the fact that there exist areas of law that are relevantly 
different at the level of their substantive principles and structural features (their 
core principles).
139
  
 
It might be objected then that in practice, there are no clear-cut distinctions 
between what I refer to as ‘areas’ of law. There are overlaps between different 
provinces of law with regard to the rules on how responsibility is established 
(i.e. the substantive norms) and the procedures for implementing those norms 
(i.e. the structural features). To name a possible example against clear-cut 
distinctions, I argued above that one core principle of domestic criminal law is 
the requirement of mens rea. But in practice, domestic criminal offenses do not 
always require criminal intent to establish criminal responsibility. Many criminal 
offenses in the UK, for instance, are offenses of strict liability requiring little or 
no fault element. In this sense, they are more akin to classic torts than crimes. 
 
Similarly, a core structural feature of criminal law is generally considered to be 
that criminal responsibility will lead to incarceration. But in practice, not all 
criminal offenses lead to prison sentences. In English law, a car accident can 
lead to a moderate criminal fine for a driving offense. Criminal law also 
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sometimes makes provision for compensating victims (e.g. through the criminal 
Injuries Compensation Board). Again, criminal law is here similar to tort law in 
that it imposes the payment of damages. It might be argued then that since we 
cannot clearly distinguish between the substantive norms and the structural 
features of different areas of law, we also cannot meaningfully distinguish 
between the different functional roles of tort and criminal law. Similarly, tort law 
sometimes recognizes punitive damages. So it might be argued that to some 
extent, both tort and criminal law can contribute to compensation of victims, and 
to punishment of perpetrators. 
 
The fact that some areas of law are called ‘criminal’ and others ‘tort’, it might be 
argued, is at least to some extent arbitrary: the ways in which laws are made are 
often arbitrary and different lawmakers will have different priorities and 
intentions in proposing particular laws. As a result, what constitutes the bodies 
of criminal and tort law respectively will often be the result of political haggling 
and compromise. An extreme view would hold that legal categories are entirely 
arbitrary. A more moderate sceptical view might suggest that while we can 
discern certain commonalities between many or most rules that fall under 
criminal law, and differences between many or most rules of criminal law and 
rules of other areas of law, those boundaries are not entirely clear-cut. The point 
of both these views is that there is no necessary single common thread running 
through all the different rules falling under one particular area of law. In other 
words, there is nothing like an ‘essence’ of an area of law independently of any 
particular rule that happens to fall under a certain areas of law at any given time. 
 
If this objection was valid for domestic law, it seems even more salient in the 
case of international law. The ways in which international law develops are 
arguably even more ‘arbitrary’ than domestic law-making processes. In 
international treaty making, political interests will often influence the 
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negotiations and the development of custom, which is partly defined by state 
practice, will be influenced by all kinds of different considerations and interests 
of the different states. And so even more than domestic law, international law 
may be argued to be too ‘messy’ for it to be a reasonable enterprise to try and 
make sense of the different areas of international law in terms of any particular 
role. 
 
Perhaps the single most influential theory of international law has been 
positivism. Positivists might be particularly tempted by the objection from 
arbitrariness. On a positivist understanding, the law is fully determined by social 
facts. The law is determined by what the relevant legal sources say it is – in 
other words, the law is nothing but the (more or less) contingent result of the 
different law-making processes.
140
 For international law, these social facts would 
primarily include whether states have ratified or acceded to treaties, or whether 
state practice has given rise to customary rules.
141
 On such an understanding, 
areas of international law are also simply the (more or less) arbitrary outcomes 
of these same law-making processes. This would mean that IHRL, as an area of 
law, is simply determined by the sum of the different legal materials outlining its 
rules and provisions – in other words, IHRL is no more and no less than those 
rules that states have agreed to.
142
 Positivists may speak of the ‘role’, or rather 
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the ‘roles’ of an area of law in terms of the specific aims that the legal rules 
falling under that particular area of law at the given moment in time stipulate – 
so for instance, IHRL may be said to serve the roles of ‘protecting the right to 
property’ or ‘protecting the right to life’. But from a positivist perspective, it 
makes no sense to speak of the ‘functional role’ of IHRL independently of the 
specific provisions IHRL encompasses. Positivists are in this sense sceptical of 
the idea that we can meaningfully speak of the role of an area of law. 
 
In its strongest form, the objection that the law is inherently messy – and that 
therefore any attempt of ascribing any particular functional role to IHRL – is 
found in critical legal scholarship. Critical legal theory is another prominent 
approach to international legal theory. In a nutshell, critical legal scholars argue 
that international law is nothing but the subjective preferences of individual 
actors who employ the formalism of international legal discourse to advance 
their respective interests or to justify their actions.
143
 Critical scholars point out 
that within the UN and other international fora, as well as in the legal literature, 
lawyers seem to routinely draw contradictory conclusions from the same norms 
or find contradictory norms embedded in one and the same text or behaviour. 
They conclude that international lawyers – although having to conform to certain 
predictable and highly formal argumentative patterns – can therefore achieve 
virtually any substantive outcome for a given legal problem.
144
  
 
The law, on this view, does not exist independently from the actors who 
implement it, as positivism has it. Rather different legal decision makers 
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constitute the law for multiple roles and from multiple perspectives.
145
 
International law is fundamentally political from a critical scholar’s perspective 
– international lawyers are able to put forward their own political agendas 
unconstrained by ready-made rules.
146
 The positivist can still allow for the 
possibility of some kind of sense or order, even if any order would be the 
outcome of the contingencies of the law-making process. But from a critical 
scholar’s perspective, the law is inherently indeterminate. On this account, it 
would seem futile to engage in a consideration of particular functional role(s) of 
international law - as long as an actor succeeds in making an argument to that 
extent within the constraints of formal international legal language, the role(s) 
that law can serve are virtually unconstrained.  
 
RESPONSE TO THE OBJECTION FROM ARBITRARINESS 
Certainly there are overlaps and similarities between areas of law and the 
boundaries between areas of law may be blurry. I take no issue here with the 
descriptive observation of positivists and critical legal scholars that in practice, 
areas of law are not entirely ‘clear-cut’. The ways in which laws are legislated 
(or emerge through custom) will often be ‘messy’, different legislative actors 
will have different intentions and the resulting laws will consequently be 
‘arbitrary’ to a certain extent. In other words, it is certainly true that law may 
often be created without the intention of serving any (one) particular aim. 
 
So when I speak of a role, functional role, or point of an area of law, I do not 
mean these as intentional concepts. I am not proposing that these areas of law 
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were designed to have the different roles one might ascribe to them, following 
the method proposed above. Rather, whether it is through statutory aims, organic 
growth, or un-intentional fortuity, my proposal is that we can make sense of, and 
guide our interpretation of, these bodies of law as distinct bodies if there is a 
doctrinal basis for ascribing them a valuable but distinct place in a system of 
law. 
 
 It may also be true, as the critical legal scholar asserts, that legal scholars 
sometimes (or even regularly) try to twist the law to suit their individual 
preferences. The law may consequently be compatible with – or amenable to 
manipulation in order to serve – a number of different roles. But at the same 
time, we can nevertheless descriptively distinguish different bodies of law in 
terms of recurring principles of jurisprudence. Returning to the examples of tort 
and criminal law, their respective features are sufficiently different for us to 
describe them as two distinct areas of law.
147
  
 
As I argued in the previous chapter, there are a number of crucial differences 
between tort law and criminal law with regard to how responsibility is 
established and what consequences responsibility under these respective areas of 
law has. Given this feasibility of distinguishing a number of core features,
148
 and 
given that there is value to having distinct areas of law then we can argue that to 
the extent that actual practice (actual law) diverges from the paradigms we either 
need to have good reasons for these exceptions, or if such reasons cannot be 
found, practice may simply be misguided and in need of reform. For instance, 
paradigmatically, the criminal law requires mens rea (criminal intention) - 
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Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002), p.49. 
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because a criminal verdict implies a moral judgment on the wrongdoing. So 
paradigmatically, crimes cannot be committed negligently.  
 
There are some exceptions to this though; for instance, if I kill someone by 
driving recklessly I might be found guilty of the crime of manslaughter. One 
way to justify this exception may be that reckless driving is such a dangerous 
activity that regulating it under tort law only might not have strong enough a 
deterrent effect/ or that the harm caused is so serious that more than civil liability 
must be at stake. Alternatively, we might argue that no negligent behaviour 
should ever attract criminal responsibility because negligent behaviour by 
definition is not purposeful wrongful behaviour and therefore does not warrant 
moral condemnation of the sort imposed by the criminal law. If we support the 
latter view, we would argue that the criminal law should be changed 
accordingly. 
 
In sum, I can say in response to the objection from arbitrariness that I will make 
a prima facie case linking doctrines to a value, postulating their status as core 
principles given that value as the functional role of the body of law. Given that I 
am providing a reasoned case for this, the burden of proof would, then, lie with 
these theorists to show that this is illusory or a mere rationalization, rather than 
for me to show it is not. I will of course address salient objections as I set out the 
argument. 
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4. THE OBJECTION FROM DISAGREEMENT ON FUNCTIONAL ROLES 
An objection related to the objection from arbitrariness is the objection from 
disagreement, which holds that the idea of a ‘functional role’ of an area of law is 
futile insofar as theorists will never agree on what the respective social roles of 
different areas of law are. So for instance, one long-standing area of debate in 
criminal legal theory has concerned whether the role of criminal law is 
moralistic, i.e. whether it serves the role of punishing transgressions of (legally 
institutionalized) moral standards, or whether it serves the role of preventing (or 
at least reducing) harmful behaviour in society.
149
 Similarly, I argued that 
scholars debate whether the aim of tort law is to minimize the sum of the costs of 
accidents (and the costs of avoiding them) or whether an individual who has 
wronged another simply thereby incurs a duty to repair the wrongful losses 
occasioned by his behaviour.
150
 Objectors may take this to prove the point about 
the arbitrariness of the law – given that areas of law are compatible with a 
number of interpretations of their role, there is no way we will ever converge on 
a common version of what the functional role of a particular area of law is. 
 
RESPONSE TO THE OBJECTION FROM DISAGREEMENT  
However, in order to critically assess and debate existing legal practice, we 
cannot avoid taking a stand on the social role of the law – or, by extension, areas 
of law. Whether particular substantive principles or structural features of an area 
of law are justified will in large part depend on the functional roles that we 
consider this area of law to play. To illustrate: if we hold that the social function 
of the criminal law is to condemn or punish offenders for their moral 
wrongdoing on behalf of society,
151
 we are likely to consider the mens rea 
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 See fn. 126 above. 
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 Such an understanding is offered, for instance, by Cane who writes that “[t]he main social 
function of principles of responsibility under the criminal law paradigm is to punish and deter 
seriously unacceptable behaviour.” Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality, p.251. 
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requirement an important principle of criminal law: it would be difficult to 
justify that agents should incur moral blameworthiness for an act that they have 
not committed intentionally. And if we are convinced that the criminal law 
should have a punitive function, we might consider imprisonment as a justified 
consequence of criminal conviction. Deprivation of liberty is one of the harshest 
punishments that can be imposed on individuals. As was said, other areas of law, 
like tort law, will instead make the liable party pay damages. But if we support 
the view that the whole point of the criminal law is to punish, we might think 
that it should impose very harsh conditions, harsher than the payment of a 
penalty, and argue that imprisonment is indeed an appropriate consequence for 
criminal responsibility. Similarly, the fact that criminal proceedings are brought 
by a public official as prosecutor might be justified in light of the criminal law’s 
role of expressing moral condemnation on behalf of society as a whole. It should 
not be up to the party harmed by the crime to decide whether or not to sue the 
alleged offender if what is at stake is the reinforcement of societal norms.
 152
 
 
If, by contrast, we disagree with the view that the role of the criminal law should 
be the punishment of offenders, we are also likely to disagree with some, or all, 
of its principles and features. For instance, if we think that the criminal law 
should serve the role of deterring certain wrongful behaviour, rather than 
punishing such behaviour, we might disagree with the mens rea requirement. 
Individuals might arguably take greater precautions not to commit wrongful acts 
(or become guilty of a wrongful omission) if they knew that they could be held 
liable even in the absence of a proven intention to commit the wrong. 
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 Note that some legal systems allow for standing of private individuals in criminal prosecution. 
So for instance, while the US generally maintains a system of public prosecution, victims may 
sometimes petition to reopen a plea bargain or sentence. For a discussion (and critique) of the 
development of victim involvement in the criminal process in the US over the last decades, see 
Danielle Levine, ‘Public Wrongs and Private Rights: Limiting the Victim's Role in a System of 
Public Prosecution’; Northwestern University Law Review (2010) 104, 335-362; also see Cane, 
ibid., on the comparatively small role played by victims in the criminal process. 
 95 
 
Similarly, if we disagree with the moral function of the criminal law and favour 
the utilitarian, crime-minimising interpretation, we might also want to abolish 
imprisonment, or any kind of punishment as a consequence of criminal liability 
altogether. (Unless, of course, there is an empirical case to be made that 
punishment decreases crime rates.)  
 
The point is that in order to argue in favour or against particular areas of law, or 
specific features of these areas of law, that is to critically engage with the law we 
have to appeal to these role(s). Similarly, for the debate on whether or not IHRL 
should be extended to a new category of duty bearers (i.e. business entities) we 
need an understanding of the functional role of IHRL. Again, the point is that 
differences in how we conceive of the role an area of law serves will have 
consequences for how we think this area of law should be shaped – they will 
determine when we consider it appropriate to hold an agent responsible, and 
what consequences liability should have. Where two people disagree about 
whether a certain type of behaviour should be regulated under the law, and under 
which area of law, the parties to the dispute will still need to adopt a particular 
view on what role this area of law serves in order to justify their respective 
views. 
 
Note that not all theorists of the criminal law subscribe to the view that the role 
of the criminal law is to punish offenders for wrongdoing. Some may argue that 
the value of the criminal law is that it deters individuals from wrongdoing, others 
still that it signals or communicates to citizens the inviolable standards of the 
community. Whichever view one adopts, this does not challenge the functional 
role method of justification for the existence of the criminal law; it just offers 
different candidates for that role. To justify the practice of the criminal law, 
theorists who advocate the deterrence view would need to establish that there is 
a value in having and maintaining a distinct area of law that has such a function. 
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I should also stress that areas of law can have a number of different functional 
roles, which to varying degrees shape the features and principles. A common 
view of the criminal law, for instance, holds it to be justified because it tends to 
minimize harmful actions, but would nevertheless consider the criminalization of 
innocent people as illegitimate even if it were to contribute to the minimization 
of harmful behaviour. Such a view implies that criminal law is shaped by more 
than one point: while deterrence or minimization of crime plays a key role in 
justifying the existence of an institution like the criminal law, in individual cases 
deterrence as a functional role is modified by the functional role of moral 
punishment. Alternatively, we could say that the functional role of deterrence is 
constrained by considerations relating to the value of liberty of individuals. 
Individuals should not be deprived of their liberty lightly unless they are shown 
guilty. But the point is the same: it is not necessarily one functional role that 
justifies all aspects of an area of law.
153
 
 
What is essential is that the different functional roles that an area of law plays, if 
any, are coherent. If core principles embodying and justifiable by two distinct 
roles for that area of law are not compatible, and no clear distinction is made in 
procedures to distinguish to which cases these apply, this presents a problem of 
incoherence. For example, if tort law also contained a doctrine of personal 
accountability to society for prohibited transgressions, there would be a 
coherence problem as to who should or could initiate proceedings and what 
standards of evidence were relevant given the two possible aims of addressing 
losses and of social reprimand. This might lead to important clashes of principles 
when trying to decide a particular case, with the standards pulling in different 
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 Also see Stephen R. Perry (1991/92), ‘The Moral Foundations of Tort Law’, Iowa Law 
Review, 77 (1992), 449-514 (p.450) and his argument that “[t]he incorporation of pure moral 
principles into legal or social institutions is an exceedingly complex business, and I do not rule 
out the possibility in advance that a kind of moral pluralism prevails within the institution of tort 
law. This might mean, for example, that pure principles of reparation are balanced against, or at 
least qualified by, norms of economic efficiency.” 
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directions. Such clashes will be clashes in principle, given that resolving such 
clashes means taking a stance of the point of this area of law. 
 
5. CLARIFYING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORAL AND LEGAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
I have argued that there are moral reasons to think of areas of law in terms of 
their functional role, and in particular in terms of the particular agent 
responsibility they establish, because it allows different moral reasons to 
regulate agents to be expressed in the legal regulation of agents. It may be 
objected that the functional role approach assumes a direct relationship between 
moral and legal categories of responsibilities, or that it assumes that legal 
categories mirror moral categories of responsibility.  
 
I should clarify that the functional role approach is explicitly not committed to 
the view that moral categories of responsibilities are mirrored in different areas 
of law. Nor should they be: for one, not all situations which engage the moral 
responsibility of an agent will appropriately be addressed by the law. Smith may 
have promised Jones the other day to plant some roses in their shared flowerbed. 
Failing to do so, Smith might be morally blameworthy for not living up to his 
promises. But we would hardly think that the law should interfere in such 
matters of neighbourly, or friendly, relations. The situation would be different, 
of course, if taking care of the flowerbed was part of Smith’s contractual 
obligations towards Jones – Smith may have signed up to the obligation of 
planting the roses when signing the lease with Jones, or there might be a 
monetary consideration involved. In this case, Smith would not only have a 
moral duty to plant those roses, but a legally enforceable one, too. And where 
she failed, the courts would have a legal duty to enforce it against her on Jones’ 
behalf. But while the law does not reflect the entire spectrum of moral 
obligations, the existence of different areas of law nevertheless makes it possible 
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to distinguish between some, and socially important, categories of moral 
responsibility. 
 
Neither am I committed to the view here that areas of law only differ, or can 
only be made sense of with regard to, the distinct conceptions of moral 
responsibility that they embody. In other words, the answer to the question of 
what the role or point of a specific areas of law is need not turn on morality only, 
or indeed on morality at all. Some distinctions between areas of law are defined 
by the particular areas of social life they regulate. Take the examples of contract 
law or land law - these areas of law deal with particular areas of social 
interaction: contract law establishes rules concerning voluntarily entered (and 
subsequently legally binding) agreements between private parties. Land law, as 
an area of property law, governs mortgages, rental agreements, licenses, 
easements, covenants and the statutory systems for land registration. The main 
distinction between these two areas of law does not turn on different types of 
moral responsibility.  In fact, some parts of land law, like rental agreements, are 
essentially contract law and so the two areas of law are consequently based on 
the same understanding of agent responsibility. So in that sense the classification 
into ‘land law’ or ‘contract law’ may be described as turning on the types of 
issues they address.
154
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 At the same time, I am not here denying that there may be morally relevant features of the 
relationships that these areas of law regulate. A case may or may not be made for that - for such 
debates regarding contract law, see, for instance, Dori Kimel, From Promise to Contract: 
Towards a Liberal Theory of Contract  (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003); Dori Kimel, ‘The 
Morality of Contract and Moral Culpability in Breach’, King's Law Journal, 21.2 (2010), 213-
231; Seana Shiffrin, ‘Could Breach of Contract be Immoral?’, Michigan Law Review, 107 
(2009), 1551-1568; Seana Shiffrin, ‘The Divergence of Contract and Promise’, Harvard Law 
Review, 120 (2007), 708-53; Seana Shiffrin, ‘Promising, Intimate Relationships and 
Conventionalism’, Philosophical Review, 177.4 (2008), 481–524; Brian Bix (2008) ‘Contract 
Rights and Remedies, and the Divergence between Law and Morality’, Ratio Juris, 21.2 (2008), 
194-211; Brian Bix, ‘Theories of Contract Law and Enforcing Promissory Morality: Comments 
on Charles Fried’, Suffolk University Law Review, 45.3 (2012), 719–734; Jody Kraus, ‘The 
Correspondence of Contract and Promise’, Columbia Law Review, 109.7 (2009), 1603-1649. 
 
 99 
 
However, for the purposes of the current argument it is sufficient to note that one 
way, and moreover a valuable way, in which areas of law may differ is that they 
establish different types, or paradigms, of responsibility. Or, to put it differently, 
differentiating between areas of law allows us, among other things, to 
differentiate between different ways of holding agents responsible in terms of 
what that means and what consequences follow given the kinds of agents that 
they are. It allows for legal regulation to reflect different moral reasons for 
holding agents to account and in different ways. 
 
6. THE OBJECTION FROM MORALIZING THE LAW 
I argued that positivists might argue that it makes no sense to speak of a 
‘functional role’ of IHRL independently of the specific provisions that IHRL 
encompasses, given the relevant legal sources, at any given point in time. But   
positivists may not only be sceptical that it is feasible to make sense of IHRL in 
terms of an overall functional role. They may further be concerned that the 
functional role approach unduly imposes moral values on the law. Defenders of 
positivism have generally sought to emphasise that values and law need to be 
kept apart when determining the law on any given subject matter. Their concern 
has been that where any kind of value talk enters the analysis of law, a neutral 
and objective study of what the law is, as opposed to what it should be, becomes 
impossible.  
 
The reason positivists are so concerned that value considerations might distort 
the law can be found in their account of international law. As I mentioned above, 
positivists define international law as those rules which states consent to,
155
 and 
the reason why states consent to international law, generally speaking, is that is 
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 Hans Kelsen, Principles Of International Law, 438-39 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d. rev. 
ed.1966); Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’, pp.413-442; Ratner and 
Slaughter, ‘Appraising The Methods Of International Law’, p.2. 
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in their interest to do so.
156
 On this view, it would seem that if international law 
has any particular role to play, it is to facilitate cooperation between states that 
benefit from this cooperation. Positivists do not have to be committed to a realist 
view that states will only consent to rules which are in their direct national 
interest. However, on a positivist account international law ultimately depends 
on the consent of states. In other words, the content of international legal rules 
can, and indeed must, be derived from an observation of the different sources 
which express state consent (e.g. treaties and custom evidenced by state 
practice). Such an identification of international law does however explicitly not 
involve any value considerations. In fact, in order to study international law 
scientifically or objectively, positivists insist that practitioners absolutely must 
refrain from bringing in any particular moral convictions.
157
 On this account, any 
theorising which goes beyond thinking about how to best establish what states 
have indeed consented to would be an illegitimate attempt to mess with the 
sovereignty of states by making what the law is depend on considerations other 
than state consent.  
 
RESPONSE TO THE OBJECTION FROM MORALIZING THE LAW 
In response, it can be said that the interpretivist approach is committed to 
developing a stand on the role or role of the law by close reference to the legal 
sources that the positivist specifies. Interpretivism does not freely stipulate 
values according to which legal practice is then evaluated. Instead, 
interpretivism draws the values from legal practice itself. This is why Dworkin 
calls interpretivism a theory-embedded view of practice.
158
 Dworkin explicitly 
endorses ‘fit’ (with actual practice) as one of the two criteria for successful 
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 Fernando Tesón, A Philosophy of International Law (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1998), in 
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157Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’, pp.413-442. 
158
 Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2006), p.51. 
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interpretation: an interpretation must be able to explain the main instances of the 
practice. (The second criterion is that the interpretation must be superior to other 
fitting interpretations.
159
) So the point here is not to establish moral foundations 
for IHRL, to propose values which IHRL, in an ideal world, should embody or 
adhere to but to make sense of existing practice. 
 
The functional role explains and justifies the specific principles that are in place 
in a given area or system of law. However, the functional role does not prescribe 
what principles should be in place independently of what there is in place. In 
other words, the explanation and justification provided by the functional role(s) 
is reconstructive of what laws and principles are in place, and is not prescriptive 
as to the specifics of what should be there. 
It is true that the identification of ‘paradigms’ of a practice, to some extent, may 
involve value judgments as to which parts of the practice are most important 
insofar practice may be ‘messy’, as I argued at length above. To some extent 
only though, because the interpreter is not at liberty to stipulate just whatever 
principle or feature he deems to be paradigmatic of an area of law. It would not 
be plausible to argue, for instance, that it is a paradigmatic principle of the 
criminal law that crimes can be committed negligently only because in some 
legal systems, there are crimes which exceptionally allow for negligence as basis 
of responsibility.   
 
Value judgments also come in at the interpretive stage, i.e. when “imposing 
purpose on an object or practice so as to make of it the best possible example of 
the form or genre to which it is taken to belong”160. This is because the practice 
may be consistent with several competing interpretations; different values may 
                                                             
159
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160
 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986; Oxford: Hart Publishing, repr.1998), p.52. 
 102 
 
‘fit the practice. In such situations it is up to the interpreter to choose which 
interpretation is the best one. 
 
However, I argued above that we need such normative engagement to critically 
assess legal practice and make arguments as to whether we want to continue a 
given area of law as it stands or change the laws. Note that I do not here take a 
stand on the relative merits of positivism and interpretivism as theories about the 
grounds of law, that is, about what makes it the case that any given proposition 
that some legal right or obligation exists true, if it is true.
161
 
 
7. THE ‘IDEAL WORLD’ OBJECTION 
An objection which is diametrically opposed to the positivist objection from the 
danger of moralising the law stems from what we might call an ‘ideal world’ 
perspective. On such a view, the problem with an interpretivist approach to 
making sense of the role of IHRL is not that it imposes values on international 
law that states may not have consented to, but instead, that it is too constrained 
by actual practice. The ideal world approach would determine the role of IHRL 
entirely independently of the existing practice of IHRL and ask what function(s), 
in an ideal world, IHRL should serve. So in other words, it should not matter on 
that view what IHRL has looked like so far, whether it has regulated only states, 
or what have been its core principles. All we need to ask is what direction we 
want IHRL to go and then reform existing practice accordingly. The underlying 
idea of such an ideal world approach is that the role of theory is to offer a 
perspective as to what we should be aspiring to, unencumbered by judgments of 
practicality.
 162
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RESPONSE TO THE ‘IDEAL WORLD’ OBJECTION 
I will take no view here on the general merit on ideal world approaches to legal 
or political theory.
163
 The question I aim to answer in this thesis, however, is a 
question directly concerned with existing practice: my discussion aims to inform 
the legal policy debate as to whether IHRL should be extended to MNCs and 
other business entities. And since my interest is in this very specific question 
about the reform of existing legal practice it makes sense to start from existing 
institutions and practices. I therefore ask what role IHRL can best be understood 
to play, as it currently stands, and what normative as well as practical 
implications it would have for the existing practice of IHRL to be extended to 
business entities (and whether IHRL could address the motivations that underlie 
calls for such an extension in the first place), rather than develop a theory of 
what role IHRL should play in an ideal world. 
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8. THE OBJECTION FROM ‘HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE’  
Finally, another possible objection deserves to be mentioned – we may call this 
the objection from ‘human rights discourse’. Some commentators in the current 
debate on human rights accountability of business have suggested that the very 
fact that there is increasing evidence in the practice of IHRL (e.g. the 
development of ‘soft law’ such as the UN Guiding Principles, or the activities of 
various human rights bodies on the topic of ‘business and human rights’) and 
increasing mention of the notion of business accountability under IHRL can as 
such be interpreted as support for the conclusion that at least part of the role of 
IHRL is to protect important human interests against business entities. While 
commentators do not commonly put this forward as an explicit ‘method’, we 
might consider this approach to be a method of determining the role of IHRL 
insofar as commentators use reference to public discourse and to individual legal 
cases to support the conclusion that the point of IHRL is to regulate all actors 
who have the capacity to harm important human interests, including business 
entities: e.g. Clapham writes - “[T]hrough the analysis of recent human rights 
cases we can elaborate ideas in order to develop an understanding of the 
importance of human rights accountability for [non-state actors]”. He argues that 
this is a way to “[r]ethinking […] human rights obligations.”164  
 
RESPONSE TO THE OBJECTION FROM ‘HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE’ 
While the interpretivist approach also draws on cases in international human 
rights law jurisprudence to develop an understanding of the role of IHRL, it does 
not take individual cases alone to lend support to any conclusions about the role 
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of the practice. The human rights discourse method faces the immediate problem 
that existing practice, both linguistic and legal, is not coherent, and different 
participants in the practice disagree as to what IHRL is about. Individual cases 
therefore may lend support to different conclusions - how different participants 
interpret the significance of human rights cases, and whether, for instance, they 
think that they lend support to the conclusion that human rights duties should be 
extended to businesses, depends itself on those participants’ commitments about 
the point of IHRL in the first place. In other words, to assess individual cases we 
first need a more general understanding of the role of IHRL that can offer 
reasons for why some parts of the linguistic and legal practice are better than 
others.
165
 In this thesis I aim to interpret IHRL in a way that makes it consistent 
and gives it a rationale. I argued above that without a normative case in terms of 
its functional role, any part of existing practice might be seen as contingent or 
accidental – so appealing to some parts of the practice in an unsystematic way, 
that is without such supporting, normative arguments, as such cannot resolve 
disagreements as to whether or not IHRL should be extended to business 
entities. In other words, when looking at a particular case we must have one eye 
on the matter at hand and its peculiarities and another eye firmly on what 
deciding this case in a particular way might mean for this body of law as a 
whole. 
 
Again, I should stress that my thesis does not offer a legal analysis – so arguing 
that certain parts of the practice are not justifiable in terms of the function al role 
of IHRL is different from saying that these are not part of actual legal practice. I 
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do not take a view here on legal interpretation as such and whether a rule should 
not be taken to be legally binding unless it can be justified by a moral value.
166
 
 
9. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I addressed a number of possible objections to the functional role 
approach that I proposed in the previous chapter. Some of these objections 
disputed the very idea of ‘functional role’ of an area of law (the objection from 
arbitrariness and the objection from disagreement on functional roles) or took 
issue with the idea that areas of law should be understood in terms of distinct 
conceptions of agent responsibility (the objection from a consequence-based 
approach to law), others were directed at the interpretivist methodology I 
propose for arriving at an account of the respective functional role(s) of an area 
of law (the objections from moralizing, the law, the ‘ideal world’ objection and 
the objection from ‘human rights discourse’). Having explained why I do not 
take these different possible objections to undermine my project, in the 
following chapter I will apply the methodology proposed to international human 
rights law. 
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CHAPTER 4: INTERPRETING THE FUNCTIONAL ROLE OF IHRL 
4A: DEFINING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The terms ‘human rights law’ or ‘international human rights law’ are sometimes 
used in different ways in the literature and policy debate. In particular, I argued 
that in the current business-and-human rights debate, commentators sometimes 
include international criminal law and extraterritorial tort mechanisms in their 
understanding of (international) human rights law.
167
 To avoid confusion, it will 
be useful to clarify the understanding of IHRL that this thesis relies on. In the 
following, I will outline the different sources of IHRL and explain to what extent 
they will be drawn upon in the following.  
 
There is no one overall regime of human rights obligations at the international 
level. Rather, international human rights law comprises a number of different 
regional and global regimes based on distinct treaties and implemented by 
distinct institutions. However, as will be seen, these different regimes share core 
structural features and substantive principles and so I argue that it makes sense 
to conceive of IHRL as one overall area of international law, and to speak of an 
overarching functional role of this area of law.  
 
2. SOURCES OF IHRL 
2.1 TREATY LAW VERSUS CUSTOMARY LAW 
To begin with, there are different types of sources of international human rights 
law. Like any type of public international law, IHRL is made up of both treaties 
and customary law. Treaties and customary law are generally considered the two 
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most important sources of international law.
168
 Treaties, for the purposes of 
international law, are defined as “international agreements concluded between 
States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a 
single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its 
particular designation.” 169 Customary law, by contrast, is defined as 
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”.170 
Custom has generally been understood as constituted of two elements, the 
‘objective’ element of state practice coupled with the ‘subjective’ element of 
opinio juris – in other words, custom is defined as state practice where it is 
coupled with the belief of states that their practice is legally obligatory.
171
  
 
In outlining the particular characteristics of IHRL in the following I will 
exclusively draw on human rights treaty law. There are two reasons for this: on 
the one hand, customary law is notoriously difficult to identify in 
                                                             
168
 Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which is generally 
considered the authoritative list of the sources of international law, names them first. It 
stipulates:  
“The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as 
are submitted to it, shall apply:  
International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized 
by the contesting states; 
International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
[…] judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” 
169
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Art.2.1a. 
170
 Article 38(1) b, Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
171
 This two-element account was famously confirmed by the ICJ in the famous case of Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Nicaragua v USA (merits), I.C.J. Reports 
1986, 14, at 97. For discussions regarding several difficulties surrounding the identification of 
customary law, such as the difficulty of determining the ‘beliefs’ of states, or the difficulty of 
even distinguishing the ‘subjective’ and ‘objective‘ elements of custom, see, for instance, 
Anthony A. D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1971); Anthea E. Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary 
International Law: A Reconciliation’, American Journal of International Law, 95.4 (2001), 757-
791. 
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uncontroversial terms and there is no definite list of customary norms and their 
precise content. Given that the aim of the current chapter is to give an account of 
the accepted paradigms of the practice, customary law does not constitute an 
appropriate source. In the following, ‘international human rights law’ therefore 
exclusively refers to those international norms established by treaty law and 
interpreted by the respective international human rights institutions (IHRIs) that 
interpret and implement these norms. And on the other hand, and more 
importantly, the different international human rights courts and monitoring 
bodies all work with explicit regard to their respective treaty regimes and so 
international human rights law is primarily developed through treaty law. 
The ratification rates of international human rights treaties are high and all states 
have assumed legal obligations under at least one international human rights 
treaty, and customary law can be argued to develop in the shadow of treaty law 
in the field of human rights.   
 
2.2 JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND SCHOLARLY LITERATURE 
“Judicial decisions” as well as “the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations” are formally recognized as “subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of [international] law”, in other words, they are 
recognized as a subsidiary source of international law.
172
 The chapter will also 
draw on judicial decisions of the regional courts and the general comments of 
the UN human rights bodies, as well as the scholarly literature on human rights 
when interpreting the role played by IHRL. 
 
 
 
                                                             
172
 Article 38(1) d of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Also see Peter Malanczuk, 
Akehurst’s Modern Introduction To International Law, (7th edn., London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 
51-52.  
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2.3 SOFT LAW 
Some authors also include so-called soft law international human rights 
standards in their account of international human rights law. Soft law may be 
defined as those international instruments that set standards for states and 
international organizations which deal with similar subject matter as 
international treaties, however are not legally binding. As such, they can be 
defined as guidelines of conduct which despite not being legally binding 
nevertheless have some weight as political maxims and have been described as 
operating in a grey zone between law and politics.
173
 Examples for international 
human rights soft law in the area of corporations and human rights would, for 
instance, include the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
174
 or the 
ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises,
175
 and more recently the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights.
176
 
 
 Soft law can be an important source for international lawyers insofar as soft law 
instruments may be considered indicative of the opinio juris of states when 
determining customary law, or may indicate the direction of development of 
hard legal standards.
177
 But as this thesis aims to assess whether a development 
of human rights duties for business entities under international law would be 
                                                             
173
 Malanczuk, ibid., p.54. 
174
 Available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/  
175
 Available at http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_094386/lang--en/index.htm  
176
 UNHRC (2011) A/HRC/17/31, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, John Ruggie; Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’. Also see John G. Ruggie, ‘Business 
and Human Rights – the Evolving International Agenda’, American Journal of International 
Law, 101.4 (2007), 819-840. 
177
 Alan Boyle, ‘Soft Law in International Law-Making’, in International Law, ed. by Malcolm 
Evans (3
rd
 edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010), pp.122-14. See Prosper Weil, ‘Towards 
Relative Normativity in International Law?’, American Journal of International Law, 77 (1983), 
413-442, for a critique of the concept of soft law.  
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desirable at all, I will not draw on these soft law instruments in interpreting the 
functional role of IHRL. I will, however, discuss business-human rights soft law 
instruments (and in particular the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights) at a later point where the thesis looks at what an extension of 
IHRL to businesses may look like and what would be the practical implications 
of such an extension. 
 
3. REGIONAL AND GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY REGIMES 
The previous section introduced the different types of sources of IHRL and 
which of them will be relevant for the current discussion. Another important 
distinction needs to be made when defining IHRL - there are several distinct 
international human rights law treaty regimes which in turn establish distinct 
human rights systems with their respective monitoring bodies and courts.
178
  
Most commonly, a distinction is made between two broad areas of international 
human rights treaty law: on the one hand, there are the human rights treaties of 
different regional organizations that make up what we may call regional human 
rights law; then there are the human rights treaties of the United Nations (UN) 
on the other hand. Any UN member state can become a signatory of each of 
these treaties and thereby accept their bindingness. The UN treaties therefore 
have a potentially much wider applicability than regional treaties, and are also 
referred to as global human rights law. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
178
 Jörg Künzli, Zwischen Rigidität und Flexibilität: Der Verpflichtungsgrad internationaler 
Menschenrechte (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 2001), p.24; Stephen Gardbaum, ‘Human 
Rights as International Constitutional Rights’, European Journal of International Law, 19.4 
(2008), 749-768. 
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3.1 REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
The regional human rights treaties most prominently include the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)
179
 and the 
European Social Charter (ESC) which apply to members of the Council of 
Europe (CoE)
180
 and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)
181
 
which applies to members of the Organisation of American States (OAS)
182
. 
They also encompass the Arab Charter on Human Rights
183
 which is binding on 
members of the Council of the League of Arab States
184
 and the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)185 which is valid for members of the 
African Union (AU)
186
. 
 
The ECHR stipulates basic physical integrity rights
187
 and a range of what are 
commonly referred to as civil-political rights.
188
 The ECHR also includes the 
                                                             
179
 For the full text of the ECHR, see http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf  
180
 For the website of the Council of Europe, see http://hub.coe.int/  
181
 For the full text of the ACHR, see http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-
32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights.pdf      
182
 For the website of the Organization of American States, see http://www.oas.org/en/default.asp 
Note that the American Convention does not apply to all the member states of the Organization 
of American States but only to those which have explicitly ratified the Convention. The twenty-
four states (of the thirty-five OAS member states) that are parties to the Inter-American 
Convention include: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
Trinidad and Tobago were a party until denouncing membership in 1998.  
183
 For the full text of the Arab Charter on Human Rights, see 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/loas2005.html  
184
 For the website of the Council of the League of Arab States, see 
www.lasportal.org/wps/portal/en/home_page  
185
 For the full text of the ACHPR, see  http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ 
186
 For the website of the African Union, see http://www.au.int/en/  
187
 In particular, the right to life (Article 2) and the right not to be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3 “Prohibition of torture”). 
188
 The right not to be held in slavery or servitude or to be required to perform forced or 
compulsory labour (Article 4 “Prohibition of slavery and forced labour”); the right to liberty and 
security (Article 5); the right to a fair trial (Article 6); the right not to be punished without law 
(Article 7); the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8); the right to freedom of 
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right to education
189
 which is commonly thought of as a socio-economic right, 
however is phrased in primarily negative terms in the European Convention.
190
  
The ECHR also stipulates that the enjoyment of all Convention rights is to be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
191
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
thought, conscience and religion (Article 9); the right to freedom of expression (Article 10); the 
right to freedom of assembly and association (Article 11); the right to marry (Article 12); and the 
right to an effective remedy before a national authority (Article 13). 
189
 The right to education is laid down in Article 2 of the 1952 Protocol to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
190
 It reads “No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions 
which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of 
parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religions and 
philosophical convictions.” (Article 2 of the 1952 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).  
Note that I do not subscribe to the view that a clear distinction can be made between ‘positive’, 
that is socio-economic rights, and ‘negative’, that is civil-political rights. See, for instance, Colm 
O’Cinneide, ‘A Modest Proposal: Destitution, State Responsibility and the European Convention 
on Human Rights’, European Human Rights Law Review, 5 (2008), 583-605; and Elizabeth 
Palmer, ‘Protecting Socio-Economic Rights Through the European Convention on Human 
Rights: Trends and Developments in the European Court of Human Rights’, Erasmus Law 
Review, 2.4 (2009), 397-425 for arguments that the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights, for instance, has increasingly developed positive obligations to provide for basic 
socio-economic rights despite its original focus on civil and political rights. 
Also see Henry Shue’s argument that both categories of rights establish positive as well as 
negative duties in Henry Shue, Basic Rights (1980; 2
nd
 edn., Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1996). 
191
 Article 14 ECHR. A number of Optional Protocols which have been ratified since the entry 
into force of the Convention itself have added further rights. These Protocols have not all been 
signed by all CoE member states and are hence not binding on all states. Optional Protocol 1 has 
added rights to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, education, and to free education. Optional 
Protocol 4 had added the right not to be imprisoned for debt, the right to freedom of movement, 
the right of nationals not to be expelled from the state to which they belong, and the right of 
aliens not to be collectively expelled. Optional Protocol 6 has abolished the death penalty except 
in time of war. Optional Protocol 7 stipulates procedural safeguards regarding the expulsion of 
aliens, the right of appeal in criminal proceedings, the right to compensation for wrongful 
conviction, the right not to be tried or punished twice in the same state for the same offence, and 
the equal right of spouses under the law. Optional Protocol 12 outlaws discrimination in relation 
to any legal right (i.e. not just Convention rights). Optional Protocol 13 abolishes the death 
penalty even in time of war. All quoted after Steven Greer, The European Convention On 
Human Rights: Achievements, Problems And Prospects (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), p.22. 
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The ACHR covers similar rights – like the ECHR it focuses on civil and political 
rights
192
 and physical integrity rights
193
. In addition, it includes an article which 
stipulates that states parties should progressively realize socio-economic 
rights.
194
  
 
The European Social Charter (ESC)
195
 sets out social and economic human 
rights for the Council of Europe countries, including the rights to housing,
196
 
health,
197
 to work
198
 and rights concerning just, safe and healthy conditions of 
                                                             
192
 In particular, it includes the right to juridical personality (Article 3); the right to freedom from 
slavery (Article 6); the right to personal liberty (Article 7); the right to a fair trial (Article 8); the 
right to freedom from ex post facto laws (Article 9); the right to compensation for miscarriage of 
justice (Article 10); the right to privacy (Article 11); the right to freedom of conscience and 
religion (Article 12); the right to freedom of thought and expression (Article 13, also Article 14 
“Right of Reply” to “inaccurate or offensive statements or ideas disseminated to the public in 
general by a legally regulated medium of communication”); the right of assembly (Article 15); 
the right of freedom of association (Article 16); rights of the family (Article 17); the right to a 
name (Article 18); rights of the child (Article 19); the right to property (Article 21); the right to 
freedom of movement and residence (Article 22). 
193
 In particular, the right to life (Article 4); the right to humane treatment (Article 5); 
194
 The precise wording of Article 26 of the ACHR reads that states should “adopt measures […] 
with a view to achieving progressively, by legislation or other appropriate means, the full 
realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural 
standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States as amended by the 
Protocol of Buenos Aires.” 
195
 For the full text of the European Social Charter, see 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/TreatiesIndex_en.asp.  
196
 Article 31 European Social Charter. 
197
 ESC Article 11 (right to health) and Article 13 (right to social and medical assistance) 
198
 ESC Article 1. 
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employees,
199
 as well as a range of other workers’ rights200 and rights to social 
security and benefits.
201
 
 
I should mention that while the distinction between civil-political human rights 
on one hand and socio-economic human rights on the other is useful in providing 
a broad description of international human rights treaty regimes, it is not a 
conceptually tight distinction, as has been argued by many scholars.
202
 On the 
one hand, one of the primary arguments that has been made to entertain this 
distinction – namely that civil and political rights primarily require states to 
refrain from interfering with individual freedoms, while socio-economic rights 
are about the (costly) provision of goods and services – has been shown to be 
unconvincing. Both socio-economic and civil-political rights give rise to both 
positive and negative duties. For instance, socio-economic rights among others 
impose duties on states to refrain from interfering with the individual freedom to 
form or join trade unions, or to seek work freely. In a similar vein, civil-political 
rights not only require states to refrain from interfering with the freedoms of 
individuals, but also give rise to duties with respect to the maintenance of costly 
infrastructure, including for instance a functioning court system, where the 
minimum living conditions for prisoners are respected, the provision of legal aid, 
or the holding of free and fair elections. It is also increasingly recognized in 
                                                             
199
 Article 2 (just conditions of work); Article 3 (safe and healthy working conditions); Article 4 
(fair remuneration); Articles 5 and 6 (rights to organize and bargain collectively); Article 7 
(rights of children and young persons to particular protections with regard to employment; 
Article 8 (rights of employed women to protections of maternity); Articles 9 and 10 (right to 
vocational guidance and training); Article 15 (right of persons with disabilities to independence, 
social integration and participation in the life of the community); Articles 16 and 17 (rights of 
families and children to particular social, legal and economic protections); 
200
 Articles 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and 29. 
201
 Articles 12 (social security); Article 23 (particular right of elderly persons to social 
protection); Article 14 (social welfare services);  
202 Such as Colm O’Cinneide or Henry Shue, see fn.190.  
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international jurisprudence that meaningful enjoyment of civil-political as well 
as socio-economic rights is often interlinked.
203
  
 
Of the regional human rights systems the European system is generally 
considered to be the most developed and efficient of the regional human rights 
systems.
204
 Other human rights bodies routinely refer to the jurisprudence of the 
European court in their own judgments and opinions.
205
 It will therefore be 
discussed in most detail here. The Inter-American human rights system has also 
been increasingly active in recent years and will provide the second example 
discussed here.  
 
There are two reasons for why I will not draw on the Arab and African human 
rights systems in this thesis. First, the debate concerning business entities and 
human rights has primarily concerned multinational corporations which are 
under the jurisdiction of states under the European and the Inter-American 
system. Since one central question of this thesis is whether IHRL would provide 
a suitable and effective mechanism to legally regulate non-state actors, it makes 
sense to focus on those human rights systems which have established an 
                                                             
203
 See O’Cinneide, ‘A Modest Proposal: Destitution, State Responsibility and the European 
Convention on Human Rights’, pp.583-605, for the argument that state action or inaction that 
leads to the destitution, degrading living conditions or similar manifestations of extreme poverty 
of individuals, should under certain circumstances be considered as constituting a violation of the 
ECHR. In other words, this would mean that the ECHR, which is generally considered to only 
protect civil and political rights, could under certain circumstances be interpreted as protecting 
socio-economic rights. Also see Mantouvalou’s argument for the inter-relatedness of civil-
political and socio-economic rights in Conor Gearty and Virginia Mantouvalou, Debating Social 
Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011). 
204
 Steven Greer, The European Convention On Human Rights: Achievements, Problems And 
Prospects (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); George Letsas, A Theory of 
Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007). 
205
 Gérard Cohen-Jonathan and Jean-François Flauss (eds.) Le Rayonnement International de la 
Jurisprudence de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme (Brussels: Nemesis-Bruylant, 
2005), quoted after Virginia Mantouvalou and Panayotis Voyatzis, ‘The Council of Europe and 
the Protection of Human Rights: A System in Need of Reform’, in Research Handbook on 
International Human Rights Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), pp.326-352. 
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effective practice to start from. Secondly, both the African and the Arab system 
are still in their infancy
206
 and have arguably not established enough of a 
practice to speak of their paradigmatic principles and structural features.  
 
3.2 GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
At UN level, there are nine international human rights treaties. They encompass 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). As their 
names indicate, these two Covenants cover civil-political rights
207
 and social, 
economic and cultural rights respectively.
208
 The UN human rights treaties also 
encompass treaties which focus on particular rights, namely the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). These treaties outline in more detail 
                                                             
206
 Mervat Rishmawi, ‘The Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights: A Step Forward?’, Human 
Rights Law Review 5.2 (2005), 361-376.  
207
 The ICCPR recognizes the rights to life and freedom from torture and slavery (Articles 6, 7, 
and 8); liberty and security of the person, in the sense of freedom from arbitrary arrest and 
detention and the right to habeas corpus (Articles 9 – 11); procedural fairness in law, including 
rights to due process, a fair and impartial trial, the presumption of innocence, and recognition as 
a person before the law (Articles 14, 15, and 16); individual liberty, encompassing the freedoms 
of movement, thought, conscience and religion, speech, association and assembly, family rights, 
the right to a nationality, and the right to privacy (Articles 12, 13, 17 – 24); prohibition of any 
propaganda for war as well as any advocacy of national or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence by law (Article 20); the right to 
political participation, including the right to join a political party and the right to vote (Article 
25); and the right to non-discrimination, minority rights and equality before the law (Articles 26 
and 27). 
208
 The ICESCR stipulates the rights to work, under just and favourable conditions, and including 
the right to form and join trade unions (Articles 6, 7, and 8); to social security, including social 
insurance (Article 9); the right to family life, including paid parental leave and the protection of 
children (Article 10); to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing 
and housing, and the "continuous improvement of living conditions" (Article 11);the right to 
health, specifically "the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health" (Article 12); 
to education, including free universal primary education, generally available secondary education 
and equally accessible higher education(Articles 13 and 14); and to participation in cultural life 
(Article 15). 
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what duties states have with respect to the right not to be subject to torture or 
inhuman punishment or treatment, and with respect to the right not to be 
discriminated against on the basis of race (meaning any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic 
origin). 
 
Finally, there are the human rights treaties which focus on the rights of 
particular groups of humans, namely the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC), the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CMW), the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (CED), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD).
209
 These treaties provide more detailed obligations for 
states with regard to their duties towards the respective groups of individuals 
they protect, and encompass civil-political as well as socio-economic rights. 
 
This chapter has clarified the understanding of IHRL I use in this thesis and 
outlined the sources of IHRL I will draw on. This has set the starting point for 
chapter 4B which, based on existing practice of IHRL as defined here, will 
identify some of the core principles of IHRL and develop a theory of what 
normative values, if any, make sense of IHRL. 
 
 
 
                                                             
209
 There are a number of so-called Optional Protocols which are treaties amending existing 
human rights treaties which also form part of international human rights treaty law. For the 
purposes of the current discussion here, however, they can be considered part of the respective 
treaties they amend. For further details, see http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/index.htm.  
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4B: THE STATE FOCUS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW  
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the current chapter I will apply the methodology that I have described in 
chapter 2 to the particular case of IHRL and develop an interpretation of the role 
of international human rights law. To recall from the methodology chapter, this 
will be done as follows: starting from existing practice of IHRL which I will 
identify based on the standard sources of international human rights law that I 
outlined in chapter 4A, I will identify the core principles (I will also refer to 
those as ‘core norms’ or simply ‘norms’ interchangeably) that I take to be 
paradigmatic of the practice. Based on these core principles, I will develop a 
theory of what normative values, if any, make sense of this practice of 
international human rights law.
 
 
 
To recall, the core principles encompass both what I call the substantive norms 
of an area of law and its structural features. The substantive norms include the 
rules on how responsibility is established under a given area of law. In chapter 2 
I argued that one core substantive norm of criminal law, for instance, would be 
that in order to be found guilty a defendant must typically have committed the 
wrongful act intentionally. For international human rights law, I will identify the 
norms that have shaped how international human rights institutions interpret the 
content of the duties that IHRL gives rise to and the norms that guide how 
international human rights institutions establish whether a human rights violation 
has occurred.  
 
Looking at these norms, I will argue that a consequentialist understanding of 
IHRL as proposed by the interest view cannot make sense of these norms. IHRL, 
I argue, has not simply been about ‘protecting important interests’. Instead, 
IHRL has explicitly focused on holding states to account in their institutional 
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capacities – it has been about regulating political power. To argue this, I will 
identify the following core features of international human rights law: 
 
(i) Many rights are distinctly about functions that only government can 
fulfil, or  
(ii) about powers that only states can exercise vis-à-vis citizens. 
(iii) Even rights concerning interests prone to be affected by businesses 
have been interpreted in a statist way (meaning that the interpretation 
of IHRL by international human rights institutions has reflected the 
particular powers and duties of states). 
(iv) IHRL stipulates interests to be protected in abstract terms and 
(v) human rights  duties have been interpreted progressively over time 
(vi) States may restrict human rights under certain circumstances 
 
I will then further argue that the focus on the institutional responsibilities of 
states is also reflected in the following core norms of IHRL that shape how and 
when responsibility for a human rights violation is assigned to a state. State 
responsibility under international human rights law encompasses: 
 
(vii) responsibility for human rights violations directly committed by state 
agents,  
(viii) responsibility when state agents exceed their institutional powers, 
(ix) responsibility for harm done by non-state actors empowered to 
perform public functions, and 
(x) responsibility to safeguard human rights against private actors like 
business entities. 
(xi) IHRL is not concerned with determining the direct agent of the harm, 
and so there is 
 no need to show that the violation is directly attributable to any 
particular individual, and 
 no need to prove intentional action. 
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I will argue that we can make sense of all these features if we understand IHRL 
as holding states accountable for the performance of their institutional duties, i.e. 
their duties as states. IHRL is explicitly not about holding accountable whatever 
agent has harmed a human rights interest, but specifically about assigning strict 
responsibility to a state for failing its institutional obligations.  
 
In sum, I will argue that given how the scope of human rights duties has been 
interpreted in international human rights law and jurisprudence, and given how 
responsibility for human rights violations is generally determined, IHRL is best 
understood as distinctly concerned with the regulation of political authority; with 
regulating the relationship between individuals and the governments under 
whose jurisdiction they find themselves.  
 
That means that human rights responsibility is not essentially concerned with 
determining the direct involvement of any given individual, or group of 
individuals, in harming the human rights interest at stake (I will call this ‘direct 
attributability’), as the interest view proposes, but about a state’s institutional 
duties to which the interest gives rise where the state has failed to meet its duties 
to respect, protect, or provide for human rights.  
 
This argument goes beyond the descriptive observation that states have been the 
sole duty-bearers under IHRL to date. Not only have states been the sole duty-
bearers of IHRL, but this focus on states has profoundly shaped IHRL: for one, it 
has shaped the content of human rights duties – in other words, it has determined 
how human rights duties have been interpreted by international human rights 
institutions. It has also shaped some of the core substantive principles of IHRL, 
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including the rules on how responsibility is established under international 
human rights law.
210
  
 
At a later point,
211
 I will discuss that the state-focus has also shaped how IHRL 
is implemented – i.e. how international human rights institutions enforce human 
rights obligations. I will discuss this in more detail in chapter 6 where I will also 
address whether IHRL would provide appropriate ways of implementing 
accountability for business entities, given the concerns that have most commonly 
motivated calls for business-human rights accountability.  
 
 
2. HOW THE STATE FOCUS HAS SHAPED THE CONTENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
DUTIES 
In the following, I argue that the state-focus has shaped international human 
rights law in a number of ways. In other words, the fact that IHRL has 
historically only applied to states is reflected in many of what I argue are core 
principles of international human rights law. Firstly, as I will argue in the current 
section 2 of this chapter, how international human rights institutions have 
interpreted the content of human rights duties has been shaped by the particular 
powers and responsibilities of states. And secondly, as I will argue in section 3, 
it has shaped when and how human rights responsibility is assigned – in other 
words, what the modes of responsibility are under IHRL.  
 
 
 
                                                             
210
 In chapter 2 I proposed the example that one core substantive norm of criminal law, for 
instance, would be that in order to be found guilty, a defendant must typically have committed 
the wrongful act intentionally.  
211
 In chapter 6, section 3. 
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2.1 WHAT ARE STATES?  
To explain how the state-focus has shaped IHRL, it is important first to 
understand what is special about states. States, in the sense that it matters for the 
purposes of this thesis, have a number of characteristics that distinguish them 
from private (also ‘non-state’ in the following) actors like business entities. 
States exercise effective control over a population.
212
 They exercise political 
authority, meaning that they decide on an institutional order, including a legal 
order.
213
 Through that legal order they have powers to impose compulsory duties 
and to extend rights to a population, and those rights and duties are decided and 
enforced by a structure of authority relations and adjudication. States thereby 
have powers to define the institutional structures of the state, they have authority 
to regulate the behaviour of private actors in their state, and they define how 
public power is exercised in that state. I am assuming the case of functioning 
states here, so this should be understood as a normative rather than empirical-
descriptive statement. In reality, there are of course cases where states fail to 
exercise effective control and this leads to important problems, not least in the 
context of the business-human rights-debate. However, for the sake of describing 
the normative role of states we can posit that the exercise of effective control is 
an integral part of it. 
 
As Raz has argued, states claim comprehensive authority in the sense that legal 
systems (unlike other normative systems like business enterprises) do not limit 
the spheres of behaviour that they have the powers to regulate.
214
  By controlling 
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 Stephen Perry, ‘Political Authority and Political Obligation’, in Oxford Studies in Philosophy 
of Law: Volume II, ed. by Leslie Green and Brian Leiter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), pp.1-74 (p.3).  
213
 I am not concerned here with the broader discussion of whether states can only have law and 
a legal system if they exercise effective control. For this discussion, see Raz, The Authority of 
Law, pp.116-117; quoted after Perry, ibid., pp. 3-4. 
214
 Ibid. The claim that authority is comprehensive holds even in countries that may have 
constitutional provisions that are immune to amendment – compared to the spheres of behaviour 
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the police and armed forces, states also control the use of coercive power in their 
respective territories.  
 
In other words, states exercise a particular kind of coercive power over their 
citizens that is qualitatively different from the kind of power that individuals can 
exercise over one another, or that private actors like businesses can exercise over 
individuals. While state power is of course exercised through individuals who 
take up the roles of state agents and exercise the respective powers, no individual 
can exercise those powers officially (de jure) unless they indeed occupy the 
special recognized roles of state actors.  
 
States not only have special powers that private actors like multinational 
corporations or other businesses do not have but they also have responsibilities 
towards citizens that business entities do not have. Ensuring the realization of 
the well-being of their citizens is the primary raison d’ȇtre of a state.215 Note, 
again, that this is of course not an empirical statement but a normative one: there 
certainly are states that do not act as though the well-being of their citizens was 
their primary concern.  However, such states do not act legitimately; put 
differently, they fail to live up to their very role as states - states derive their 
legitimacy from pursuing the well-being of their citizens,
216
 and the realization 
of human rights, in turn, is arguably central to individuals’ well-being.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
that private agents can regulate, the powers of states through control of the legal system is still 
much larger. 
215
 Saladin Meckled-García, ‘How to Think About the Problem of Non-State Actors and Human 
Rights’, Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy, 11 (2008), p.54; David J. Karp, 
Responsibility for Human Rights – Transnational Corporations in Imperfect States (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp.116-117, where he argues that public agents by definition 
accept the burdens of human rights protection and provision, or else they give up their public 
role. 
216
 Also see the argument of Patrick Capps, Human Dignity and the Foundations of International 
Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), esp. ch.8, where he argues that states must be understood 
as ultimately deriving legitimacy from the pursuit of the human dignity of the communities they 
govern.  
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Arguing that states have primary responsibilities for the protection and 
realization of human rights is of course not the same as arguing that non-state 
actors like businesses do not have any responsibilities with regard to the interests 
that underlie human rights. But in this thesis I am not concerned with discussing 
the precise substantive responsibilities that business entities do or do not have 
with regard to important human interests. As I argued above
217
 I take it as a 
given that business entities have more than just responsibilities to make profit for 
their shareholders. Such responsibilities may well include moral responsibilities 
not to harm important human interests or responsibilities to positively contribute 
to the realization of important human interests. However, this thesis does not aim 
to make a case for or against a particular division of labour between states and 
business entities with regard to the realization of important human interests. 
Instead, this thesis takes an interest in the form that such duties should take, and 
more precisely, with whether an extension of direct duties for business entities 
under IHRL would be a desirable development. It is therefore sufficient for the 
purposes of this thesis to argue that states, by virtue of the kinds of agents they 
are, have powers and responsibilities that are qualitatively distinct from those of 
business entities. 
 
In this chapter I will focus on how some of the special characteristics of states 
are reflected in IHRL and have shaped many of the core principles of IHRL. 
While the argument here already draws on normative reasons for why states, 
given the kinds of agents they are, require particular standards to ensure that they 
exercise their powers in a legitimate way, chapter 5 (in particular section 2) will 
elaborate on the normative case and discuss in more detail why it is indeed 
valuable to preserve IHRL to distinctly address states. In other words, while the 
current chapter focuses on describing that IHRL has been concerned with states 
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 See discussion in chapter 1, section 2.2 on ‘Arguments in moral and political theory’. 
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and their particular powers and obligations, in the next chapter I will present a 
normative argument in favour of keeping this state-focus of IHRL. 
 
In the following, I will show that the state-focus (i.e. the fact that IHRL has to 
date only applied to states) has shaped the content of human rights duties in the 
following ways: to begin with (in section 2.2), I argue that the duties to which 
IHRL gives rise are largely left open-ended and that the idea that underlies this 
open-ended, or abstract, framing of IHRL is that states are the kinds of agents 
that can legitimately make choices as to how, in detail, to realize human rights. 
This is also reflected in the fact that states have some discretion to interpret 
human rights, as I argue in section 2.3. 
 
I then argue (in section 2.4) that many of the rights recognized in international 
human rights treaties are distinctly concerned with regulating the relationship 
between states and their citizens. This holds true either in the sense (i) that they 
are about functions that only governments can fulfil, by virtue of the kinds of 
institutions they are, or in the sense (ii) that they protect citizens (or other 
individuals under the jurisdiction of a given state) from the particular powers 
that states, again by virtue of the kinds of institutions they are, may exercise or 
abuse vis-à-vis individuals. In other words, I argue that many human rights are 
distinctly about particular government functions and powers. 
 
In section 2.5 I argue that even those rights which concern interests which are 
more prone to be affected by non-state actors like businesses have been 
interpreted by international human rights courts and monitoring institutions in a 
statist way. This means, for one, that the interpretation of such rights by IHRIs 
has reflected the particular powers of states but also that the duties that are 
established have reflected the particular responsibilities that only states have 
towards individuals under their jurisdictionRelated to the point that IHRL 
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stipulates the interests to be protected in abstract terms, I will argue in section 
2.6 that human rights have been interpreted as giving rise to progressive duties, 
in other words, human rights duties may change over time without changes in 
the texts of international human rights law documents. I will argue that this is 
justifiable for states but would not be justified, at least not in the same way, for 
private actors like business entities. Finally, in 2.7 I argue that states may restrict 
fulfilment of their human rights duties under certain circumstances, or balance 
human rights against other policy considerations, which again reflects that IHRL 
has been tailored to hold states, as specific agents that hold legitimacy to make 
policy, to account. 
 
2.2 THE ABSTRACT NATURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN IHRL  
Both the UN human rights treaties and the regional human rights treaties come 
in the form of lists of rights which stipulate the interests to be protected – such 
as the interests of ‘life’, of ‘not being subject to torture’, of ‘freedom of 
expression or thought’, ‘health’, or ‘education’ - in a relatively abstract manner. 
The duties to which these interests give rise are largely left open-ended, they are 
not specified in much detail in the texts of IHRL treaties as such.   
 
So for instance, Article 3 of the ECHR stipulates that “No one shall be subjected 
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”,218 but does not 
outline what constitutes torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, nor what duties states have to ensure realization of this right; 
similarly, Article 6 of the ICCPR stipulates that “Every human being has the 
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
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 Similarly, Article 7 of the ICCPR reads “No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without 
his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.” 
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arbitrarily deprived of his life” but does not outline in detail the obligations that 
states have with regard to realizing the right to life.
219
 
 
Some rights are laid down in some more detail: Article 6 of the ECHR, for 
instance, lays down the right to a fair trial and specifies to some extent what 
conditions need to be met for a trial to be fair and what particular duties states 
have. For instance, hearings have to be fair and public, they have to take place 
within a reasonable time and have to be conducted by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. States need to presume the innocence of 
anyone charged with a criminal offense until they have be proven guilty; they 
have to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation in a 
language she understands; to provide adequate time and facilities to the accused 
to prepare his defence; to provide and pay for legal assistance if needed; and to 
provide an interpreter in court if proceedings are in a language the accused 
cannot understand.
220
    
 
But while with respect to a number of rights, international human rights treaties 
go into some more detail what duties these rights give rise to on behalf of states, 
it is true for all rights that they have to be interpreted in much more detail to be 
meaningful in specific contexts.
221
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 Article 6 (2-6) of the ICCPR does outline a number of obligations that states have, for 
instance, regarding the imposition of the death penalty; however, it does not outline all the duties 
that states have been found to have with regard to the right to life in IHRL. Similarly, Article 2 
of the ECHR stipulates that “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law” and outlines a number of 
situations where deprivation of life resulting from the use of force shall not be regarded as a 
violation of the right to life. 
220
 Article 6 ECHR. 
221
 On this point, also see Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2011), p.337. 
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In what way does the fact that human rights duties are not laid down in detail 
reflect that IHRL has been particularly concerned with regulating states? 
Arguably, it is based on the understanding that states are the kinds of agents that 
have authority to make political decisions on the precise content of human 
rights, in other words, the understanding that states have the legitimacy to decide 
how the various human rights should be fulfilled under their respective 
jurisdiction.
222
 They can choose, for instance, among different models of 
providing health or education to citizens, what type of legal system to have and 
how to realize the various fair trial rights within that system, and so forth. The 
provisions of IHRL are explicitly not attempts to define in detail what states 
should or should not do to realize each right. Rather, they require interpretation 
by states in their implementation. Evidently states do not have complete freedom 
in their realization of human rights – the very point of international human rights 
law, as I argue here, is to restrict the use of powers of states and ensure that they 
adequately realize human rights and thereby respect their responsibilities as 
states within their respective systems. What particular obligations human rights 
give rise to is elaborated over time by the jurisprudence of the regional courts, 
General Comments and Optional Protocols of the UN human rights bodies 
respectively.
223
 However, the idea that underlies the comparatively open-ended, 
or abstract, framing of IHRL is that states are the kinds of agents that can 
legitimately make choices as to how, in detail, to realize human rights.
224
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Ibid., pp.336-338. 
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 Chapter 6, section 3, provides more detail as to the specific workings of the different 
international human rights institutions and how they go about communicating or publishing their 
respective interpretations.  
224
 Note that this is compatible with different understandings of what is the morally justified 
content of any particular human right (which, in turn, should arguably inform how states decide 
to specify the legal content of human rights - a discussion that is, however, beyond the scope of 
this thesis). For a discussion of different schools of thought on what justifies the content of any 
given right, see Saladin Meckled-García, ‘Specifying Human Rights’, in Philosophical 
Foundations of Human Rights, ed. by Rowan Cruft, S. Matthew Liao and Massimo Renzo 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2015).  
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2.3 STATE DISCRETION TO INTERPRET HUMAN RIGHTS 
Relatedly, and arguably based on the same justification, is that states are left 
some discretion to decide how to interpret the content of particular rights or how 
to weigh individual rights against each other.
225
 International human rights 
institutions have the function of monitoring whether states comply with their 
international human rights duties but there are legitimate variations as to how 
different states interpret human rights at the national level. In the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR, this idea is expressed through the concept of ‘margin of 
appreciation’. Even though the European Court of Human Rights holds 
jurisdiction over all cases concerning the interpretation of the Convention, the 
ECtHR can defer to the judgment of national authorities where it considers the 
national authorities in a better position to decide on a specific issue.
226
 While the 
precise extent of the margin of appreciation and what justifies its use in 
particular cases is contested,
 227
 the general idea is that international human 
rights institutions play a subsidiary role to the national legal systems and that in 
the first instance, it is the responsibility of states to protect human rights and to 
choose how to do so.
 
 
 
States may, for instance, differ in their interpretation of what constitutes a breach 
of the freedom of speech. For instance, in the case of Handyside v UK, the 
applicant complained that the seizure and confiscation of a book (the ‘Little Red 
Schoolbook’) that he had published constituted a violation of his right to 
freedom of expression. The European Court of Human Rights argued in its 
judgment that it was for the national authorities to decide in this case whether or 
not the confiscation was indeed necessary to protect public morals (the book 
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 Pieter van Dijk and Godefridus J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (3
rd
 edn., Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998), pp.82. 
226
 Handyside v The United Kingdom, A24 (1976), para 49. 
227
 See George Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation’, Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, 4 (2006), 705-732. 
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contained what the state considered sexually obscene materials). In other words, 
the Court left it to the state’s discretion whether or not the right to freedom of 
expression indeed included the right to publish the kinds of materials contained 
in the ‘Little Red Schoolbook’.  
 
In other words, international human rights institutions complement domestic 
legal institutions in their protection of human rights; they play a subsidiary role 
where domestic institutions fail to fulfil their human rights duties.
228
 Beyond 
certain minimum requirements,
229
individual states also have discretion as to how 
to implement human rights domestically and what bodies, in addition to judicial 
bodies, to assign responsibilities, such as national human rights commissions, 
ombudsmen or truth commissions.
230
  
 
2.4 HUMAN RIGHTS THAT ADDRESS PARTICULAR STATE FUNCTIONS AND POWERS  
Many of the human rights recognized by international human rights law are 
about the particular functions and powers that governments exercise for and vis-
à-vis those under their jurisdiction. As I argued above, states, by virtue of the 
kinds of agents they are, have particular powers that are qualitatively distinct 
from the powers that private agents can exercise over individuals. We may 
distinguish between different groups of human rights that constrain these 
particular powers that states have and ensure that individual interests are 
protected against abuse of these powers. They encompass some, but not all, of 
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 Walter Kälin and Jörg Künzli, The Law of International Human Rights Protection (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), p.185. 
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Ibid.,pp.185-190, identify the following minimum requirements: States must (i) allow 
individuals to invoke human rights at the domestic level (duty to incorporate) and to seek an 
effective domestic legal remedy in the event of violations (duty to provide a legal remedy); (ii) 
investigate alleged violations (duty to investigate) and, in cases of particularly serious violations, 
to bring criminal charges against perpetrators (duty to prosecute and punish); (iii) to compensate 
or rehabilitate victims of violations (duty to provide reparation); and (iv) to prevent future 
violations (duty to prevent).  
230
 Ibid.  
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the human rights that are typically referred to as civil-political rights. Firstly, 
there are those rights that lay down procedural fairness in the way individuals 
are treated in the legal system that the state establishes. They include the various 
fair trial rights - the right to due process, a fair and impartial trial, the 
presumption of innocence, but also rights regarding the recognition as a person 
before the law or rights that protect individuals against punishment without law 
or ex post facto laws.  
 
Political participation rights are another category of human rights which are 
essentially about the relationship between states and their citizens, they entitle 
citizens to take part in state institutions – including the rights to vote and be 
elected to participate in government, and to have access to public service in 
one’s country on terms of equality. 
 
Finally, there are those rights that entitle individuals to civic status – such as the 
right to marry, or the right to a name and to a nationality, and to some extent the 
rights of the child or of the family. The interests that these rights protect 
distinctly concern the standing of individuals as citizens, in other words the 
standing that individuals have vis-à-vis institutional state structures and that only 
state structures can confer.  
 
For instance, the right to nationality imposes duties on states not to (arbitrarily) 
deprive individuals of their nationality, nor to deny them the right to change their 
nationality. One important reason why it is so important for individuals not to be 
deprived of their nationality and to have official standing as a citizen is because 
in a world where nation states do have the powers described above, and where 
states are also the primary duty bearers to provide for human rights, being 
stateless  (i.e. not being the national of any state) leaves individuals unable to 
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participate in society or to enjoy their human rights.
231
 As stateless individuals 
do not have a legal bond with any state, they can often not access health care, 
education, enjoy their property rights or their ability to move freely as all of 
these tend to require proof of national identity to prove that the individual is 
entitled to enjoy these rights.
232
  
 
Similarly, the right to a name is about the entitlement of every individual to be 
officially recognized as individual with legal standing. Article 24 of the ICCPR 
stipulates that “Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall 
have a name” - without a name, an individual does not have an official identity 
within the state structure which, like the stateless person, would leave her unable 
to claim her rights from a government.  
 
Business entities, as private agents, do not have the powers that correspond to 
any of these rights – they cannot create or enforce laws, they do not entertain the 
institutions that define the political system and they cannot confer civic standing 
to individuals. In turn, it would not make sense to impose the duties that 
international human rights law creates with respect to these rights and that 
regulate the use of these powers on business entities.  
 
2.5 THE STATIST INTERPRETATION OF ALL HUMAN RIGHTS  
However, not all the rights that have traditionally been classified as international 
civil and political human rights seem to immediately concern the relationship 
between citizens and governments, or the regulation of distinct government 
functions and government powers. Other civil-political rights, it may be argued, 
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 In this context, also see Arendt’s argument that the right to political membership in a 
community is the “right to have rights”. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), pp.292-300. 
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 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘What is Statelessness?’, 
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protect interests that are more liable to being affected by non-state actors, 
including business entities. These rights include, for instance, the right to life, 
the right to liberty and security, or the right not to be subject to torture. As 
advocates of business-human rights duties have stressed, business enterprises 
can greatly harm the interests that underlie these rights, as the following (by no 
means exhaustive) examples illustrate: 
 
One of the better known and extreme examples where business entities were 
directly involved in grave harm to the physical and psychological integrity of 
individuals, for instance, included the cases of torture of detainees in the US-run 
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq where private corporate contractors that had been 
hired to interrogate detainees directed US soldiers to humiliate, beat, sexually 
assault and otherwise torment prisoners.
233
  
 
Business entities also have capacities to affect the liberty and freedom of 
movement of their employees; for instance, private companies have been known 
to confiscate passports or identity cards of employees, making it impossible for 
employees to leave their employer or the country of employment at their own 
discretion.
234
 In many cases, businesses have come under scrutiny for employing 
forced labour. One of the examples mentioned earlier was the employment of 
slave labour by some major global supermarkets chains in the production of 
prawns in Thailand.
235
 In another high-profile case, several multi-national oil 
companies were found to have benefitted from forced and child labour provided 
by the Burmese government for the construction of a gas pipeline in Burma .
236
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The oil company Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria has been criticized as having at 
least contributed to the death of peaceful protesters against their operations in 
Nigeria by having requested Nigerian soldiers and police to clamp down on the 
protests, and of having provided monetary and logistical support to the Nigerian 
state forces, even though they were aware of the brutal methods of the Nigerian 
forces.
237
 
 
Companies have also been criticized for providing the tools for governments for 
violating freedom of thought and expression rights – Cisco Systems, a company 
that sells computer networking equipment, for instance, has been accused of 
having designed and maintained a censorship network used by the Chinese 
government to monitor and access private internet communications, identify 
anonymous blog authors and to block online publications critical of the Chinese 
Communist Party.
238
 
 
And certainly, businesses have capacities to discriminate against employees, or 
would-be employees, on the basis of the different protected characteristics laid 
down in IHRL (i.e. race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status)
239
 in their hiring or promotion processes. 
 
Business corporations have also been argued to impact many or most of the 
interests protected by socio-economic rights. Many socio-economic rights 
directly relate to employment and the conditions of employment, and business 
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can of course very directly affect many of the underlying interests. Examples of 
these rights include the right to just and favourable conditions of work which 
ensures, among others, fair wages that allow for decent living, safe and healthy 
working conditions, rest and leisure; the right to form and join trade unions and 
to strike; rights to social security and insurance; and the rights of children not to 
be economically exploited or to perform any work that is hazardous or interferes 
with their education, health or development. Where corporations do not pay 
employees decent wages, provide for safe working conditions or employ child 
labour, business entities could also be thought of as harming the interests of an 
adequate standard of living, health, and education more generally. 
 
Proponents of human rights duties for business enterprises argue that all this 
goes to show that business entities can negatively affect (many or at least some 
of) the interests that IHRL protects, and so, assuming the interest view I 
described in more detail above, it would only be logical to make business a 
potential duty bearer under IHRL.
240
  
 
The fact that business entities have capacities to impact, and indeed to seriously 
harm, important human interests seems undisputable in the face of growing 
evidence and I am not concerned with discussing the extent or nature of these 
capacities here beyond the illustrative examples given above. I also agree with 
the claim made by proponents of business-human rights accountability that we 
need much more effective regulation and oversight of business entities to 
minimize such harm, including through legal regulation. However, the argument 
that I make in the following is that IHRL, in its current form, is not simply – as 
the interest view has it – about ‘protecting the interests’ that underlie the rights 
stipulated by IHRL ‘against just any actor that may have capacities to harm these 
interests’. Instead, international human rights, including the ones discussed in 
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the preceding paragraphs, that would seem most liable to being affected by 
business corporations, have been interpreted in a statist way. This means that 
they have been interpreted in the jurisprudence of international human rights 
courts and other monitoring bodies in a way that focuses on protecting these 
interests against the particular powers of states, and on outlining the negative as 
well as the positive duties that states must fulfil for these rights to be realized.  
 
For instance, the way in which the right of life has been framed in IHRL is in 
context of the particular threats that states pose to the life of individuals. I argued 
that states, on the one hand, exercise a particular kind of coercive power over 
citizens that is qualitatively distinct from the kind of power that private actors 
can exercise over one another. States exercise political authority, which entailed 
decision-making on an institutional order, including a legal order. So states, for 
instance, have powers to decide whether or not to impose the death penalty. 
Consequently, one area of focus of IHRL with regard to the right to life has been 
concerned with outlining under what conditions states may impose the death 
penalty, and when deprivation of life that results from the use of force by states 
constitutes a violation of the right to life and when it does not.
241
  
 
Among the duties corresponding to the right to life are also duties of states to 
regulate third actors
242
 and ensure that they do not deprive others of their life – 
                                                             
241
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for instance, states must criminalize murder and they must investigate any 
unexplained death and possibly bring to justice the perpetrator. For instance, the 
duty to fulfil the right to life includes duties to investigate all unexplained deaths 
under a state’s jurisdiction, particularly those having occurred in custody, with 
the requisite independence and diligence.
243
 A refusal to undertake such 
investigations or failure to conduct them with due diligence will constitute a 
violation of the right to life.
244
 The same duties could not apply to business – 
business neither has the means nor the normative authority to regulate and/or 
prosecute individuals.  
 
I also argued that states have special positive responsibilities towards individuals 
to realize the fundamental interests recognized in IHRL – this has also been 
reflected in the jurisprudence concerning the right to life. For instance, where 
people are unable to satisfy their subsistence needs as a consequence of the 
behaviour of state authorities, duties to fulfil the right to life can give rise to an 
obligation to provide goods and medical services necessary for survival.
245
 
States also have duties to take steps to enhance the protection of life such as 
through the adoption of measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase 
average life expectancy. And finally, states also have duties to protect those 
under their jurisdiction from threats that emanate from natural or human-made 
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Ramsahai and Others v The Netherlands, Grand Chamber, 52391/99 (2007), paras 321 ff.; and 
Finucane v The United Kingdom, Reports 2003-VIII, paras 67 ff. 
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(1994), para 8.8.  
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 This happened, for example, when Paraguay refused to protect the land rights of indigenous 
communities who, as a consequence, were no longer able to pursue their traditional lifestyle 
leading to the death of some of their members. IACtHR cases of Xakye Axa Indigenous 
Community v Paraguay, C/125 (2005), paras 162 ff., and Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community 
v Paraguay, C/146 (2006), paras 159 ff..   
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risks – the state of Russia, for instance, was found responsible for a violation of 
the right to life in a case where it had failed to warn and take measures to protect 
citizens from a deadly mud slide.
246
 In a similar vein, the state of Turkey was 
found responsible for a violation of the right to life because it had failed to take 
“appropriate steps to prevent the accidental death of nine of the applicant’s close 
relatives” who were killed when a methane explosion occurred at a household-
refuse tip.
247
 
 
So on the one hand, the right to life has been interpreted with the particular 
powers of states in mind, it has been interpreted as protecting individuals against 
the particular threats that states, given their particular institutional powers, pose 
to individuals’ lives. It would not make sense to impose those same duties on 
business entities – businesses do not have the powers to impose legal 
punishment, let alone capital punishment, on individuals, and they do not control 
the use of legitimate force. (It has been argued that in some situations, there is no 
clear distinction between state and private powers, such as where business 
entities are contracted to operate detention centres or support the military in its 
functions – this objection will be considered in more detail in chapter 6, section 
4.5)  
 
And on the other hand, states have duties that are more extensive than the duties 
that businesses would have. While it seems rather uncontroversial that business 
entities can be assigned responsibilities to ensure safe working conditions for 
their employees, or to ensure that their products do not harm those who use 
them, most people would agree that business entities do not have duties to adopt 
measures that reduce infant mortality or increase life expectancy for the 
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 ECtHR, Budayeva and Others v Russia, 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 and 
15343/02 (2008). 
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population at large, or to protect individuals against all kinds of natural or 
human-made risks to their lives. Businesses, as the kinds of institutions they are, 
also do not have the same extensive duties to realize human rights. While it is a 
primary raison d’ȇtre for states to ensure the realization of human rights for their 
citizens
248
 (and with regard to most human rights for any individual under their 
jurisdiction) this is not the case for business entities. To ask businesses to take 
on the same duties that states have, even given similar or the same de facto 
capacities, would be to confuse the respective roles of states and business 
entities.
249
 
 
The state-focus is also evident in other rights – for instance, the right to liberty 
and security of the person has been interpreted as aiming to prevent states from 
unlawfully arresting or detaining individuals, and outlines the entitlements that 
individuals have once they are detained or arrested, such as that no individual 
may be deprived of their liberty unless it is in accordance with a legal procedure 
and unless the individual has been convicted by a court, that individuals need to 
be informed promptly of the reasons for arrest and any charges against them, that 
everyone detained or arrested must be brought promptly before a judge, and is 
entitled to proceedings by which the lawfulness of the detention must be 
decided, or that everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in 
contravention of IHRL shall have a right to compensation.
250
  
 
And the right to freedom of movement, as interpreted in IHRL jurisprudence, 
has focused on outlining rules that regulate the movement within, out of and into 
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 Meckled-García, ‘How to Think About the Problem of Non-State Actors and Human Rights’, 
p.54; also see Perry, ‘Political Authority and Political Obligation’, p.10, where he writes that 
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 Karp, Responsibility for Human Rights – Transnational Corporations in Imperfect States, 
pp.116-117; also see chapter 4B, section 2.1 on ‘What are states’ in this thesis. 
250
 Kälin and Künzli, The Law of International Human Rights Protection, pp. 273-302. 
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states, including rules applicable to the expulsion of aliens. States also have a 
range of further-reaching positive duties to facilitate the right to movement; the 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), for instance, 
establishes state duties to take specific measures that states need to take to 
increase the mobility of persons with disabilities.
251
  
 
And even those international human rights that are concerned with the 
workplace very directly have been interpreted by IHRIs to outline the particular 
duties that states have: for instance, the right to health at work does not stipulate 
the particular measures that businesses would have to take to provide for a 
healthy workplace. Rather, international human rights institutions have focused 
on outlining what states have to do to regulate businesses. For instance, Article 
3(1) of the European Social Charter requires states to formulate, implement and 
periodically review a coherent national policy on occupational health and safety 
in consultation with employers’ and workers’ organizations252, and states have 
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 For instance, Article 20 CRPD reads: “States Parties shall take effective measures to ensure 
personal mobility with the greatest possible independence for persons with disabilities, including 
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persons with disabilities and to specialist staff working with persons with disabilities; 
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account all aspects of mobility for persons with disabilities.” 
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 European Committee of Social Rights, ECSR Conclusions 2003, Art 3(1), p.31 (on Bulgaria). 
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duties to promote the progressive development of occupational health services 
for all workers
253
. 
 
The right to health more broadly requires states to ensure the best possible state 
of health for their population given their resources and existing knowledge, that 
health systems respond appropriately to health risks that can be controlled by 
human actions,
254
 and that they are accessible to the entire population without 
discrimination.
255
 
 
Again, the way in which these rights have been interpreted by IHR bodies has 
very clearly reflected the specific duties that states have towards their citizens or 
those under their jurisdiction – businesses neither have the legitimacy, nor can 
they sensibly be thought to have the obligations, to formulate and implement 
health policies or to provide health systems for the population at large. 
 
This is of course not to say that we cannot conceive of obligations that 
businesses could sensibly, and justifiably, be imposed in relation to the interest 
of health, however, such obligations would need to take a very different form 
from those of states. We would want, for instance, much more detailed guidance 
as to the particular conditions of the workplace, including health and safety 
measures that businesses should put in place on their premises, or on the kinds of 
health benefits to pay their employees. So what I have argued here is that the 
state-focus has shaped how the content of human rights obligations has been 
interpreted, and that if IHRL were to be extended to businesses, these obligations 
would need to be translated for businesses first. And it is certainly not 
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impossible to imagine that IHRIs could develop such a specific jurisprudence for 
business entities; however, as I will argue in more detail in chapter 5, this would 
fundamentally alter the nature of IHRL to the point that it would undermine 
what is currently the distinct role of IHRL. For now, the point made is that 
existing jurisprudence has explicitly been developed with states in mind as duty 
bearers and could not simply be applied to business entities as it stands. So far, 
IHRIs have not described or elaborated on the specific duties that non-state 
actors like businesses would have with respect to the rights laid down in IHRL.  
 
2.6 THE FLEXIBLE NATURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS DUTIES 
I argued that international human rights law gives rise to extensive obligations 
for states that would not be justified, at least not to the same extent, for business 
entities. Moreover, it is a core principle of IHRL that what duties a given right 
gives rise to may change over time. I also discussed above
256
 that international 
human rights treaties do not lay down in much detail what duties human rights 
give rise to on the side of duty bearers (that is states in the current state of 
IHRL). Instead, they stipulate, in rather abstract terms, the interests that right 
holders (i.e. individuals) have. The precise extent of duties relating to each right 
is interpreted through case law and jurisprudence of the regional courts as well 
as the UN human rights bodies over time. But what is interesting to note is that 
the aim is explicitly not to arrive at a definitive understanding of human rights. 
Rather, the flexibility of duties has emerged as a core doctrine of international 
human rights law over time and can be found throughout the jurisprudence of 
both regional courts and UN human rights bodies.
257
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 Section 2.2 of this chapter. 
257
 Greer, The European Convention On Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects, 
p.212, for instance argues (with regard to the ECtHR) that “the Court has the ultimate 
constitutional responsibility for determining what each right means . . . .[W]hether this process 
is described as ‘ defining ’ vague rights more precisely,‘determining their scope’, or ‘balancing’ 
one right against the other, matters less than the recognition that there is no scope for genuine 
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This means that rights can give rise to different, and increasingly demanding, 
duties over time, depending both on the evolving conception of what a particular 
right entails, as well as on the available resources of the state – this has often 
been referred to as the ‘progressive’ or ‘evolutive’ nature of IHRL.258 On the one 
hand, the content of duties will evolve with the understanding of what 
constitutes a violation; and on the other hand, the human rights duties that a state 
has depends on the availability of resources that can be dedicated to the 
fulfilment of human rights at the given point in time. 
 
That the content of duties depends at least in part on the understanding of what 
constitutes a violation at a given point in time finds expression, for instance, in 
the ECHR’s ‘living instrument thesis’, also known as ‘evolutive’ or ‘dynamic’ 
interpretation, on the basis of which the Convention “must be interpreted in the 
light of present-day conditions”.259 In the Court's view, it “must have regard to 
the changing conditions within the respondent State and within Contracting 
States generally and respond, for example, to any evolving convergence as to the 
standards to be achieved”.260  
 
In the European human rights system, the method of evolutive interpretation was 
first used in the case of Tyrer v United Kingdom where the question at stake was 
whether judicial corporal punishment of juveniles amounted to degrading 
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 van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(3
rd
 edn., Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998), pp.77. 
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 See, for instance, Tyrer v The United Kingdom, A/26 (1978), para 36; Cossey v The United 
Kingdom, A/184 (1990), para 35; Goodwin v The United Kingdom, Grand Chamber, Reports 
2002-VI, para 75; I v The United Kingdom, Grand Chamber, 25680/94 (2002), para 55; VO v 
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Commission of Human Rights (ECmHR) on East African Asians v The United Kingdom, 
4403/70 (Commission Decision 14 Dec 1973), paras 192-195 which stresses that the ECHR is to 
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Robinson, ‘The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law’, Leiden Journal of International 
Law, 21 (2008), p.933. 
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 Goodwin v The United Kingdom, Grand Chamber, Reports 2002-VI, para 74; I v The United 
Kingdom, Grand Chamber, 25680/94 (2002), para 54. 
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punishment within the meaning of Article 3 (the prohibition of torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) of the ECHR. The court found 
that corporal punishment could indeed be considered as degrading, pointing out 
that it had largely been abolished in other member states of the Council of 
Europe.
261
 In other words, even though corporal punishment might not have 
been considered degrading in earlier years, the understanding of the scope of the 
right, and the corresponding duties of states, had changed. 
 
Similarly, in the case of Marckx v Belgium
262
 the ECtHR based its decision on 
the observation that there had been an evolution in the understanding of what 
could be considered a human rights violation: the applicants, a child born out of 
wedlock and his mother argued that Belgian legislation violated their right not to 
be discriminated against. At that time, Belgian law did not confer maternal 
affiliation by birth alone with respect to children born out of wedlock. Maternal 
affiliation could thus only be established either by voluntary recognition or by 
court declaration. The court held that Belgian law put so-called “illegitimate 
families” under unfavourable and discriminatory conditions. In response to the 
Belgian government’s argument that the discrimination was justified on the 
grounds that “this was in the purpose of ensuring the [traditional] family’s full 
development as a matter of objective and reasonable grounds relating to morals 
and public order” 263  the court responded that while a distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate families may have been permissible at the time when 
the Convention was drafted, the understanding of most Member States of the 
Council of Europe had evolved since that time. In the light of these changes, the 
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate families could no longer be 
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 Tyrer v The United Kingdom, A/26 (1978), para 31. Also see van Dijk and van Hoof, Theory 
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regarded as appropriate.
264
 The idea that underpins this flexible, or progressive, 
interpretation of human rights duties is that human rights standards are not static 
but reflective of social developments.
265
 
 
The doctrine of dynamic interpretation of human rights has also been embraced 
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In an Advisory Opinion, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that “[a]ll the international case-law 
pertaining to human rights has developed, in a converging way, throughout the 
last decades, a dynamic or evolutive interpretation of the treaties of protection of 
the rights of the human being.”266 
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on Human Rights, pp.77. In another case, Dudgeon v United Kingdom, A/45 (1981), the Court 
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And in particular the duties that socio-economic rights establish have explicitly 
been conceptualized as duties which are progressive depending on the resources 
available to states – states have duties to realize socio-economic rights to a 
maximum of the resources they have available and with a view to progressive 
realization of these rights.
267
 
 
To avoid misunderstanding, I should note that not all the duties that socio-
economic rights give rise to are contingent on the availability of resources. 
States have a number of immediate duties relating to socio-economic rights that 
are independent of their state of wealth. They must, for instance, prohibit 
discrimination with regard to health care, education or the workplace; and they 
must take immediate steps towards the realization of socio-economic rights 
which might include the collection and assessment of relevant data, or the 
formulation of strategies and plans towards the realization of rights and the 
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Article 2(1) of the ICESCR states that “[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes 
to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially 
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The flexibility of duties is also found in UN human rights treaties which include longer term 
goals which can only be progressively achieved over time. For instance, the provisions of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination read as 
follows: “to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial 
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“combat[e] prejudices which lead to racial discrimination and to promot[e] understanding, 
tolerance, and friendship among nations and racial or ethnical groups” (Art.7). 
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adoption of laws and policies.
268
 They must also not take retrogressive measures, 
i.e. allow the protection of socio-economic rights to deteriorate unless the state 
has shown that the measure was adopted after a careful review of all its options 
to fully use its available resources. Also, some socio-economic rights, such as 
the right to form and join trade unions which do not require significant 
resources, are not subject to progressive realization. And finally, states do have 
what are called ‘minimum core obligations’ to meet the minimum essentials of 
each of the socio-economic rights laid down in IHRL. If states fail to meet their 
minimum core obligations they must demonstrate that they have made every 
effort to use all available resources.
269
 The minimum core obligations are 
elaborated in detail in different General Comments adopted by the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, but they include, for 
instance, obligations to ensure the right of access to employment, especially for 
disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups; to ensure access to the 
minimum essential food, to basic shelter, housing and sanitation, and an 
adequate supply of safe drinking water, or free and compulsory primary 
education.
270
 However, the duties corresponding to socio-economic rights are 
dependent on the availability of resources in the sense that as states’ capacities to 
realize human rights increase, their duties to do so do, too. 
 
So human rights duties are flexible over time in two ways: on the one hand, in 
particular with regard to socio-economic rights, IHRL recognizes that duties 
depend on the availability of resources to meet them. On the other hand, they 
                                                             
Other examples of such steps could be the monitoring and assessment of any progress made in 
the implementation of the plans and strategies; the establishment of grievance mechanisms so 
that individuals can complain if the State is not meeting its responsibilities. Examples taken from  
Office of the High Commissioner for  Human Rights, ‘Frequently Asked Questions on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, 
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269 Office of the High Commissioner for  Human Rights, ‘Key concepts on ESCRs - What are 
the obligations of States on economic, social and cultural rights?’, p.16, 
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depend on the evolving understanding of what constitutes a violation of a 
right.
271
 The flexibility of IHRL has been called a “hallmark of human rights 
law”.272 
 
This abstract and flexible nature of human rights duties is arguably justified for 
states: it was already argued that a core aspect of the raison d’ȇtre of states is to 
provide for the well-being of their citizens. And if the well-being of citizens is 
indeed a primary aim for states, it seems plausible that states should be held to 
account to progressive standards. Where states have greater resources, they 
should also have greater responsibilities to spend these resources towards 
increasing the well-being of their citizens. States should aim to achieve the 
highest fulfilment of human rights possible. And given the central responsibility 
that states have in ensuring their citizens’ rights, it also seems justified that an 
evolving understanding of what a particular right entails should be reflected in 
the states’ correlative duties. However, as the following chapter will argue in 
more detail, imposing such flexible duties on non-state actors would be more 
problematic. 
 
That rights are essentially ‘progressive’ or ‘evolutive’ in nature also fits again 
with the idea that HRs are not attempts to lay down detailed rules on how to 
realize human rights, but that rather they were designed to guide states as the 
kinds of actors that legitimately have some scope to interpret rights, to make 
political decisions on how to best implement human rights.
273
 Business entities, 
by contrast, are not the kinds of agents that we want to give discretion to give 
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these answers so to regulate businesses we would need much more detailed, 
fleshed out regulation.  
 
2.7 STATES MAY RESTRICT HUMAN RIGHTS  
States may restrict human rights under certain circumstances. International 
human rights law explicitly recognizes that states may restrict rights, to some 
extent, if necessary to pursue collective goals such as national security, public 
safety, general welfare or economic well-being or the prevention of crime, or to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others.
274
 The right not to be tortured or to be 
subject to inhuman and degrading treatment is the only right which cannot be 
derogated from. So in this sense, international human rights duties can explicitly 
be balanced against other policy goals. This is not to say that international 
human rights bodies may not determine that particular measures or derogations 
that a state has taken to pursue these other policy goals are excessive and unduly 
interfere with or restrict human rights; however, again the point is that the 
system of international human rights protection are based on the assumption that 
duty bearers are the kinds of agents that have the legitimacy and the prerogative 
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 Articles 8-11 of the ECHR stipulate that the rights to respect for private and family life, 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression  and the freedom of 
assembly and association  may all be restricted for various reasons, including the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, economic well-being of the country, the 
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and freedoms of others” (Article 12).   
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to make policy.
275
 What this means is that if duties under IHRL were extended to 
business entities, the discretion to restrict their human rights duties or to balance 
human rights duties against other policy priorities could not be extended to 
business agents in the same way that it currently applies to states.  
 
So in this sense, international human rights duties can explicitly be restricted by 
states, they can be balanced against other policy goals.
276
 This does not mean 
that states have complete discretion as to when to fulfil their duties. International 
human rights bodies may find that particular measures that a state has taken to 
pursue these other policy goals are excessive and unduly interfere with or restrict 
human rights. So states have duties to strike an appropriate balance between 
human rights and other policy aims.
277
 However, this is another feature which 
reflects that IHRL has been tailored to the specific function of holding states to 
account. If international human rights duties were extended to business or other 
private actors, we certainly would not want these actors to have discretion how 
and when to fulfil their human rights duties. 
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3. HOW THE STATE FOCUS HAS SHAPED THE DIFFERENT MODI OF LIABILITY 
UNDER IHRL 
In this section I argue that the state-focus has also shaped what we may call the 
different modi of responsibility under IHRL. In the following, I will identify 
when and how states may incur responsibility for a human rights violation. I will 
argue that responsibility for human rights under IHRL not only encompasses 
responsibility for human rights violations directly committed by state agents 
(section 3.1), including where state agents exceed their institutional powers 
(section 3.2), but that states can also be responsible for human rights violations 
when harm is done by non-state actors that performed public functions (section 
3.3). Furthermore, states have human rights obligations to safeguard important 
human interests against private actors like business entities (3.4). I will further 
argue (in section 3.6) that IHRL is not concerned with determining what we may 
call the ‘direct agent’ of the harm. In particular, there is no need to show that the 
violation is directly attributable to any particular individual, and no need to 
prove intentional action. 
 
In other words, human rights responsibility, as it is currently conceptualized in 
IHRL, is not only about responsibility for acts or omissions directly attributable 
to the state, but it is more broadly about the performance of the institutional 
duties of states, which include duties to perform public functions and regulate 
private actors.  
 
As I mentioned above, what particular obligations the human rights specified in 
UN and regional human rights treaties give rise to is elaborated over time by the 
jurisprudence of the different international human rights institutions (i.e. the 
regional human rights courts and UN human rights bodies). In human rights 
jurisprudence, human rights duties have come to be conceptualized as duties to 
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respect, protect and provide
278
 and I discussed several examples of these duties 
above. Analysing the kinds of duties that arise under these duties to respect, 
protect and provide, we find that whether a state violates a human right does not 
necessarily turn on whether a state agent was directly involved in the harm in the 
sense of a state agent performing an abusive act. I therefore argue that human 
rights responsibility is not primarily concerned with responsibility in the sense of 
direct attributability – i.e. it does not assign responsibility to the agent who did 
the harm that led to a particular human rights violation. Rather, the relevant 
question for human rights responsibility is whether the state failed one of its 
institutional duties with regard to the interest at stake – so responsibility in IHRL 
is about institutional responsibility.  
 
3.1 HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY STATE AGENTS 
To be sure, on the one hand IHRL is of course concerned with regulating the 
actions and omissions of state agents directly. The duty to respect has generally 
been interpreted in human rights jurisprudence as entailing that states may not 
interfere with human rights, they may not prevent individuals from enjoying 
their rights. In other words, under the duty to respect states have negative 
obligations to avoid harming the interests identified by human rights. State 
agents include all organs exercising legislative, executive or judicial functions, 
including municipal and other local authorities or state authorities in federal 
states.
 279
 So states must take reasonable measures to ensure that their agents do 
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 The verb ‘fulfil is sometimes used interchangeably with ‘provide. This tripartite classification 
of human rights duties was influenced by Henry Shue who argued that any right grounds 
multiple duties. In his language, obligations are conceptualized as “avoid (violations), protect 
and aid” - Shue, Basic Rights, p.52. Also see Mégret, ‘The Nature of Obligations’, pp.130.  
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 International Law Commission ILC, ‘Commentary – Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, UN Doc A/56/10. Also see UN Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment No 31(80), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), ‘Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’, para 4, which reads as 
follows: “The obligations of the Covenant in general and article 2 in particular are binding on 
every State Party as a whole. All branches of government (executive, legislative and judicial), 
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not harm human rights while exercising public functions, such as to ensure that 
state agents refrain from controlling or censoring the press, that they abstain 
from ill-treating or torturing detainees, or that they do not interfere with 
individuals’ choices of where to take up university education.280  
 
3.2 RESPONSIBILITY WHEN STATE AGENTS EXCEED THEIR INSTITUTIONAL POWERS 
A state remains accountable for the actions of its agents even where the latter act 
outside the state’s actual control. So when state agents exceed their official 
authority, that is when they do not implement state policy but act on their own 
behalf, their actions are still attributable to the state.
281
 Even if state authority 
collapses, say during times of conflict, and in the resulting vacuum of state 
power private groups without formal authority begin to perform state functions 
the violations they commit will still be attributable to the state in question.
282
 
 
3.3 STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR NON-STATE ACTORS PERFORMING PUBLIC 
FUNCTIONS 
States are also responsible for private actors who have been empowered to 
perform public functions. So for instance, where a private security firm is 
contracted by the state to run a prison, where an airline performs functions on 
behalf of the state in the area of immigration control
283
 or where private security 
                                                                                                                                                                    
and other public or governmental authorities, at whatever level - national, regional or local - 
are in a position to engage the responsibility of the State Party.” 
280
 Kälin and Künzli, The Law of International Human Rights Protection, pp. 98-99. 
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Velásquez-Rodríguez v Honduras, C/4 (1988), para 170, and the European Court of Human 
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 Kälin and Künzli, ibid., p.80. 
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 International Law Commission (ILC), ‘Commentary – Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, UN Doc A/56/10, para 2 on Art.5. quoted after Kälin 
and Künzli, ibid., pp.79-80. 
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firms perform de facto police or military functions, the state’s human rights 
obligations will still be engaged. If the employees of a private security firm 
contracted by the state to run a prison torture prisoners, it is not that firm, nor the 
employees, who will be responsible under IHRL but the state. Public functions, 
by nature, are the kinds of functions that states have duties to perform and states 
cannot absolve themselves from those duties by delegating them to private 
actors.
284
  
 
According to the same logic, the state will also be responsible for private agents 
who are not formally contracted to fulfil public functions but who nevertheless 
act on the instructions or under the control of the state
285
 - so for instance, 
paramilitary units or vigilante or terrorist groups
286
 acting either inside or outside 
the state.  
 
Where state agents properly secede from central control and establish a de facto 
separate authority states are no longer responsible for the actions of these 
agents.
287
 Again, this can be made sense of if the point of human rights 
responsibility is to hold states to account because as the kinds of institutional 
agents they are, they have specific powers over individuals. Where a new de 
facto authority is established, the original state no longer has these powers – and 
consequently IHRL is no longer applicable to the original state. 
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3.4 RESPONSIBILITY TO SAFEGUARD HUMAN RIGHTS AGAINST BUSINESS ENTITIES 
In light of the interpretation of human rights responsibility as being about 
institutional responsibility, it also makes sense that states not only have to ensure 
respect for human rights in the performance of public functions, but that in 
addition, under the duty to protect, states have a range of positive duties to 
protect the interests safeguarded by international human rights law from harm by 
third parties.
288
 This includes the duty to legally regulate those under their 
jurisdiction. In order to protect the right to life, for instance, states have to 
establish legal rules in domestic law to protect the interest of life, e.g. through 
the criminalization of murder.
289
 This duty would be breached, for instance, 
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where domestic criminal legislation failed to sanction certain homicide offences, 
or where it provided excessive justificatory grounds for security forces.
290
   
 
Beyond legal regulation, states have further positive duties to protect human 
rights against possible harm from third actors.
291
 States can be found to have 
violated human rights where a private individual killed another even if all the 
appropriate laws were in place. What has to be shown is that the state failed to 
meet its institutional duties – for instance, a killing could amount to a human 
rights violation where the state failed to adequately protect the victim, such as by 
providing police protection for private persons who have been threatened by 
another private individual,
292
 or where it failed to investigate the murder after the 
fact.
293
 (If, by contrast, the state did fulfil its institutional duties, a murder 
committed by a private individual will not qualify as a human rights violation.)  
 
In the case of Z. and others v The United Kingdom, for instance, the European 
Court of Human Rights found that the UK had violated the rights of four 
children not to be subject to ill-treatment, having failed to take reasonable steps 
to protect the children from abuse by their parents over a four-year period even 
though the abuse was known to social services.
 294
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The precise content of positive state obligations to protect is contested - and 
indeed has changed over time.
 295
 However, the point is that this shows, again, 
that human rights responsibility is about the institutional responsibility of states. 
Potentially, the actions of any individual under a state’s jurisdiction could trigger 
the state’s accountability for a human rights violation. In other words, the 
government need not have participated in the abuse to incur human rights 
responsibility; human rights law makes institutions accountable rather than 
holding individuals to account for personal involvement in the abuse.  
 
4. HUMAN RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITY AS INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
How can we make sense of the fact that states are not only responsible for the 
immediate acts and omissions of their own agents, but that they are also 
responsible for harm done by non-state actors performing public functions, and 
responsible to safeguard important human interests against private actors? I 
argue that we can justify these different possible modi of responsibility under 
IHRL if we understand human rights responsibility as concerned with holding 
states accountable for performance of their institutional duties, in short, if we 
understand it as concerned with states’ ‘institutional responsibility’. This 
institutional responsibility encompasses both situations where state agents were 
directly involved in harm, but also a range of situations where states have 
indirect responsibility given their particular institutional duties, irrespective 
whether they are the directly attributable agents for a given harmful situation 
through policy and/or a chain of command, or not. 
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 Hakimi, ‘State Bystander Responsibility’, p.342 argues that while there is wide agreement 
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By contrast, IHRL is not concerned with responsibility in the sense of direct 
attributability – it is not about attributing responsibility to the individual who did 
a particular harmful act that resulted in the human rights violation. So when 
deciding whether a state has violated a human right, the core question for 
international human rights bodies is not whether state agents were actually 
involved in harming the human rights interest at stake. What matters is whether 
the state had an institutional duty which it failed to perform. As the particular 
kind of institutional entities they are, states have institutional duties to control 
their agents, which explains that states are accountable for the actions and 
omissions of their own agents even where the latter act outside the de facto 
control of the state.            
 
There are a number of other principles of IHRL which underline that IHRL is 
explicitly not concerned with responsibility as direct attributability, but with a 
state’s institutional responsibility. When determining whether a human rights 
violation has occurred, both regional and global institutions will focus on 
establishing whether the facts of the violation fit that list of actions and/or 
omissions for which the state is responsible directly or indirectly, rather than on 
showing that the violation is directly attributable to a particular individual.
296
 
Both UN and regional human rights institutions will primarily aim to ascertain 
whether a violation has occurred, rather than establish that the violation was 
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committed by any particular individual – in other words, responsibility is not 
assigned to any particular individual within a state. What this means, also, is that 
states can be found guilty of a human rights violation even where the person who 
directly committed the act that harmed a particular interest protected by human 
rights is entirely unknown.
297
  
 
Even where state agents are directly involved, IHRL does not single out the 
individual officer or state agent and case names will only bear the name of the 
state. In other words, under IHRL the state bears institutional responsibility for 
actions and omissions both of its own agents (i.e. state agents) and of third actors 
if it fails to take measures to regulate those actors appropriately.  
 
And since IHRL is not concerned with the personal responsibility of the person 
who directly acted (or failed to act) in the particular way that gave rise to the 
human rights complaint, the establishment of responsibility does not require any 
proof of intentional action. IHRL does not include a mens rea requirement – i.e. 
to find a human rights violation it does not need to be shown that any offending 
individual acted intentionally.
298
 Instead, state responsibility depends on 
showing policy and decisions are either direct or negligent with regard to the 
duty, which is not itself essentially about direct attribution of harms to a natural 
person or collective private agent like a business entity. 
 
In this sense, state liability for human rights violations is strict – it is established 
regardless of individual culpability. Again, this is justified insofar as 
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international human rights law is concerned with deciding when a state has 
failed its institutional responsibilities.  
 
5. AGAINST THE STATIST INTERPRETATION – DOES IHRL ALREADY 
IMPOSE DUTIES ON BUSINESS ENTITIES? 
The argument has sometimes been made that IHRL already applies to non-state 
actors, including business entities. This might be taken as an argument against 
my interpretation of IHRL as focused on the institutional responsibilities of 
states. In this vein, Clapham has argued, for instance, that “[r]egional human 
rights bodies have been faced with a number of cases where the direct 
perpetrator of the human rights abuse was a non-state actor”.299 However, the 
examples then offered in favour of the argument that human rights already apply 
in the private sphere are all cases where human rights institutions have defined 
the duties of states how to protect individuals from “human rights abuses 
committed by non-state actors",
300
 in other words, where human rights treaties 
have taken what is also called horizontal effect.
301
 The case law that Clapham 
refers to has, for instance, required states to put in place regulations for entities 
that pollute,
302
 or to prevent employers from engaging in anti-union practices.
303
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However, the fact that private actors are indirectly subject to IHRL insofar as the 
laws that states enact must promote human rights does not contradict my 
argument that responsibility in IHRL is about the responsibility of states: the 
examples of such indirect effect are precisely examples of such state 
responsibility. As the kinds of agents that states are, they must regulate third 
actors in relation to their (potential) impact on the interests protected by IHRL. 
Business entities then have legal obligations to comply with the legislation or 
regulations put in place by states, but they do not thereby have human rights 
duties. The human rights duty of the state is, for instance, the duty to regulate 
business entities that pollute, but the obligations of businesses then stem from 
the domestic law (perhaps criminal or tort law) that has been enacted to give 
effect to the state obligation.
304
 This is precisely the distinction I drew between 
responsibility as direct attributability and responsibility as strict institutional 
responsibility.  
 
6. CONCLUSION  
I have argued in this chapter that the state focus, that is the fact that IHRL has 
only directly applied to states to date, has defined international human rights law 
in a number of ways. Firstly, I argued that the state focus has shaped the content 
of human rights duties. Many rights are about functions that only governments 
can fulfil, or protect individuals against the particular institutional powers of 
states. And even human rights that concern interests that seem most liable to 
being affected by business enterprises, from the right to life to rights that 
concern health and safety or other conditions in the workplace, have been 
interpreted by international human rights courts and monitoring institutions in a 
way that has focused on determining the specific duties that states have towards 
individuals. In section 3, I argued that the state-focus has also shaped the 
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different modi of responsibility under IHRL and that human rights responsibility 
under current IHRL is best interpreted as about the strict institutional 
responsibility of states, rather than as direct attributability for abusive actions or 
omissions.  
The interpretation I offer of human rights responsibility in international law 
stands in contrast with the interest view of international human rights law that I 
introduced in chapter 1.  To recall, according to the interest view, the role of 
IHRL is to protect important human interests against anyone who has the 
capacity to interfere with these interests – in other words, it is about direct 
attributability for abusive behaviour. I have argued that this is not how IHRL has 
been interpreted by IHR institutions. Instead, the explicit concern of IHRL has 
been on the regulation of the duties and powers that states have with regard to 
these interests.  
It might be argued that there is no conflict between the interest view and my 
interpretation of IHRL so far: my argument in this chapter has been that 
international human rights law, as it currently stands, is best interpreted as 
concerned with the institutional responsibilities of states. The interest view, by 
contrast, is a view about what IHRL should do or should be like. Proponents of 
the interest view do not claim that IHRL has been about responsibility of any 
agent who can harm important human interests. Instead, they propose that the 
state-focus is outdated in the face of new realities where non-state agents 
increasingly harm fundamental human interests and that therefore, IHRL should 
be extended to business entities in the future. In the next chapter, however, I will 
argue that there are good reasons – both normative and practical - for keeping 
the current state focus and for why the interest view does therefore not offer an 
attractive account of what IHRL should be reformed to be either. 
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CHAPTER 5: AGAINST AN EXTENSION OF DIRECT DUTIES FOR 
BUSINESS ENTITIES UNDER IHRL 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In chapter 3, I argued that prima facie, we should not assume that legal 
regulation is only about consequences but also ask whether an area of law allows 
us to express distinct kinds of responsibility. In chapter 4, I then argued that the 
specific focus of IHRL has been on regulating political authority, on regulating 
the relationship between states and individuals under their jurisdiction. To that 
end, I drew out several characteristics of IHRL. I argued that many rights are 
about functions that only governments can fulfil, or protect individuals against 
the particular powers that states have vis-à-vis those under their jurisdiction. I 
argued that even those human rights which are seemingly about interests that 
may be harmed by business have been interpreted in a statist way, that is in a 
way that reflects the particular powers and responsibilities of states. I then 
argued that the state-focus of IHLR has also shaped some of the core substantive 
principles that guide when and how responsibility for a human rights violation 
can arise under IHRL.  
 
Now this chapter addresses the question of whether there are any good reasons 
to keep this state-focus. I will present both a principled and a pragmatic 
argument against extending international human rights law to business entities 
(and so for keeping the state focus): in section 2, I will argue that an extension of 
human rights duties to business, i.e. to non-state actors, would undermine the 
distinct role and value of IHRL – I call this the principled case against direct 
duties for business under IHRL. This argument draws on chapter 2, where I 
argued for the value of having distinct areas of law to reflect distinct types of 
responsibility, and against a view of areas of law that understands it merely in 
terms of the interests it protects. It also develops further the idea that I 
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introduced in chapter 3 that states are agents that are in principle distinct from 
business entities – they fulfil a particular role and therefore have particular 
powers and responsibilities that business corporations do not have. 
 
I discuss a number of practical issues that an extension of direct duties for 
business entities under IHRL would raise. I argue that for one, it is not clear how 
the rights focused on government functions would translate into duties for 
business enterprises and that even for those human rights that seem more readily 
applicable to businesses, new jurisprudence would need to be developed to 
address the specific duties of business enterprises. In other words, I argue that 
for human rights duties to be applicable to businesses, international human rights 
institutions would first need to translate such duties for businesses. I will 
consider what I call the objection from a partial extension which argues that at 
least some human rights duties could straightforwardly be extended to business 
entities. I argue that even supposedly ‘negative’ duties to respect human rights 
would need to be reinterpreted for businesses. I then argue that beyond a 
translation of the substantive content of human rights duties, a number of other 
core principles of IHRL, including the principles that govern when and how 
responsibility for a human rights violation can be attributed to a state, would 
need to be changed for IHRL to be suitable to regulate businesses. This means 
that IHRL could not immediately be applied to businesses and therefore does not 
provide the obvious solution that it is sometimes made out to be in the current 
business-and-human rights debate. It also means, relating back to the principled 
case, that any extension of IHRL to business entities would turn IHRL into a 
whole new body of law that would no longer play the distinct and valuable role 
that I argue IHRL to currently play in this thesis. 
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2. THE PRINCIPLED CASE AGAINST EXTENDING DIRECT HUMAN RIGHTS 
DUTIES TO BUSINESSES  
Having argued that IHRL has explicitly focused on regulating political authority, 
the argument I make here is that an extension of IHRL to non-state actors would 
undermine the distinct role of IHRL. In chapter 2 I argued that legal regulation is 
not just about holding agents to account for negative consequences but that the 
existence of different areas of law allows us to differentiate between different 
reasons to regulate agents, between different types of agent responsibility
305
. 
With regard to IHRL in particular, I argued in the previous chapter that this area 
of international law has specifically been concerned with the regulation of 
relationships between states and those under their jurisdiction, that is has been 
about the strict institutional responsibility that states have for the protection and 
realization of important human interests rather than about direct attributability – 
i.e. holding agents to account for their immediate impact on important human 
interests. 
 
I argued in chapter 2 that one value of entertaining distinct areas of law is that it 
allows for legal language to more clearly communicate, or signal, what is at 
stake, morally speaking, in a given instance of legal regulation. As long as IHRL 
only applies directly to states, as it currently does, and as long as the language of 
legal human rights violations is therefore reserved to address instances where 
states have failed to fulfil their duties with regard to the important human 
interests protected by IHRL, the finding of a human rights violation implies 
more than that an important human interest has been harmed. It also signals that 
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a state has either abused the particular powers it has by virtue of being a state, or 
that a state has failed to fulfil its particular duties in its capacity as state. 
 
This could be taken to be circular: as long as human rights duties are restricted to 
states, a finding that a human right was violated implies that a state committed 
the violation. So there seems to be nothing interesting in that discovery. 
However, the point of my argument here is that the way IHRL applies to states 
tells us about the role of objectives of the provisions. Saying a human rights 
violation has taken place indicates something about the kind of agents involved 
and their particular kinds obligations– i.e. the relationship between states and 
those under their jurisdiction and the particular normative responsibilities this 
entails for states. As I argued in more detail in chapter 3, states on the one hand 
have specific powers, by virtue of the kind of institution they are. On the other 
hand, they have specific institutional responsibilities to provide for the human 
rights of their citizens.  
 
States hold sovereign powers over their respective territories, and have the 
institutional power to define the laws and policies in their country, in other 
words, they have the power to define what is lawful and what is unlawful under 
their jurisdiction. So states are not only capable of committing violations, but 
they can do so under the colour of law. 
 
To illustrate, governments may expel certain minorities from their lands, or 
make laws to curtail the freedom of expression or assembly. While business 
entities can affect these very same interests – e.g. they may expel and displace 
people from their lands, or they may curtail their employees’ rights to freedom 
of expression, I argue that there is an important qualitative difference between 
these two situations. Violations by the state are violations under the colour of 
law - not only is harm done (i.e. individuals are dispelled, or prevented from 
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expressing or exchanging their views, but this harm is done under the veil of 
lawfulness, or under the veil of righteousness. Harm is done under the veil of 
lawfulness if the laws of the land officially legitimize the abuse – such as laws 
that discriminate against certain minorities, or laws that curtail the freedom of 
expression.  
 
International human rights law responds to exactly this danger: by providing a 
framework of what governments may and may not do to people under their 
jurisdiction, what kinds of positive and negative responsibilities they have 
towards those under their jurisdiction, including when laws are in breach of 
those responsibilities. It defines when state behaviour is abusive, and indeed 
illegal under international law, even where it may be lawful under the law of the 
land. IHRL sets out constraints on how states may exercise their institutional 
powers, including constraints on how the law may be used.
306
 
 
But international human rights law does not only respond to violations under the 
colour of law. It also addresses situations where the domestic law of a states is in 
line with international human rights standards, but where state practices violate 
human rights law – a state may have impeccable freedom of speech and 
expression laws in the books, perfectly in compliance with IHRL, but 
nevertheless jail dissenters when they exercise their legal rights, or fail to hold to 
account police forces that use excessive force in suppressing peaceful assemblies 
or demonstrations. In such situations, even though the harm done may not be 
legitimized legally (‘under the colour of law’), it nevertheless occurs under the 
veil of righteousness because the state abuses its institutional powers to commit 
the harm, or fails to live up to its duties to prevent or investigate harm and hold 
agents to account for harm done.  
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 In this context, see Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2006) on the value of legality, of using the law rightly.  
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The argument I make here is that harm that is done under the veil of 
righteousness or lawfulness is a particular kind of harm. Violations committed 
by states, or tolerated by states, deny individuals the official respect they deserve 
from their government.
307
 This is a special kind of harm to an interest: the 
wrongness of an act lies not only in the consequences but also in the kind of 
agent in play: official disrespect is wrong in a way that personal disrespect is not 
because it is using the collective and legal authority and legitimacy of a 
community to do so, even in omitting to act.
 
 
 
Proponents of business-human rights responsibility under IHRL tend to argue in 
terms of the consequences that business entities may bring about – and that these 
consequences can be as bad as the consequences that states can bring about.
308
 
But I argue that the particular role of international human rights law does not, or 
not only, lie in its addressing ‘negative outcomes’, but that it offers a unique 
framework of addressing the special kind of harm that is done under the veil of 
lawfulness or righteousness. IHRL thus plays a role that, by definition, cannot be 
played by the domestic laws of a particular state. International human rights law, 
for the first time in history, introduced the idea that violations committed by 
states against their own citizens can amount to legal violations at all. Before, 
international law had regulated inter-state affairs only, and so by definition, 
states could only violate the legal interests of other states. There were no rules to 
define the legitimate conduct of states vis-à-vis their own citizens. It was only 
after the Second World War that the international community decided that the 
protection of individuals against their own governments should become a subject 
of international law. In this way, the drafting of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and the subsequent adoption of the legally binding global and 
regional human rights treaties, marked the entry to a new era of international 
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 I borrow the term ‘official disrespect’ from Thomas Pogge, ‘How Should Human Rights be 
Conceived?’, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik, 3 (1995), 103-20.  
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 See discussion in chapter 1, sections 3.1 and 3.2 above. 
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law. States, for the first time in history, officially recognized that there were 
boundaries to how they could treat their own citizens and committed themselves 
legally to respect those boundaries.  
 
The domestic laws of a particular state can, by contrast, address the kind of harm 
that private actors like businesses may do. This is of course dependent on states 
adopting and implementing laws that prohibit harmful behaviour – in other 
words, states have to regulate the actions of business entities in a way that 
protects important human interests against harm or even promotes the positive 
realization of these interests. Examples of such regulation might be laws that 
protect workers’ rights in the workplace, like the rights to unionize and strike, 
laws that prohibit discrimination by employers on the grounds of religion, 
gender, or sexual orientation, or laws that lay down minimum wages that 
employers have to pay so their employees can enjoy a decent standard of living. 
(This list is of course by no means comprehensive and meant for brief, 
illustrative purposes only.) 
 
The argument by proponents of direct business responsibilities under IHRL is, of 
course, that in practice, states often fail to put in place laws or regulations that 
prevent businesses to do harm. This is an important point in the business-human 
rights-debate and as I have stressed elsewhere, I fully agree with the need to 
better regulate business entities. But the point is a pragmatic one that suggests 
using IHRL to patch holes in the regulation of business entities without 
considering what, if anything, might be lost in principled terms.
309
 My point here 
is that we risk losing nuance in our legal language, as I will explain drawing on 
two examples in the following. 
 
                                                             
309
 Later in this chapter, and in chapter 6, I will also look at pragmatic reasons not to extend 
IHRL. 
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A finding of a human rights violation can also signal that a state has failed its 
particular institutional duties to protect and provide for a right. Under IHRL, as 
is currently stands, when a private actor commits a killing – and the state fails to 
take the appropriate steps to follow-up, such as to investigate who committed the 
killing and take the appropriate (legal) steps, or – if the state could reasonably 
have prevented the killing – the state violates its human rights responsibilities. 
However, a murder can be committed without a state having committed a human 
rights violation – the state may have taken all appropriate steps to prevent the 
murder before it happened, and it may have brought to justice the murderer after 
the fact. In this case, a criminal court may find the individual guilty of murder 
which is a verdict on this particular individual’s wrongdoing. However, given 
that the state has met all its institutional responsibilities there is no additional 
finding on institutional responsibility. If we called the murder committed by the 
individual a human rights violation the human rights vocabulary would no 
longer allow us to make this distinction between the two distinct levels of 
responsibility involved – i.e. the direct responsibility of the private actor for the 
killing, and the strict institutional responsibility of the state for failing to take the 
appropriate steps before or after the killing. 
 
Similarly, currently, when a human rights institution finds a violation of the right 
to health this is not only a finding on whether someone’s interest of health has 
been harmed or negatively affected. It is not only a finding on a negative 
outcome. Rather, it means that the state has failed its responsibilities with regard 
to the interest of health.  It could mean that the state either failed to provide 
goods or services that could reasonably be expected given that state’s resources; 
or that the state purposely discriminated against particular groups or individuals 
in the provision of healthcare, for instance by denying people from a particular 
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ethnic background access to hospitals or denying an individual access to health 
care on other arbitrary grounds.
310
  
 
If IHRL was extended to business entities this distinct purpose of IHRL would 
be undermined: IHRL would no longer be reserved to address the specific 
responsibilities that states have vis-à-vis those under their jurisdiction. The 
finding of a human rights violation, in turn, would no longer imply that a state 
had failed its institutional duties. The term ‘human rights violation’ would no 
longer tell us anything about the kind of responsibility/ agent accountability 
engaged; it would only tell us that a specific interest had been harmed.  
 
It is important to stress that my argument here is not that states always, or even 
most of the time, have the greater capacity to affect important human interests, 
neither in a negative way (by harming these interests) nor in a positive way (by 
contributing to the realization of the interests). It is beyond doubt that business 
entities have tremendous power to do harm to fundamental human interests, as 
has been amply discussed in previous chapters. And, as is often pointed out in 
the context of the business and human rights debate, some businesses have huge 
resources that would allow them to contribute to realizing important human 
interests.
311
 
 
My argument in this thesis is that if we agree that there is a principled distinction 
between the duties that states have with respect to the interests protected by 
IHRL, and the duties that non-state actors like business have, there is a good 
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p.14 
 173 
 
case to reflect that principled distinction in legal vocabulary. In other words, 
there is a good case to then reserve the language of human rights for states. 
 
And as long as states have the legal monopoly on the legitimate use of force in 
their respective territories and remain the primary actors in regulating and setting 
the institutional framework, there is value to being able to distinguish situations 
where a business does not comply with regulation from situations where the state 
fails to regulate in the first place, or fails to enforce regulation.
312
  
 
As I show in more detail in the following chapter, there are other ways, 
including regulation under other areas of law, under which businesses could be 
regulated which would be more suitable to business entities than IHRL – e.g. 
through domestic criminal or civil regulation, or through an extension of the 
state duty to protect. In fact, as I argue, such alternative ways to regulate might 
also be more effective in the regulation of business than IHRL. 
 
3. PRACTICAL CHALLENGES TO EXTENDING DIRECT IHRL DUTIES TO 
BUSINESS ENTITIES 
This section discusses a number of practical challenges to extending direct duties 
under IHRL to businesses. I argue that for one, a whole new jurisprudence 
would need to be developed with regard to the substantive content of human 
rights duties for business entities: as I showed in chapter 4, many rights are 
focused on government functions, and it is not clear what duties, if any, these 
rights would give rise to for businesses. And even those rights that seem more 
directly applicable to business entities would need to be re-interpreted for 
business because international human rights jurisprudence has focused on 
specific state responsibilities for these rights.  
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Also, some of the core principles of IHRL would need to be rethought to be 
made suitable for businesses. Currently, human rights duties are explicitly left 
open-ended, states have some significant discretion to interpret human rights and 
may, under certain circumstances, restrict human rights. Human rights duties are 
also conceptualized as explicitly progressive over time and, for the case of socio-
economic rights, dependent on states’ resources. All these features, I argue, 
make good sense as long as human rights duties apply to states, given that states 
are the kinds of actors that have the legitimacy to make certain policy choices, 
but also specific responsibilities to provide for the realization of human rights. 
They would have to be amended if IHRL was extended to businesses. The state-
focus of IHRL has also defined the principles that guide how responsibility is 
established under IHRL – if IHRL were extended to business entities, 
international human rights institutions would have to develop standards of 
responsibility that are fit to hold private actors like businesses to account 
(perhaps it could import such standards from areas of law that have been 
developed to hold private actors to account, such as criminal or civil law). 
 
This, in turn, means on the one hand that an extension of IHRL to business 
entities would not offer the immediate solution that it is sometimes made out to 
be in the current debate. But, more importantly, it also means that an extension 
of IHRL to business entities would turn IHRL, as we currently know it, into a 
whole new body of law and IHRL would consequently lose its distinct character 
as described above. In other words, an extension to businesses would undermine 
what I argue is the specific identity and value of IHRL. 
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3.1 RE-INTERPRETING THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT HUMAN RIGHTS DUTIES  
In the previous chapter, I argued that many of the human rights recognized by 
international human rights law are about the particular functions and powers that 
governments exercise for and vis-à-vis those under their jurisdiction: in 
particular, those include those rights that lay down procedural fairness in the 
way individuals are treated in the legal system that the state establishes, political 
participation rights that entitle citizens to take part in state institutions, and those 
rights that entitle individuals to civic status – such as the right to marry, or the 
right to a name and to a nationality, and to some extent the rights of the child or 
of the family. I argued
313
 that the interests that these rights protect distinctly 
concern the standing of individuals as citizens, in other words the standing that 
individuals have vis-à-vis institutional state structures and that only state 
structures can confer. Business entities, as private agents, do not have the powers 
that correspond to any of these rights – they cannot create or enforce laws, they 
do not entertain the institutions that define the political system and they cannot 
confer civic standing to individuals. In turn, it would not make sense to impose 
the duties that international human rights law creates with respect to these rights 
and that regulate the use of these powers on business entities.  
 
It has sometimes been argued by proponents of an extension of IHRL to 
businesses that given their extensive economic powers which they may use or 
abuse for political influence, businesses can impact all the interests protected by 
IHRL, including the ones just discussed, and some efforts have been made to 
draw out the kinds of responsibilities that businesses could be imposed even with 
regard to the rights that primarily concern citizen-state relations. A joint 
publication by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the 
UN Global Compact, the International Business Leaders Forum and the Castan 
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Centre for Human Rights Law of Monash University
314
, for instance, states 
concerning the right to a fair trial that “[c]ompanies could negatively impact on 
this right if they attempt to corrupt the judicial process, for example, by bribing 
judges or jurors, or destroying relevant evidence. Companies may facilitate the 
right by helping to provide legal representation to employees who cannot 
otherwise afford it.”315 
 
And I do not mean to argue that it would be impossible for international human 
rights institutions to re-interpret, or translate, human rights duties for business 
entities and I will come back to this point. But the point I argue here is that 
current international human rights jurisprudence could not simply be imposed on 
businesses the way in which it has applied to states.  
 
I further argued in chapter 4 that even those international human rights that 
would seem to be liable to being affected by business entities (such as the rights 
to life and physical integrity, the rights to liberty and freedom of movement, 
rights to privacy, freedom of thought and religion, freedom of assembly and 
association, or a number of socio-economic rights that directly relate to 
employment and the conditions of employment) have been interpreted in the 
jurisprudence of international human rights courts and treaty monitoring 
institutions in a way that focuses on protecting the underlying interests against 
the particular powers of states, and on outlining the particular positive duties that 
states have for the realization of these rights.
 316
 I argued, for instance, that the 
jurisprudence on the right to life has been concerned with outlining what 
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measures states have to take to regulate the use of force in their territory, what 
laws need to be in place to protect individuals’ lives (such as legislation 
criminalizing murder), under what circumstances, if any, states may impose 
capital punishment, but also what further positive steps states have to take to 
promote the interest of life, such as to provide goods and (medical) services, or 
to adopt measures to reduce infant mortality and to reduce average life 
expectancy.  
 
Again, the same duties could not sensibly be imposed on business entities. On 
the one hand, businesses do not have the same powers that states have by virtue 
of their particular institutional role – business entities do not have the powers to 
impose legal regulation, they do not control the use of legitimate force, etc. – so 
it would not make sense to impose the same duties that states currently have 
under IHRL on business entities. At the same time, state duties for the 
realization of human rights are arguably more extensive than business duties 
could be – it would seem rather controversial to argue that business entities have 
duties to adopt measures that reduce infant mortality or to increase life 
expectation for the population at large.  
 
Again, it is certainly conceivable that IHRIs could develop a new human rights 
jurisprudence specifically targeted to MNCs and other business entities, and 
there have been various attempts to draft (non-binding) guidance for what duties 
human rights could give rise to for businesses. The joint publication by the UN, 
a business forum and Monash University mentioned above, for instance, seeks to 
clarify what the duty to respect could mean for business. For each of the rights 
laid down in the two global human rights covenants, the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR, it explains how each of the rights “may be relevant to a company’s 
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activities”.317 However, the guide remains rather vague in most instances or on 
most aspects of duty specification,
318
 which attests to the fact that such 
‘translation’ is far from being straightforward, as is often implied in the current 
debate. Rather than outlining specific duties for business, the guide highlights 
areas in which business might be found to harm the interest underlying the 
respective human rights in question. Just like human rights jurisprudence for 
states has evolved over decades, and continues to evolve, to specify what duties 
states have corresponding to different international human rights, it would 
require similar time and effort to develop a jurisprudence outlining the duties for 
business. 
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3.2 THE ARGUMENT FROM A PARTIAL EXTENSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
DUTIES 
I should stress that a translation of human rights duties for business entities 
would not, of course, be impossible. However, I argue that it would nevertheless 
add a number of practical challenges to an extension of IHRL that have been 
little discussed in the current debate. In the following section, I argue that an 
implicit but widespread assumption has been that while IHRL may to some 
extent focus on the specific duties or powers of states, this is not the case for all 
of international human rights law. It has been assumed that at least some of the 
duties that IHRL establishes could directly be extended to business entities 
because they are primarily negative in nature – in other words, they are duties 
not to harm important interests rather than duties to positively provide for goods 
or services to contribute to the realization of human rights. I call this the 
argument from a partial extension of direct human rights duties to business 
entities. As the following sections show, this argument is very much at the core 
of the current business-and-human rights debate.  
 
In chapter 2, I introduced one of the most widely noted and discussed documents 
in the current policy debate on business and human rights have – the 2011 
United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (also 
the ‘Guiding Principles’ in what follows). As I argued, these Guiding Principles 
have since been influential in international policy debates.
319
 What is interesting 
is that while the Guiding Principles suggest that all human rights might 
potentially be ‘impacted’ by business enterprises320, they also stress that not all 
the duties that IHRL gives rise to should apply to multinational corporations and 
                                                             
319
 See chapter 1, section 2.1 on ‘The search for consensus – the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights. 
320
 UNHRC (2011) A/HRC/17/31, ‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, John Ruggie; Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, p.13. 
 180 
 
other business entities and explicitly emphasize that the duties that business has 
with regard to human rights are complementary to state duties. In particular, the 
Guiding Principles suggest that business duties should be limited to the 
responsibility to respect – they suggest only applying negative human rights 
duties to business entities, i.e. such duties that are about not harming important 
interests: “[business enterprises] should avoid infringing on the human rights of 
others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are 
involved.”321 
 
I call this the ‘partial extension view’, in contrast to what we can call the ‘full 
extension view’ as it was suggested, for instance, by the UN predecessor of the 
Guiding Principles, the so-called Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights.
322
 The 2003 Draft Norms took a different approach to the 
Guiding Principles and proposed that businesses should essentially be assigned 
the same legal human rights duties to “promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, 
ensure respect of, and protect human rights” 323  that have traditionally only 
applied to states. The Draft Norms faced a lot of criticism for their full extension 
approach which made no principled distinction between the duties of states and 
those of businesses, and for failing to provide guidance as to how to delineate 
duties for business entities that would take account of the different roles of 
businesses as opposed to states. 
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What the partial extension view suggests is that at least some of the duties that 
IHRL currently establishes can straightforwardly be applied to businesses. In 
other words, there would seem to be no need for a translation of human rights 
duties for business entities - the partial extension view suggests that an extension 
of duties to respect
324
 would simply be about applying a subset of duties that 
have already been defined by international human rights institutions to business 
entities. I argue that this is misleading. 
The assumption underlying the argument from partial extension proposal is that 
duties to respect human rights are primarily negative, i.e. that they require 
refraining from doing harm, rather than the provision of goods or services to 
positively contribute to the realization of human rights. And negative duties, it is 
argued, can quite uncontroversially be imposed on businesses enterprises. 
However, one problem with this line of reasoning is that there is not always a 
clear-cut distinction between positive and negative duties corresponding to 
human rights. So for instance, the right to a fair trial is often thought of as giving 
rise to negative duties not to deny an individual a hearing before an impartial 
tribunal within reasonable time, not to presume the accused guilty, etc. However, 
to be able to fulfil these supposedly ‘negative’ duties, states need to supply a 
functioning court system which requires positive measures of putting such a 
system in place and of maintaining it with all the facilities and human resources 
it needs to be functional. 
Another problematic assumption underlying the partial extension view is the 
idea that negative duties would automatically be the same for states and for 
business entities. This is not necessarily the case – Ratner provides the example 
of the right to freedom of speech which requires governments, among other 
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things, to refrain from penalizing individuals for speech that is critical of the 
government. However, it might be legitimate for a company to penalize its 
employees for public speech that insults the company to consumers, or gives 
away trade secrets.
325
 In other words, different principles will be needed for 
determining when human rights duties can be balanced against the interests of 
states, and for determining when and how they can be balanced against the 
interests of business entities.  
I have argued that even a partial extension of IHRL would not evade the 
challenges of human rights duties having to be reinterpreted for business. This, 
in turn, means that on the one hand, IHRL does not offer the immediate solution 
that it is sometimes made out to be in the current debate. 
 
3.3 RETHINKING CORE PRINCIPLES OF IHRL FOR BUSINESS ENTITIES 
I further argued that the state-focus of IHRL has been reflected in three other 
core features of IHRL: firstly, IHRL does specifically not lay down the duties 
that correspond to each of the human rights but stipulates the interests to be 
protected in relatively abstract terms. I argued that the underlying idea is that 
states are the kinds of agents that prima facie have the legitimacy to make the 
relevant policy choices as to how, in detail, to realize human rights. And, 
relatedly, states are left some significant discretion to decide how the content of 
particular rights should be interpreted in particular contexts. International human 
rights law also explicitly recognizes that states may restrict human rights under 
some circumstances, such as where this is necessary to pursue certain collective 
goals such as national security, public safety, general welfare or economic well-
being or the prevention of crime, or to protect the rights and freedoms of 
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others.
326
 Again, I argued that this is justified insofar as states have the 
legitimacy, and the obligation, to make policy choices and the understanding is 
that under certain circumstances, it may be necessary for states to compromise 
their human rights responsibilities in order to exercise their role. 
 
By contrast, the same is not true of private agents like business corporations. 
These are not the type of agents that have the moral legitimacy to decide on how 
best to realize the interests protected by IHRL. Business corporations are not the 
kinds of agents that we would want to entrust with decisions regarding the 
realization of human rights. They are not representative of a legitimate political 
body and they are not entrusted with authority to decide or adjudicate 
interpretative questions of right or duty in the way that states are. They would be 
judges in their own cause, given that their interests or the interests of their 
shareholders would always be factored into their decisions in one way or 
another. As primarily profit-making entities, their main forms of ‘accountability’ 
are accountability to their shareholders,
327
 to legal authorities, and to the market 
in terms of success or failure. In short, businesses are not accountable in the right 
way, that is in the way that states are, to make decisions on behalf of the well-
being of the whole population.
328
 As a result, the comparatively broad guidance 
that IHRL provides to states as to how to protect and further important human 
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interests is not the kind of guidance that is appropriate for businesses. IHRL 
would need to develop much more detailed guidance as to what particular duties 
each right gave rise to than they currently do for states. In the previous chapter, I 
gave some examples of human rights that concern the workplace and so might 
seem particularly relevant for business entities. In interpreting the right to health 
at work, for instance, international human rights institutions have focused on 
outlining what states have to do, such as to formulate and implement national 
policies on occupational health and safety, or to promote the progressive 
development of occupational health services for workers. For businesses, we 
would want to have much more detailed guidance; we would not want to leave it 
up to businesses to decide what constitutes adequate rules on occupational health 
and safety.  
 
So arguably, if IHRL was indeed extended to business entities, the way in which 
IHRIs would need to specify duties would need to have much more regulatory 
detail as to what are the minimum standards that businesses should observe in all 
different areas of corporate activity. One question that this raises is whether 
international human rights institutions would have the appropriate expertise and 
capacities to provide such detailed regulation. But also, and more importantly, 
another question is whether this would not interfere with one of the ideas that I 
argued is at the heart of IHRL: the idea that states, prima facie, should have a 
certain level of discretion to decide how to realize human rights. This, in turn, 
includes decisions as to how to regulate private actors like business entities with 
regard to the different interests that underlie human rights. If IHRIs began to 
develop jurisprudence for the regulation of businesses in this regard, this would 
therefore raise important questions as to the proper division of labour between 
IHRIs and states. 
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And the practical challenges of extending direct human rights duties to business 
would not be limited to the determination of the substantive content of such 
duties. My argument in chapter 3 was that the statist focus of IHRL has shaped 
some of the core principles of IHRL. 
 
I also argued that human rights duties are interpreted progressively, meaning that 
rights can give rise to different, and increasingly demanding, duties over time, 
depending both on the evolving conception of what a particular right entails, as 
well as on the available resources of the state.
329
 I argued that we can make sense 
of the flexible, or progressive, nature of human rights obligations for states 
insofar as the well-being (and therefore the realization of human rights) of 
citizens lies at the core of states’ raison d’ȇtre. This arguably justifies that states 
should spend more towards the realization of human rights as their resources 
increase, as well as that they should be held to the highest standards of what a 
particular right entails in a given context at a given point in time. 
 
Imposing such flexible obligations on private agents, like business entities, by 
contrast, would be problematic. The flexible nature of human rights duties is in 
direct contrast with a principle which is generally considered to be at the core of 
law: the principle of legality. The principle of legality encompasses three related 
principles: the principle of specificity, the principle of non-retroactivity, and the 
ban on analogy or extensive interpretation. The principle of specificity holds that 
legal rules should be as specific as possible. The principle of non-retroactivity 
holds that no action or omission should be made illegal retro-actively, i.e. after it 
has been (c)omitted. And the ban on analogy or extensive interpretation holds 
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that laws should not be applied by analogy or, in other words, be extensively 
interpreted.
 330
 
 
There are two related arguments in favour of the principle of legality. The first 
one which we may call the ‘fair notice argument’  holds that it would be unfair 
to punish people for not acting in accordance with law where it was not clear 
what the law required in the first place. The second argument, call it 
‘government abuse argument’, holds that historically, rulers have used vague law 
to target and repress opponents
331
 and we should therefore avoid vague law.  
 
The reason we value that agents can freely choose to abide by the rules is that in 
liberal societies we are committed to the value of the autonomy of persons. 
Individuals should, as far as possible, be able to plan their lives, including 
avoiding breaching the law and be punished for it.
332
 Where the law is unclear 
and individuals can be punished for breaching a rule they were not aware 
existed, this autonomy is obviously disturbed. The specificity of rules protects 
individuals from an arbitrary application of rules to them. Where laws are 
loosely defined, authorities have relatively greater powers to define breaches of 
the law ad hoc and apply the law ‘arbitrarily’. The specificity of laws thus not 
only enables individuals to exercise their freedom to choose, but also prevents 
authorities from holding individually to account arbitrarily.
333
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Of course, where duties are flexible, and change over time, they cannot at the 
same time be specific, non-retroactive or non-analogous. Insofar as IHRL only 
applies to states, this has not been problematic. We can certainly imagine 
situations where international courts or monitoring bodies find states in breach 
of their human rights duties even though states could not have foreseen these 
duties when they committed to them. And it might be costly for states to change 
their laws and policies in response. But holding institutional agents to account 
still does not raise the same moral issues as holding individuals to account. 
States, as institutional agents are non-natural agents, not autonomous agents who 
must be able to pursue their individual life-plans and be able to avoid being held 
to account by the law where they could not have foreseen it (the fair notice 
argument).
 334
 To put it differently, holding states legally to account for an action 
or omission they might not have foreseen to be illegal does not interfere with the 
autonomy or agency of any particular individual. Neither do states have to be 
protected from the arbitrary use of their own coercive power (the government 
abuse argument).  
 
Business entities are not individuals in the sense of natural persons. However, as 
business entities their role is also quite distinct from the role that states play. 
Businesses are specialized organs of society which primarily exist for the 
purpose of pursuing their respective business interests, and as such they need to 
be able to foresee their obligations, and potential costs associated with them. 
There need to be clear rules that apply to business so that corporations can plan 
and pursue their business in compliance with existing standards. This is certainly 
not to say that states should not be permitted to change laws and regulations over 
time, even if this may affect businesses – negatively or positively - in their 
operations. However, given that for business – other than for states – the 
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fulfilment of human rights is not a primary raison d’ȇtre, it would seem 
problematic to impose the same progressive duties on business that apply to 
states, in particular the progressive duties associated with socio-economic rights. 
States have obligations to realize such rights to a maximum of their available 
resources – imposing the same duties on businesses would effectively amount to 
asking business to take on the role of states.
335
 
 
Businesses certainly have moral duties to contribute their fair share towards 
social justice and states should hold them accountable for these duties (e.g. by 
regulating business activities, or by taxing profits made by private business 
entities). It also seems plausible to hold that these duties become more 
demanding the wealthier the business in question is.  But if we were to apply the 
principle of progressive realization to business organizations unaltered, this 
would mean that businesses would need to realise human rights to a maximum 
of their available resources; perhaps requiring the setting up of special 
institutions, tax schemes, etc., that they have no right to create and impose on 
their contracted employees or anyone else. Whilst states have a right to impose 
specific and well defined social burdens, that being part of their role, business 
organisations work through contract and have no rights of imposition beyond 
that. 
This means that if IHRL was extended to business entities, international human 
rights institutions would need to develop different principles to determine the 
content of human rights duties for these entities. We would need different 
principles as to how much, if any, of their available budget, for instance, 
business entities could legitimately be required to dedicate to the positive 
realization of socio-economic rights such as the right to health or education. 
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The statist focus has also defined the principles that guide how responsibility is 
established under IHRL – these principles could also not simply be applied to 
business as they stand. Human rights institutions would need to develop different 
principles for determining when a violation by a business has taken place; to 
determine what modes of involvement in the harmful situation at stake would 
give rise to business responsibility. I argued that states are not only responsible 
for the actions and omissions of their own agents, regardless of whether these 
agents act on direction of the state or whether they exceed their institutional 
powers, but that states are also responsible for non-state actors that are 
empowered to fulfil public functions, as well as for the regulation of any private 
actor (including businesses) under their jurisdiction with regard to human rights.  
 
If IHRL was extended to business entities, one central question, for instance, 
would be how to delineate responsibility – such as whether only actions and 
omissions ordered by management would be covered by IHRL, or whether the 
actions of any employee could trigger human rights responsibility; whether 
businesses would be responsible for the actions and omissions of suppliers and 
sub-suppliers, etc. 
 
It would also need to be decided whose rights business entities would have 
duties to protect and realize - whether businesses would only have duties for 
their employees, or whether they would also have responsibilities to provide for 
the fulfilment of human rights of the communities where they operate, or 
perhaps for citizens of their country of operation at large. States are generally 
responsible to regulate any actor under their jurisdiction and to provide for the 
interests of those under their jurisdiction – however, it would need to be decided 
what the equivalent of jurisdiction would be for business.   
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I also argued in chapter 4 that under current IHRL, there is no need to establish 
the identity of whoever did the particular harm that gave rise to the human rights 
violation in question, and that there is no need to prove intentional action. These 
principles seemed justified for states: firstly, as chapter 3 argued at length, 
responsibility of states under IHRL is not just about holding states to account for 
the direct actions and omissions of state agents, but also about state duties to 
regulate its jurisdiction and to ensure that those important human interests laid 
down in IHRL are protected against third actors (and other natural or man-made 
risks). Where one of these interests has been harmed, the focus of determining 
whether this harm amounts to a human rights violation is therefore not on 
determining the identity of whoever caused the harm, but on asking whether the 
state failed to fulfil its special duties, whether the state could reasonably have 
been expected to prevent or punish the harm in question.  
 
To put it differently, strict liability is important when dealing with states because 
they are charged and trusted with regulating our collective life both in terms of 
intervening in and in terms of setting the background for private actors to 
interact. That means that setting those terms wrongly (and so allowing harms), 
even where that is not intended, or reasonably foreseen, brings with it liabilities 
that a private actor could not and should not bear. States, as political entities 
trusted with the regulation of political community owe us a special kind of 
accountability. 
 
If IHRL were extended to business entities, international human rights 
institutions would arguably have to incorporate standards of responsibility from 
areas of law that have been developed to hold private agents to account, such as 
criminal law or civil law; arguably, it would only be justified to hold business 
entities to account where it can either be shown that there was some kind of 
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intent to harm, or where businesses acted negligently in the sense that harm 
could reasonably have been foreseen and avoided. 
 
This is not to argue that these practical challenges of changing the principles of 
IHRL to suit business entities could not me met; and there have been some 
efforts to address some of these practical issues. Scholars have suggested, for 
instance, that corporate duties could vary depending on a corporation’s ties with 
the government, its relationship to populations affected by business operations, 
the particular human right in question or the particular structure of the business 
entity.
336
 However, it would alter IHRL in such a way that it would turn into a 
different body of law – it would no longer have the same identity that I argued to 
constitute the very role and value of this body of law. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I addressed the question of whether there are any good reasons to 
retain the state-focus of IHRL that was described as having defined the role of 
IHRL in chapter 4. I first discussed what I called the principled case against an 
extension of IHRL to business entities and argued that such an extension would 
undermine the distinct role and value of IHRL – that is, its being able to express 
the distinct institutional responsibilities that states have towards individuals in 
their capacity as states. Currently, I argued, the term ‘human rights violation’ 
tells us something about the special normative relationship between states and 
individuals – states have particular powers to commit violations under the veil of 
lawfulness or righteousness that makes harm done by states qualitatively 
different from the harm that business entities (or other non-state actors) can do to 
individuals. Where states violate human rights, the wrongfulness not only lies in 
the negative consequences for important human interests but also in the fact that 
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it expresses official disrespect on behalf of the state, that the harm is done using 
the collective and legal authority and legitimacy of a community. 
 
I then discussed a number of practical issues that an extension of direct duties for 
business entities under IHRL would raise. Firstly, I argued that for human rights 
duties to be applicable to businesses, international human rights institutions 
would first need to translate such duties for businesses, even if an extension was 
only partial and restricted to so-called duties to respect. Beyond a translation of 
the substantive content of human rights duties, it would also be necessary to 
rethink a number of other core principles of IHRL, including some of the 
principles that have guided how and when responsibility can arise for human 
rights violations. This, on the one hand, means that an extension of IHRL to 
business entities would not offer the immediate solution that it is sometimes 
made out to be in the current business-and-human rights debate. But on the other 
hand, and perhaps more importantly, it also means that an extension of IHRL to 
business entities would turn IHRL, as it currently stands, into a whole different 
body of law. This new body of law would have to incorporate a whole new set of 
core principles targeted at business entities, as opposed to states.  IHRL would 
start to look more like a hybrid of what currently is IHRL, and areas of law that 
have addressed private wrongs and the responsibility of private agents and 
developed the appropriate principles been used to hold private actors 
responsible, such as civil or criminal law.  
 
This brings us back to the principled case made in the first part of this chapter – 
IHRL would no longer play the distinct role of establishing institutional 
responsibility of states, but also be concerned with an entirely different 
understanding of responsibility. In fact, IHRL would encompass different 
understandings of responsibility - it would encompass different principles for 
determining the substantive content of human rights duties, as well as for 
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determining responsibility for a violation, that would apply depending on what 
actor it applied to. I argued that currently, the very value of IHRL lies in its 
being able to express a distinct understanding of statist-institutional 
responsibility. If IHRL was opened up to business entities, and consequently 
amended for these entities in the ways described above, it would no longer be 
able to do so. 
Having made the normative case against an extension of IHRL to business 
entities, and having discussed a number of the practical complications that such 
an extension would entail, I argue that it needs to be asked whether an extension 
of IHRL to business would indeed be worth wile. To answer that question, I 
suggest that we need a clearer understanding of whether IHRL is at all suitable 
to address the concerns that underlie calls for business human rights 
responsibility in the first place. This will be the subject of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6: CAN IHRL ADDRESS THE CONCERNS THAT 
MOTIVATE CALLS FOR BUSINESS-HUMAN RIGHTS 
ACCOUNTABILITY? 
1. INTRODUCTION  
One common assumption that underlies the current business-and-human rights 
debate is that an extension of IHRL would ensure, or at least contribute to, 
greater accountability of business entities with respect to their impact on 
important human interests. I argue, however, that we need a more thorough 
understanding of what are the motivations that drive calls for greater corporate 
accountability to assess whether international human rights law, even if it were 
extended to apply to business enterprises directly, could indeed effectively 
contribute to greater accountability of businesses.  
 
In the following, it is argued that one overarching concern that has motivated 
calls for business-human rights responsibility is the observation that states often 
fail to regulate businesses sufficiently to prevent or punish harmful corporate 
activities. I will identify some of the most commonly discussed reasons for this 
failure of national level regulation, and then ask whether an extension of IHRL 
to business entities would be able to provide a solution. I will discuss how IHRL 
is implemented and argue that while an extension of duties under IHRL to 
business entities would allow international human rights institutions to name and 
shame business entities directly, it would not lead to a straight enforcement of 
human rights duties by IHRIs. This is because IHRL relies for its 
implementation on state action. In other words, an extension of IHRL to 
businesses would not provide an immediate solution to national enforcement 
gaps where states are unable or unwilling to regulate companies. 
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In section 4, I will then argue that beyond the common concern from lack of 
national regulation, we can identify a number of distinct motivations that 
underlie calls for human rights accountability. While a comprehensive 
discussion of all the different ways in which business may harm human rights is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, in the following discussion I will draw on a 
number of typical situations in which business entities have been found to harm 
human rights and identify different reasons for why commentators call for 
business-human rights accountability: in some cases, I argue that (i) 
commentators draw on IHRL because IHRL provides international minimum 
standards that offer a frame of reference where national standards are lacking. 
Calls for human rights accountability’ of businesses can also be (ii) calls for 
material compensation for damage caused by corporate activities ; or (iii) calls to 
punish corporate actors for wrongdoing, to prevent impunity for abusive 
behaviour where national criminal laws are not enforced. Finally, (iv) calls for 
corporate human rights accountability can also be calls not for legal 
accountability but for ‘corporate social responsibility’ more broadly speaking, 
for businesses to positively use their powers and capacities to contribute to the 
realization of important human interests. 
 
For each of these, I will discuss to what extent IHRL is suitable to address these 
distinct motivations. I will argue that IHRL may provide a useful starting point 
for developing legal obligations for business entities, even though existing 
international human rights jurisprudence would need to be reinterpreted to apply 
to business entities (as opposed to states, as it has to date). However, as IHRL 
neither has a strong compensatory component, nor does it fulfil a punitive 
function, it is arguably less suited to address concerns from material 
compensation or the punishment of corporate wrongdoing.   
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I will conclude that in the current debate the practical advantages of an extension 
of direct duties for business entities under IHRL may have been exaggerated – 
contrary to what commentators often suggest such an extension would not 
automatically result in greater accountability of business entities. At most, IHRL 
can provide some guidance for the development of duties for businesses in the 
future; however, enforcement mechanisms other than the ones currently offered 
by IHRL would need to be developed for an effective implementation of such 
duties. 
 
2. THE LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HARMFUL BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 
There has been a tendency in the current debate to address a broad range of 
different situations in which corporate activities can have a negative impact on 
individuals’ interests under the common ‘umbrella’ of ‘business and human 
rights’. The emphasis of commentators in the debate has tended to be on 
stressing that the reach of business virtually extends into all areas of individuals’ 
lives and that consequently, business can impact on virtually all the important 
interests protected by human rights.
337
 In other words, ‘business and human 
rights’ tends to be considered as a unified topic. 
 
The emphasis that business can impact on all the interests protected by human 
rights has arguably played an important role in raising public awareness of 
harmful corporate activities: while in the earlier days of business-human rights 
advocacy, the primary focus was on a comparatively narrow range of labour 
standards (like the prohibition of child or forced labour), it is now commonly 
understood that business can negatively impact people’s interests in a much 
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broader way; such as through pollution caused by corporate activities, or through 
business complicity in the actions of abusive governments. This is valuable 
insofar as it highlights the many areas in which companies have been able to 
engage in harmful behaviour and so stresses the need for much more 
comprehensive and effective regulation of business enterprises. 
 
However, the emphasis on stressing that businesses can potentially adversely 
affect all those interests that underlie IHRL has arguably also come at the cost of 
a more nuanced discussion of the particular concerns that business conduct poses 
in different situations. In this chapter, I argue that we need a more thorough 
understanding of what are the motivations that drive calls for greater corporate 
accountability to assess whether international human rights law, even if it were 
extended to apply to business enterprises directly, could indeed effectively 
contribute to greater accountability of businesses. In the following, it is argued 
that on the one hand, there one overarching concern that has motivated calls for 
business-human rights responsibility is the observation that states often fail to 
regulate businesses sufficiently to prevent or punish harmful corporate activities. 
I will identify some of the most commonly discussed reasons for this failure of 
national level regulation, and then ask whether an extension of IHRL to business 
entities would be able to provide a solution. 
 
2.1 THE CAPACITY VIEW REVISITED 
In chapter 1 I argued that what has generally motivated calls for business-human 
rights accountability under IHRL has been the observation that business entities 
(increasingly) have capacities to adversely impact on people’s enjoyment of 
important interests. What motivates calls for business-human rights 
accountability is the desire to hold business to account for unacceptable 
behaviour, to prevent business from harming important human interests. IHRL, 
in turn, is understood as protecting exactly those interests and so commentators 
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conclude that an extension of IHRL duties to businesses directly would be the 
appropriate response. I called this the capacity view.  
 
But of course, while the capacity view can be considered to lie at the core of 
most arguments for business - human rights - accountability, arguments are more 
complex than that - the capacity view only is only the beginning of the story. In 
section 2 I argue that one overarching concern that has motivated calls for 
business-human rights accountability under IHRL is the perception that MNCs 
and other business entities largely are not held accountable for harmful or 
abusive behaviour and identify some of the reasons for the lack of corporate 
accountability. Section 3 will then discuss whether an extension of direct duties 
under IHRL to business entities would be able to address the perceived 
unaccountability of multinational and other companies. I will argue that IHRL 
may to some extent contribute to enhancing accountability of business entities 
insofar as the ‘naming and shaming’ of corporate actors for abusive behaviour 
could provide incentives for business entities to act more responsibly. However, 
given a lack of direct enforcement of international human rights duties by 
international human rights institutions, even an extension of direct IHRL duties 
to MNCs and other businesses would not be able to solve the core problem of 
corporate impunity that commentators identify: the inability, and perhaps more 
often than not unwillingness, of governments to regulate corporations. 
 
2.2 STATE FAILURE TO REGULATE  
One argument that is commonly put forward by proponents of business 
accountability under IHRL is that states often fail to regulate businesses 
appropriately with regard to important human interests. As I explained in chapter 
4B, states not only have duties under international human rights law not to harm 
the interests protected by international human rights law, but they also have 
extensive duties to protect individuals under their jurisdiction against any third 
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party under their jurisdiction, including business enterprises – for instance, they 
have duties to introduce legislation to prohibit abuse, monitor compliance by 
business, establish administrative and judicial mechanisms necessary to 
effectively investigate complaints, put in place mechanisms to bring perpetrators 
to justice, and facilitate the provision of effective remedies, including the 
provision of reparation to victims where appropriate. Commentators point out, 
however, that states often fall short of regulating business in the way prescribed 
by IHRL.
338
 This may be for different reasons. The paramount reason why 
governments fail to regulate business corporations in this regard is that the 
deregulation of the business environment is seen as a way to attract or retain 
(foreign) investment.
339
 For instance, the lowering (or abolishing) of labour 
standards, such as rules concerning decent minimum wages, health and safety 
standards for workers, or standards on collective bargaining rights that business 
entities need to comply with is seen as a way of attracting investors because it 
arguably lowers the running costs of operations for business. Even though 
arguments have been made that there is a business case for corporations to 
adhere to labour standards insofar as it tends to lower medium and longer term 
risks in practice (as workers are healthier and more content) there is still ample 
evidence for such a race to the bottom.
340
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In such situations, the corporate behaviour that is targeted by human rights 
critics is often legal under national laws. In other cases, national legislation to 
regulate businesses may exist but governments fail to enforce it– usually for the 
same reason of not wanting to deter actual or prospective investors.  
 
2.3 MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE CORPORATE VEIL 
Another point that tends to be made in relation to the argument from lack of 
domestic regulation concerns the particular case of multinational corporations 
(MNCs, also referred to in the literature as transnational corporations or TNCs). 
The corporate structure of MNCs makes it particularly challenging to effectively 
regulate these entities under national law. While multinationals operate as 
entities that are globally integrated in their operations, the different entities 
located in different countries have distinct legal personalities.
341
 Simply put, this 
means that legally, the parent company tends not to be liable for actions or 
omissions of their subsidiaries, even when the parent company is the sole 
shareholder of the subsidiary. This phenomenon has also been referred to as the 
‘corporate veil’ separating the parent multinational company from its 
affiliates.
342
 This complicates the regulation of the overall activities of TNCs 
under domestic law,
343
 in particular in situations where states do not have strong 
incentives to regulate in the first place.  
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2.4 THE FAILURE OF VOLUNTARY CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY INITIATIVES 
In addition to arguments about state unwillingness, or inability, to regulate 
businesses, for the reasons identified above, and the argument from the corporate 
veil, commentators have argued that an extension of IHRL to business is needed 
because voluntary initiatives for corporate social responsibility have failed to 
substantively improve business behaviour.
344
 In the last decades, a range of 
voluntary initiatives were adopted and promoted by businesses as well as 
international organizations like the OECD, ILO or the UN Global Compact.
345
 It 
is argued, however, that such voluntary initiatives have not led to a significant 
improvement of business behaviour and have instead often been used by 
companies as window-dressing rather than to make an actual difference in 
business conduct.
346
 
 
The idea here is that an extension of international human rights law to business 
entities would make obligations of business with regard to human rights binding 
and non-negotiable; they would no longer depend on the discretion of business 
entities themselves.
347
  
 
                                                             
344
 Ruggie, Just Business, p.xxviii; Steven Ratner, ‘Business’, in Oxford Handbook of 
International Environmental Law, ed. by Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.807-828; Albin-Lackey, Without Rules – A Failed 
Approach to Corporate Accountability; www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/business-and-
human-rights/corporate-accountability. 
345
 See chapter 1, section 2.1. 
346
 Deva writes that “In view of the four decades of experimentation with voluntary initiatives, 
there is a legitimate skepticism about the efficacy of any new avatars of voluntary initiatives, 
including the GPs”[GPs referring to the UN Guiding Principles. Surya Deva, ‘The Human 
Rights Obligations of Business: Reimagining the Treaty Business’ (2014), p.11, http://business-
humanrights.org/en/pdf-the-human-rights-obligations-of-business-reimagining-the-treaty-
business . 
347
 Deva writes in this context that it would signify “that human rights are non-negotiable: they 
should not be subject to the consent, willingness or capacity of business to assume human rights 
obligations. Nor should the application of human rights to business be dependent on the 
presence of a business case. Rather, compliance with human rights should be a pre-condition for 
having the privilege to conduct business in society.”Ibid., p.2. 
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The previous sections have discussed a number of common situations that have 
given rise to calls for business-human rights accountability. The underlying 
motivation for why commentators have called for an extension of IHRL to 
businesses in all these situations has been that businesses can have significant 
impact on the enjoyment of important interests, but at the same time, business 
corporations have often been left unregulated and unaccountable for abusive or 
harmful behaviour.
348
  A number of reasons for this are commonly put forward: 
national level regulation has been lacking or not sufficiently enforced because 
governments are unable or unwilling to regulate business entities to avoid harm 
in the first place, or hold them to account where harm has already occurred. This 
situation is exacerbated for MNCs, which evade national-level regulation 
because of their complex legal structures. Finally, voluntary initiatives for and 
by business have not been effective in preventing abusive business practices. 
 
An extension of IHRL to business, commentators (explicitly or implicitly) 
suggest, could address both: on the one hand, IHRL provides international 
standards that can be applied even when regulation at the national level fails (for 
the different reasons described above), and these standards are not just of a 
voluntary nature but legally binding
349
.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
348
 Also see on this point de Brabandere, ‘Human Rights and Non-State Actors in a State-Centric 
Legal System’, p.7. 
349
 David Kinley and Junko Tadaki, ‘From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law’, International Law, 44.4 (2003-2004), 
931-1023 (p.934). 
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3. CAN IHRL ADDRESS THE GAP IN LEGAL REGULATION AT THE 
NATIONAL LEVEL? 
However, what these arguments from the benefits of direct duties for business 
entities tend to overlook is how IHRL is implemented in practice. As I will 
explain in more detail in the following, international human rights standards are 
not enforced by international human rights institutions directly, but by the states 
that are parties to the respective human rights instruments. What this means is 
that international human rights law does not provide an immediate solution to 
the problem of lack of protection at the national level where states are unable or 
unwilling to regulate. Chapter 4A introduced two kinds of international human 
rights institutions (IHRIs) that implement international human rights law: the 
regional courts, and the global treaty monitoring institutions. While there are 
differences as to how these various IHRIs function in detail (e.g. how these 
institutions publicly declare a human rights violation, and the forms in which 
they provide guidance to states), I argue that that they all have two main avenues 
for implementing IHRL: on the one hand, IHRIs make it public that a violation 
has occurred, and on the other hand, they provide authoritative guidance for 
states as to how to meet their human rights obligations.  
 
Perhaps the most obvious difference between the different IHRIs is that in the 
case of the regional human rights courts (that is, for the purposes of this thesis, 
the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights), the declaration of violation will be in form of a judgment which is 
legally binding on states.  
 
The UN treaty monitoring institutions, by contrast, as well as the European 
Committee of Social Rights and the Inter-American Commission,  issue their 
findings in the form of ‘Recommendations’, ‘Conclusions’, ‘Concluding 
Observations’, or ‘General Comments’. Recommendations, Conclusions, or 
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Concluding Observations are issued when a particular situation was examined 
following an individual complaint or a special inquiry, or in reaction to state 
reports on human rights in their country. General Comments, by contrast, are a 
specific form of guidance that can be issued by the UN human rights monitoring 
institutions that are independent of a specific state context – they constitute 
statements of the Committee’s understanding of the interpretation of a particular 
right. While not legally binding, Recommendations, Concluding Observations 
and General Comments all constitute official interpretations of states’ human 
rights obligations by the respective IHRIs and they have what may be called 
quasi-legal character. In other words, they provide authoritative guidance to 
states in a way that is similar to legal judgments.  
 
3.1 PUBLIC AFFIRMATION THAT A VIOLATION HAS TAKEN PLACE 
While different in form and degree of legal bindingness, the human rights 
judgments of the regional human rights courts serve essentially similar functions 
to the recommendations and comments by regional as well as global IHRIs. 
Firstly, they constitute a public declaration of the violation in question. 
Judgments as well as recommendations and comments are of a public nature and 
so it is openly affirmed that one or more individuals have been wronged by the 
state. This arguably serves the purpose of establishing the truth of the allegations 
– we may call this the declarative function of IHRL. Beyond its intrinsic 
function of vindicating the victim(s)  of the given human rights violation, the 
declaration of the violation arguably also serves the purpose of putting pressure 
on states to remedy the situation that gave rise to the violation and to ensure that 
similar violations are prevented in the future. This has also been referred to in 
the literature as ‘naming and shaming’ of states.350 
                                                             
350
 Note that other organizations, such as NGOs, may also engage in ‘naming and shaming’ of 
states for human rights violations – see Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, ‘Sticks and Stones: Naming 
and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem’, International Organization, 62(4) 
(2008), 689-716. 
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3.2 GUIDANCE FOR STATES … 
In addition to declaring that a human rights violation has taken place, the 
regional courts as well as the UN bodies generally recommend changes in 
policies, practices and legislation. Both at the global and at the regional level, 
recommendations will generally encompass two aspects: (i) measures to put an 
end to the abusive situation that gave rise to the specific human rights complaint 
at stake (or in the case of the UN human rights institutions, the European 
Committee of Social Rights or the Inter-American Commission, a violation that 
was identified on the basis of a state report or a Special Procedure) and (ii) 
measures to prevent the re-occurrence of violations in the future.
351
  
 
… on ending the given violation 
So on the one hand, reports and judgments will give guidance as to how the 
respondent state is to rectify the unlawful situation that has given rise to the 
violation of the right(s) of the applicant/ the individual(s) concerned in the given 
case. Such measures may include changes in legislation, policies or practices of 
the government or other state actors (like courts and other judicial bodies). They 
may also require particular actions on the part of the violating state – such as the 
release from detention of an individual, the provision of medical and 
psychological care for torture victims, the reopening of domestic proceedings 
where the previous trial has been found unfair,
352
 the destruction of information 
that is held on the human rights victim in a case of violation of privacy, or the 
revocation of a deportation order,
353
 the restoration of liberty of individuals who 
                                                             
351
See Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (2
nd
 edn., Oxford University 
Press, 2005), p.319. 
352
 IACtHR case of Caesar v Trinidad and Tobago, C/123 (2005), para 2, quoted after Jo M. 
Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, (2
nd
 
edn., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p.192. 
353
 Başak Çalı and Nicola Bruch (2011) ‘Monitoring the Implementation of Judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights: A Handbook for Non-Governmental Organizations’,  
https://ecthrproject.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/monitoringhandbook_cali_bruch1.pdf  
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have been illegally detained, the return of property that was seized, protection 
for displaced persons to return to their home, the re-instatement of employment, 
or the cancellation of judicial, administrative, criminal, or police records where a 
conviction is overturned, or the return of lands to indigenous communities.
354
 In 
urgent situations, the Commission may request a state to adopt precautionary 
measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons.
355
  
 
Measures can also include symbolic actions that aim to recognize the dignity of 
victims, such as the rectifying of misinformation that may have been spread 
about them or about the events at stake, and of providing some consolation to 
families and friends of victims,
356
 such as public acts like ceremonies to 
acknowledge responsibility for human rights violations, public state apologies to 
victims, the publication and dissemination of the judgment, for instance on 
national newspapers, measures to commemorate victims or events such as by 
building monuments or naming streets or schools after victims, or the location 
and identification of the remains of disappeared persons.
357
 
 
 
… and on  preventing the re-occurrence of violations  
On the other hand, reports and judgments as well as global IHRIs regional will 
give guidance on what steps states should take to prevent the re-occurrence of 
human rights violations similar to the given case in the future.
358
 (In fact, the 
                                                             
354
 Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
pp.196-203. 
355
 ACHR Art. 50(3). Also see Organization of American States, ‘Petition and Case System’ 
(2010), p.15, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/pdf/HowTo.pdf 
356
 Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
p.204 
357
 Ibid., pp.204-212. 
358
 See UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31(80), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 
(2004), ‘Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’, para 
17 which states that “[i]n general, the purposes of the Covenant would be defeated without an 
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General Comments of the UN committees only provide such forward-looking 
guidance as they are not in response to a particular violation.) Again, such 
measures may be in the form of recommendations for changes to legislation, 
policies or practices of state actors. To ensure that violations are not repeated in 
the future, the American Court, for instance, has ordered states to engage in 
capacity building, in particular for police, prosecutors, judges, penitentiary 
officials, the military and other public authorities. It has also ordered legislative 
reform, including the adoption, amendment, or repeal of national laws – for 
instance, in YATAMA v Nicaragua, the Court ordered Nicaragua to reform its 
electoral laws so as to ensure that indigenous and ethnic minority communities 
could exercise their political and electoral rights.
359
 In the case of Claude Reyes 
v Chile, it ordered the state to adopt laws to realize the right of access to state-
held information.
360
 They can also include the advice to provide additional 
training to state authorities (for instance, training on the prohibition of torture for 
police officers) or to develop awareness-raising measures concerning the type of 
violation.  
 
In this sense, whenever an applicant brings a case, the outcome of the case will 
not only be relevant to him or herself, but it can have important implications for 
the institutional structures of the state more generally. So IHRL is explicitly not 
only targeted at expressing recognition of a given violation but it also serves the 
purpose of reforming the given institutional context, to ensure that the policies, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
obligation integral to article 2 to take measures to prevent a recurrence of a violation of the 
Covenant. Accordingly, it has been a frequent practice of the Committee in cases under the 
Optional Protocol to include in its Views the need for measures, beyond a victim-specific 
remedy, to be taken to avoid recurrence of the type of violation in question. Such measures may 
require changes in the State Party’s laws or practices.” ACHR Art. 50(3) and Organization of 
American States, ‘Petition and Case System’ (2010), p.15, 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/pdf/HowTo.pdf.  
359
 IACtHR case of Yatama v Nicaragua, C/127 (2005), paras 258-259, 267; quoted after 
Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, p.214. 
360
 Claude Reyes v Chile, C/151 (2006), para 101, quoted after ibid. 
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laws and practices of that state are made more conducive to human rights.
361
 We 
may call this the reformative function of IHRL. This, again, fits with the 
interpretation of human rights responsibility in chapter 4B as statist, institutional 
responsibility.  
 
3.3 NO DIRECT ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS  
I have argued that IHRIs implement international human rights law in two main 
ways. Firstly, they publicize that a human rights violation has occurred, and 
secondly, they propose authoritative guidance for states as to how to implement 
their human rights obligations both with regard to the individual(s) immediately 
affected by the instance of the violation and how to avoid similar violations vis-
à-vis anyone else in the future. However, the actual enforcement of human rights 
obligations ‘on the ground’, i.e. in a given country context, is left to states. And 
indeed, while IHRIs provide guidance on measures that states should take, states 
are left some discretion as to how, in detail, to implement the recommendations.  
 
A number of minimum obligations are generally imposed by international 
human rights treaties: individuals need to be able to seek an effective domestic 
legal remedy where they find their rights violated; states have to investigate 
alleged violations; states need to compensate or rehabilitate victims of violations 
and prevent violations in the future. But how exactly to discharge these duties 
will be up to the state party.
362
 States are also relatively free to decide, for 
instance, which institutions to authorize at the domestic level to fulfil human 
rights duties. So for instance, states may opt to have their human rights duties 
                                                             
361
 Çalı argues in a similar vein that one purpose of the European Human Rights System is to 
“trigger reform”. Başak Çalı (2008) ‘The Purposes of the European Human Rights System: One 
or Many?’, European Human Rights Law Review, 3 (2008), 299-306. 
362
 See Walter Kälin and Jörg Künzli, The Law of International Human Rights Protection 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 185, for these minimum requirements.  
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discharged by administrative authorities, by national human rights commissions, 
or by ombudsman’s offices or truth commissions, all of which may establish 
very different types of procedures or mechanisms.
363
   
 
In other words, IHRIs cannot enforce human rights standards directly. While the 
regional courts and UN monitoring bodies provide guidance on policy, practice 
or legislation changes, it is the role of the state to decide on the implementation 
of any particular measures. The strongest teeth that human rights bodies have to 
enforce human rights duties is that there is a reputational cost associated to being 
pointed out as human rights violator.  Neither international human rights courts 
nor treaty monitoring bodies can directly cancel legislation or implement 
changes in practices or policies.
364
  
 
So where does this leave us with regard to the question of whether an extension 
of direct business duties under IHRL would be an effective way to increase 
business accountability? I argued that commentators suggest that IHRL could 
provide international and legally binding standards to address the perceived 
impunity of businesses due to a lack of national level regulation. But given that 
enforcement of IHR obligations is still left to national authorities IHRL does not 
provide for an immediate enforcement solution. 
 
Also, IHRL is explicitly subsidiary to domestic law.
365
 Its purpose is not to 
replace domestic law but to review whether the judgments rendered by domestic 
                                                             
363
 Ibid., ch.6. 
364
 Furthermore, as Çalı and Wyss note, international human rights institutions can only spring 
into action where states expressly agree to be subject to the given international human rights 
regime in question. See Çalı, Başak and Alice Wyss, ‘Authority of International Institutions: The 
Case for International Human Rights Treaty Bodies’, UCL School of Public Policy Working 
Paper Series, 29 (2008), 1-23 (p.1) 
365
 Paolo G. Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law’, 
American Journal of International Law, 97.1 (2003), 38-79 (esp. pp.57-58); also see Dean 
Spielmann, ‘Whither the Margin of Appreciation?’, UCL-Current Legal Problems Lecture (20 
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courts are in line with international human rights commitments.
366
 So 
international human rights law only comes into play when domestic remedies 
have been exhausted.
367
 This means that individuals (or other legal persons like 
NGOs) who have a human rights complaint must first pursue domestic legal 
avenues to decide on the situation.  
 
Arguably, the fact that IHRIs do not have powers to directly enforce human 
rights obligations, and enforcement is ultimately left to states, could be taken as 
an argument against the effectiveness of human rights treaties in general: as 
states are both the subjects but also the enforcers of international human rights 
law, it may be argued that states will only implement their human rights duties 
where they consider it in their interest. However, the case is arguably stronger 
for businesses. States by and large voluntarily sign up to IHRL which suggests 
that, at least in principle, they accept that they have human rights obligations, 
that it is at least part of their role to realize human rights. There is comparatively 
less agreement as to what obligations, if any, business entities have with regard 
to human rights. Even though there is a growing sense that business entities 
                                                                                                                                                                    
March 2014) for an argument that the doctrine of the margin of appreciation can be regarded as 
an incentive for domestic judges to “conduct the necessary Convention review, realizing in this 
way the principle of subsidiarity”. Also see the ECtHR case of “Relating to Certain Aspects of 
the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium” v Belgium, A/6 (1968), para B10, 
quoted after Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, p.127. 
366
 Handyside v The United Kingdom, A24 (1976), paras 48-50 (1976). Para 49 of Handyside 
notes that it is not the Court’s task to “take the place of the competent national courts but rather 
to review […] the decisions they delivered in the exercise of their power of appreciation.” 
Quoted after Pasqualucci, p.127.  
367
 In the case of the Inter-American system, domestic remedies are considered exhausted “when 
the judicial branch has issued a decision of last resort.”  Under certain circumstances, it may not 
be necessary to exhaust domestic remedies – e.g. the Inter-American Commission may examine a 
petition in which domestic remedies have not been exhausted when domestic laws do not provide 
due process to protect the rights allegedly violated; the alleged victim has not been allowed 
access to domestic remedies or has been kept from exhausting them; or there is delay in the 
issuance of a final decision on the case with no valid reason.” See Organization of American 
States, ‘Petition and Case System’ (2010), pp.8-9, 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/pdf/HowTo.pdf. 
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should not only, or at all cost, pursue profits, profit is still considered the 
primary purpose of business entities by many, not least corporate actors 
themselves, and there is little agreement on how to balance this purpose against 
obligations with regard to human rights, as the debates surrounding the Draft 
Norms and Guiding Principles, among others, have demonstrated. 
 
This said, like for states, the naming and shaming by international human rights 
institutions may also provide a strong incentive for companies to comply with 
the standards set out by IHRL. The language of human rights is arguably a 
powerful tool and it could certainly be argued that if IHRL was extended to 
business, and international human rights institutions would consequently address 
business-human rights issues more directly and more frequently, this in itself 
might lead to improvements in business behaviour simply because business has 
no incentive to be put on the spot in front of consumers. 
 
4. CAN IHRL ADDRESS DISTINCT MOTIVATIONS FOR CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY? 
In this section I will argue that beyond the overarching concern from lack of 
national regulation, we can identify a number of distinct motivations that 
underlie calls for business-human rights accountability, ranging from (i) business 
compliance with international minimum standards; (ii) the compensation of 
victims for harm; (iii) the punishment of corporations or individual corporate 
actors, to (iv) calls for greater corporate social responsibility or distributive 
justice more broadly.  
 
To illustrate these motivations, I will draw on some of the most typical situations 
in which business entities have been found to harm important human interests. 
However, I should note at the outset that I do not thereby mean to suggest that 
each of these different situations of harmful corporate behaviour neatly 
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corresponds to one particular motivation. Indeed, in most if not all instances, 
several of the motivations will be in play, perhaps to different degrees.  
 
4.1 CALLING FOR BUSINESS COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM 
STANDARDS  
One reason for commentators to refer to international human rights law where 
corporations engage in harmful behaviour is that IHRL is taken to provide 
internationally agreed minimum standards that can provide guidance where 
national regulation is lacking or unenforced. Take one of the most common 
scenarios that has prompted calls for business-human rights accountability: 
situations where companies violate labour standards in their operations. 
Common allegations include, for instance, that companies use child or forced 
labour, pay inadequate wages, or do not provide decent working conditions, 
which may include not adhering to basic health and safety standards. Companies 
in the footwear, clothing and sporting goods industries have received particular 
attention for inhumane working conditions in factories. Corporations have also 
been known to withhold workers’ identity papers in order to force them into 
abusive contracts. They have been found to fail to provide safety training or 
safety equipment for hazardous jobs, or to prevent workers from organizing and 
bargaining.
368
   
  
Arguably, commentators call for corporate accountability in such cases to 
achieve changes in corporate behaviour and to achieve that businesses respect 
certain minimum standards in their operations. International human rights law 
encompasses a range of rights that are directly related to employment and the 
conditions of employment – from the right to just and favourable conditions of 
work which ensures, among other things, fair wages that allow for decent living, 
safe and healthy working conditions, rest and leisure; the right to form and join 
                                                             
368
 See above chapter 1, section 1.2 above for a more detailed discussion of such examples. 
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trade unions and to strike; rights to social security and insurance; or the specific 
rights of children not to be economically exploited or to perform any work that is 
hazardous or interferes with their education, health or development.
369
 And 
while I argued in chapter 4 that in order for IHRL to be applicable to business 
entities, international human rights institutions would need to first translate the 
specific duties that correspond to each of these rights, because duties have so far 
been interpreted against the specific backdrop of responsibilities and powers of 
states, it seems nevertheless plausible to argue that international human rights 
standards at least provide a good starting point for developing corporate duties in 
the workplace.
370
 Arguably, translation for rights that concern the workplace or 
conditions of employment more generally is considerably more straightforward 
than translation of other rights, such as human rights concerning political 
participation or civic status.
371
 States, for instance, have duties to protect the 
right to remuneration that provides workers with fair wages and equal 
remuneration for work of equal value, or duties to adopt national occupational 
health and safety policies aimed at reducing accidents and injuries to health 
arising in the context of employment. While business entities would not have the 
same duties, e.g. to develop and implement policies, they could be assigned 
duties to pay fair wages, or to put in place appropriate health and safety 
provisions in the workplace (even where states fail to regulate these areas of 
employment). Indeed, a range of (non-binding) guidance materials for 
businesses have been developed by organizations such as the International 
                                                             
369
 See chapter 4, section 2.5 above. 
370
 See, for instance, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the 
United Nations Global Compact, the International Business Leaders Forum and the Castan 
Centre for Human Rights Law of Monash, Human Rights Translated – A Business Reference 
Guide (2008), http://hrbdf.org/doc/human_rights_translated.pdf 
371
 For a discussion of the latter, see chapter 4B, section 2.4 above. 
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Labour Organization (ILO) or the UN Global Compact Office and the UN Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
372
 
 
4.2 THE CASE FOR COMPENSATION FOR CORPORATE HARM 
In some cases, calls for corporate accountability have essentially been calls for 
material compensation for damage or harm incurred through corporate activities. 
In many of the cases that are highlighted by human rights critics, business 
enterprises have come under scrutiny for the adverse social or environmental 
consequences of their activities. In particular firms in the oil, gas or mining 
sector have been criticized in this regard because their operations often involve 
forced resettlements of individuals or entire communities. They have also been 
found to pollute the environment that people rely on for their livelihoods. So for 
instance, the U.S. petrochemical corporation Chevron's drilling practices in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon have been related to severe pollution and health problems 
in the indigenous communities and the people in the area.
 
In the Niger Delta, oil 
spills by the Royal Dutch Shell company have resulted in ongoing damage to 
fisheries and farm lands. This, in turn, has had negative impacts on people’s 
livelihoods in a number of ways – to name just a few of the consequences that 
critics have pointed out, people who worked as fishermen and farmers have 
largely lost their jobs, food prices have risen significantly, and drinking water 
has been contaminated which causes cancer and other serious health problems to 
the population who consumes the water. 
                                                             
372
 See the ILO’s eight conventions that cover the right to freedom of association and the 
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced 
or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the elimination of 
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.  
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High Commissioner for Human Rights et al., Human Rights Translated – A Business Reference 
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As in the case of labour standard violations, one objective to call for corporate 
human rights accountability in such cases may be that international human rights 
law provides some of the standards that are being violated in such cases. E.g., 
some of the jurisprudence on the rights to an adequate standard of living, to 
housing, or also on the right to freedom of religion (where places of residence 
have religious or spiritual value to residents) may provide useful guidance for 
developing standards of corporate behaviour in such instances and to help 
prevent and mitigate adverse social and environmental consequences of 
corporate activities in the future.
373
 For instance, international human rights 
jurisprudence on the right to housing prohibits states from forcefully evicting 
individuals, and sets out the exceptional circumstances and conditions under 
which resettlement may be legitimate. So again, IHRL might provide a starting 
point for outlining duties that businesses could be assigned with regard to the 
important human interests involved. 
However, calls for accountability in such cases are arguably also, and 
importantly, about the provision of adequate material compensation where 
damage has already occurred.
374
 It seems fair to argue that the argument in 
favour of human rights accountability here is essentially an argument from 
corrective justice: companies should be responsible to provide compensation 
where they cause material damage to individuals.  
 
Would an extension of direct duties of business under IHRL be useful in such 
situations? Arguably, the contribution that IHRL can make in this regard is 
limited. International human rights institutions may award reparations
375
 - 
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 Amnesty International, The True ‘Tragedy’ – Delays and Failures in Tackling Oil Spills in 
the Niger Delta; Amnesty International, Petroleum, pollution and poverty in the Niger Delta 
(2009), esp. p. 57, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR44/017/2009  
374
 Amnesty International, Petroleum, pollution and poverty in the Niger Delta, p.60. 
375
 The ECtHR’s authority to afford reparation is laid down in Article 41 of the ECHR which 
states that “[i]f the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the protocols 
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victims of human rights violations can be compensated for the legal costs they 
incur in bringing a human rights case and they may sometimes receive 
compensatory payments for damages resulting from the violation. However, 
material compensation is certainly not a core function of IHRL and there are a 
number of limitations to the ability of IHRIs to achieve such compensation. The 
European Court of Human Rights, for instance, has been argued to have taken a 
rather cautious approach to compensation; for one, the ECtHR reserves 
discretion to decide on a case-by-case basis whether it deems it necessary to 
afford what it calls ‘just satisfaction’376 at all, and such just satisfaction is not 
always afforded in the form of pecuniary damages. In some cases, the ECtHR 
may decide that the declaratory judgment establishing the violation(s) as such 
constitutes just satisfaction, leaving it up to the responded state to decide what, if 
any, redress to offer to the victim(s).
377
 And the requirement to prove a causal 
link between the harm suffered and the given human rights violation
378
 has 
meant that awards of pecuniary damages have been less frequently awarded than 
non-pecuniary damages (that aim, for instance, to compensate victims for moral 
injuries, like harm to reputation, psychological harm, humiliation etc.).
379
 The 
ECtHR generally only exercises its power to order damages when it is “satisfied 
that the injured party cannot obtain adequate reparation under the national law of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial 
reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” 
Article 63(1) of the American Convention states “If the Court finds that there has been a 
violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured 
party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if 
appropriate, that the consequences of the measures or situation that constituted the breach of 
such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.” 
376
 Ibid. 
377
 Ingrid Nifosi-Sutton, ‘The Power of the European Court of Human Rights to Order Specific 
Non-Monetary Relief: a Critical Appraisal from a Right to Health Perspective’, Harvard Human 
Rights Journal, 23 (2010), 51-73 (pp.52-53). 
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 Goodwin v The United Kingdom, Grand Chamber, Reports 2002-VI, paras 48-50; quoted after 
ibid., p.54. 
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 Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, p.298 and p.319. 
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the State concerned”,380 and furthermore, the ECtHR has been criticized for not 
ordering damages consistently even where redress is unavailable domestically.
381
  
This said, in particular the Inter-American Court of Human Rights established 
some case law where, for instance, it ordered compensation for violations of the 
rights to traditionally used and occupied territories – for instance, in the case of 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua where the IACtHR held 
that Nicaragua had violated the property rights of the Awas Tingni community 
by granting logging concessions for the community’s territory to a foreign 
company  and failing to recognize the community’s customary land tenure 
system. The IACtHR ordered Nicaragua to “[c]arry out the delimitation, 
demarcation and titling of the corresponding lands of the members of the Awas 
Tingni Community [...] with full participation by the Community and taking into 
account its customary laws, values, customs and mores” and to pay $50,000 in 
reparation for immaterial damages, to be used for the collective benefit of the 
community.
382
  
It would be conceivable that international human rights institutions could 
develop similar jurisprudence targeted at business entities. However, current 
IHRL does not yet offer guidance on the responsibilities that business entities 
could legitimately be imposed – again, state and business duties will arguably 
look different in many respects. States, for one, are the kinds of agents that can 
make policy decisions as to whether or not a specific piece of land is made 
                                                             
380
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available to private investors, or as to how to regulate property rights, including 
property rights of communities that have systems of communal land ownership. 
But states also have responsibilities to ensure that the human rights of 
individuals in its territory are respected and realized – so when making decisions 
regarding land use, perhaps in the interest of economic development, they have 
obligations to take into account their human rights duties and decide whether 
these obligations are compatible with its decision to grant concessions. Business 
entities may have duties not to pursue a specific investment if it becomes known 
to them that such investment could only be pursued at the cost of resettling 
native communities from lands that are of important economic or cultural value 
to them, perhaps they might even legitimately be assigned some duties to 
investigate the potential adverse impact of their operations in advance of 
pursuing a particular investment.  
However, their duties are arguably less comprehensive than the ones of states – 
they do not have the same extensive duties of care to ensure the well-being and 
rights of individuals that states have. In some cases, especially where business 
entities invest abroad, they might not even have the relevant access to 
information on the detailed impact of their operations. At the same time, 
businesses do not have the same legitimacy – given a lack of the appropriate 
accountability mechanisms to the population at large
383
 - to make the kinds of 
decisions that states may make. International human rights bodies generally 
leave a margin of discretion to states as to when individual rights may be 
balanced against competing policy considerations, including considerations of 
economic development
384
 and so human rights institutions will provide guidance 
in relatively general terms to states as to when decisions to grant concessions for 
land use are in line with their human rights duties. For business entities, by 
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contrast, we would want much more detailed guidance on what conditions have 
to be met for an investment to be legitimate.  
Finally, and this relates back to the argument above that an extension of IHRL to 
business entities would not be able to close the enforcement gap, the 
implementation of compensation, even where it is ordered by an IHRI, is left to 
states. 
 
4.3 THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR ‘HUMAN RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITY’ 
I argue that yet another motivation for critics to call for business accountability 
has been to morally hold corporations to account. Commentators often stress in 
calling for human rights accountability that businesses should not get away with 
harmful behaviour, that human rights duties for business entities are needed to 
counter widespread corporate impunity.
385
 While the theme from lack of 
accountability plays a role in all of the examples of corporate harm I have 
discussed, the argument from corporate impunity is arguably particularly strong 
in cases where business entities have been involved in particularly serious types 
of harm. Often, this has been the case where business entities are implicated, in 
one way or other, in human rights violations by governments.
 386
 Such cases 
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have also been referred to as situations of business complicity in human rights 
violations.
 387
 In such instances, companies may not directly cause the abuse at 
stake but contribute to, or benefit from, abusive state behaviour. While 
complicity can come in many different degrees, and the different types of 
complicity do not fall into clear-cut categories, Clapham and Jerbi have 
suggested a useful distinction between direct, beneficial and silent complicity.
388
  
 
Direct complicity occurs where corporations are found to knowingly and 
actively help to commit violations. So for instance, companies have supplied 
regimes with the materials and services needed to commit killings – as in the 
case of van Anraat,
389
 a Dutch manufacturer who directly and knowingly 
delivered the chemicals required to produce mustard gas to Saddam Hussein.  
 
Corporations have also been implicated in violent clamp-downs of protests 
against their operations, resulting in severe physical harm to or even death of 
protesters, as the example of the oil company Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria cited 
in chapter 1 illustrates.
390
 
 
Corporations have also benefitted from human rights violations on part of the 
government even where they may not have been actively involved in committing 
the harm – illustrated by the case discussed in chapter 1 where a number of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, Addendum: Corporations and human 
rights: a survey of the scope and patterns of alleged corporate-related human rights abuse.  
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multinational oil companies benefitted from forced and child labour supplied by 
the Burmese state-owned oil company Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) 
for a joint venture.
391
  
 
There have also been serious labour standards abuses that have triggered calls 
against corporate impunity, such as the case of the collapse of an eight-story 
garment factory in Bangladesh producing clothes for many European and US 
brands after a fire in 2013, killing and injuring thousands of employees.
392
 In 
such cases, where corporate activities – more or less directly – contribute to such 
serious harm, the reason to call for human rights responsibility is arguably not so 
much about referring to the standards established by IHRL – violations like 
torture or killing will be illegal under virtually any national criminal legal 
system. In that sense, there is no need to refer to IHRL for external standards. 
And in some of the examples mentioned above, there have indeed been criminal 
suits – for instance, in the case of Frans van Anraat, the Dutch supplier of 
chemicals for the production of mustard gas to Saddam Hussein who was 
sentenced to 17 years of prison after the District Court of The Hague found him 
guilty of complicity to war crimes.
393
 However, the concern is that businesses 
will often not be held accountable under national criminal systems and so IHRL 
is called on to provide international responsibility to substitute for domestic 
criminal responsibility.  
 
An extension of direct duties under IHRL to business entities, however, is 
arguably not fit to address the underlying concerns here. For one, I argued that 
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IHRL does not provide for enforcement mechanisms independently of national 
enforcement. IHRL does also not provide for any mechanisms that would hold 
the individuals who were directly involved in the violation to account – for 
instance, there are no individual punishments, such as incarceration, associated 
to human rights violations. Also, as I argued in more detail in chapter 4B, the 
principles of responsibility of IHRL would need to be re-thought entirely to be 
fit to establish criminal-type responsibility for any actor. As I argued  above, 
because human rights responsibility has been centred around the idea of state 
institutional responsibility, the modi of responsibility have explicitly not been 
concerned with establish individual guilt – so for instance, the individual who 
committed the violation does not even have to be known to the international 
human rights institution determining that a violation has taken place. In other 
words, IHRL does explicitly not play a punitive role.
394
 
 
4.4 CALLS FOR BROADER CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY  
In some cases, calls for corporate human rights accountability may be less calls 
for legal accountability, either in the criminal or in the civil sense, and may 
instead have another important purpose: to draw attention to the possible moral 
implications of business activities and to appeal to the corporate social 
responsibility in a broader way. Consider, for instance, the third type of 
complicity identified by Clapham and Jerbi, silent complicity. In cases of silent 
complicity, corporations fail to use their influence to condemn or criticize human 
rights abuses committed by governments. This may occur when employees of 
the company are affected by abuses, such as where human rights or labour 
activists that work for the company are imprisoned and the company decides not 
to take any action. Corporations have also been accused of silent complicity for 
                                                             
394
 In the case of Avsar v Turkey, Reports 2001-VII, the ECtHR stated that “[t]he Court is not 
concerned with reaching any findings as to guilt or innocence in that sense.” Also see discussion 
in chapter 4B, section 4 above. 
 223 
 
operating in countries with abusive governments, or for fuelling abusive regimes 
or ongoing violent conflicts. So for instance, US and European companies have 
been criticized for trading weapons, diamonds and timber from conflict states 
like Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Côte 
d'Ivoire and Liberia.
395
 Complicity may be considered silent in such cases 
assuming that corporations were not involved in the actual abuses during the 
conflicts, nor in planning the abuses – the charge then is that the companies did 
not use their economic weight to influence the government to end conflicts.  
 
I should emphasize that the three categories of complicity are coarse and 
certainly do not capture all the possible different ‘shades’ of complicity. And 
there may sometimes be reasonable room for disagreement of what kind of 
complicity is at stake – in the case of weapons and natural resource trade from 
conflict regions, for instance, complicity may also be considered beneficial (and 
not just silent) if the ongoing conflicts were effectively conducive to the cheap 
supply of natural resources to companies. And if the argument can be made that 
corporations provided financial support without which conflicts would likely 
have ended much earlier, in other words, that corporations effectively sustained 
armed conflicts, we may even think of company involvement in these instances 
as a form of direct complicity. In this scenario, corporations at least to some 
extent provided the economic resources necessary for the government to 
continue to commit human rights violations.
396
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However, where complicity is more akin to silent complicity, there is often room 
for debate over what kind of responsibilities corporations can be assigned in the 
first place, and in turn, what should be the appropriate regulatory response. 
Legal regulation of actors makes sense where obligations can be defined and 
generalized reasonably accurately in advance but this may not be possible in all 
the spheres of life where businesses can affect social and individual human 
interests. Questions of when businesses should or should not engage in a country 
given that country’s human rights record, or of when corporations should seek to 
use their political influence to improve the human rights situation might be 
among those questions that defy easy, or generalisable, answers. 
 
This is not to say that business entities cannot be thought to have any moral 
responsibilities in such instances, and calls for business responsibility in those 
cases may fulfil a valuable function to appeal to the social or moral conscience 
of business actors to seek to ensure that their activities do not have the kinds of 
adverse impacts described above. But an extension of IHRL to business entities 
would arguably not be an appropriate or effective response. Above I discussed at 
length that even for the less controversial areas of business responsibility, an 
extension of human rights duties from states to businesses would require the 
translation of such duties – and in areas where it is very contested what such 
duties should be in the first place such translation would be much more 
problematic and unlikely to gather the support needed by states to lead to results 
in practice at least in the short and medium run. 
 
The use of patents by pharmaceutical companies serves as another example that 
has motivated calls for human rights responsibility. Patents have been criticized 
as artificially driving up prices for medicine and in turn hampering access to 
medicine for the global poor; and thereby negatively affecting people’s interest 
in health, and even their interest in life. In particular, criticism has been voiced 
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with respect to pharmaceutical firms manufacturing any life-saving medications, 
such as medication to treat HIV/AIDS. The idea is that the deprivation of 
medicine causes avoidable suffering which could be remedied if certain policies 
or institutions were changed. The argument in favour of business accountability 
here is at its core an argument from social justice. The idea is that corporations 
that make huge profits should not do so at the expense of fundamental human 
interests, or use at least some of those profits to positively contribute to the 
realization of important socio-economic interests. In other words, calls for 
human rights responsibility here are calls for ‘corporate social responsibility’ in 
a broader sense. 
 
There certainly is a good moral argument to be made that corporations like 
pharmaceutical companies, which have direct influence on essential human 
interests, and which given their gigantic budgets could easily afford to make 
medication more accessible for the poor, should do so. However, again the 
question has to be whether an extension of IHRL to business corporations would 
be able to provide a solution to this situation. In chapter 4, I argued in detail that 
IHRL, at least in its current form, does not provide guidance on the obligations 
that could be imposed on business entities, as opposed to states.  
 
Again, reference to IHRL may be useful insofar as it outlines some of the most 
important human interests and could in that way be taken to serve as a starting 
point to develop guidance for business entities as to how they could - given the 
extensive capacities and budgets of many corporations – contribute to 
progressively realize these interests.  The Guidelines prepared by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the right to the highest attainable standard of health,
397
 for 
instance, propose a number of steps that business may take to increase access to 
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medicines of the poorest and most vulnerable.
398
 But the duties that states 
currently have with regard to the provisions of health and healthcare are 
arguably quite different from the duties that could be imposed on businesses and 
so again, as I argued in more detail in chapter 5, an extension of direct duties to 
business would only be justified if duties were reinterpreted for business.  
 
4.5 THE CASE OF BUSINESS ENTITIES EXERCISING STATE FUNCTIONS 
In some cases, commentators have called for business-human rights 
accountability where corporations take on functions that have traditionally been 
the exclusive domain of states. A commonly cited example in this context 
concerns abuses by private military and security companies (PMSCs) that play 
an increasing role in providing services to states in conflict zones around the 
world.
399
 In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, for instance, between 
15,000 and 20,000 private contractors were employed for a range of services 
from handling military logistics to acting as translators and interrogators in 
detention facilities, and one case that gained particular attention by human rights 
activists and other commentators was the ill-treatment and torture of inmates of 
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in which contractors from two companies, Titan Corp. 
and CACI, were deeply implicated.
400
 And businesses have not only assumed 
state-like functions in conflict contexts. Private companies have been charged by 
governments to fulfil functions ranging from the provision of health care, 
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education, or the operation of detention facilities.
401
 In the United States, in 
some private residential areas (so-called ‘common-interest developments’) local 
government and police functions are effectively privatized and no longer 
exercised by the state.
402
 
 
The argument in favour of business-human rights accountability here is that 
business entities should be held to the same standards that state actors would be 
held to if they were to exercise these functions.
403
 Applying human rights 
standards directly to business in such instances would be a way of preventing 
that human rights standards are undercut by states outsourcing their functions to 
corporations. Would an extension of international human rights law to business 
be the right response to address these kinds of situations? Firstly, it is important 
to stress that IHRL already imposes duties on states to ensure that private actors 
that fulfil what are essentially public functions do so in compliance with 
IHRL.
404
 As I discussed above,
 405
 public functions are the kinds of functions 
that states, by nature, have duties to perform and cannot absolve themselves 
from.  
 
This means that states remain responsible for private actors empowered to 
perform public functions. So for instance, when states decide to hire private 
security firms to run their prisons or to perform other de facto police or military 
functions, or when airlines perform immigration control functions on behalf of 
the state, it remains the responsibility of the state to ensure that the companies 
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charged with providing these public services act in accordance with the state’s 
human rights obligations and the state will incur direct responsibility under 
IHRL for any conduct of the company that is not in line with these obligations 
(as long as the business acts on the instructions or under the control of the state, 
this is regardless of whether the business was formally contracted to fulfil public 
functions).
406
 
 
The case becomes more difficult, of course, in contexts where the relationship 
between the state and the corporation that de facto fulfils the ‘state function’ is 
less clear. Karp, for instance discusses the case of companies that operate in the 
Amazon rainforest in Brazil. In this region, despite Brazil not qualifying as a 
fragile or weak state generally speaking, the state can be considered as largely 
absent. Multinational corporations operating in this region commonly provide 
hospitals and educational facilities, for their employees but also for local 
communities more broadly, and construct public infrastructure like roads or 
railways. In other words, businesses here act as de facto providers of what are 
generally agreed to be public services or public goods – and in that sense assume 
state-like functions.
407
 However, these companies are not officially contracted to 
fulfil these functions. In this situation, it is less clear whether the state bears 
direct responsibility to ensure that such services are delivered in line with 
international human rights obligations. 
 
So might it be justified to apply IHRL directly to corporations in such instances? 
In cases where business entities fulfil functions which are very similar to 
functions traditionally fulfilled by states, it may intuitively make sense to hold 
business entities to the same standards. And the arguments from a need for 
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translation
408
 would not seem to apply: existing international human rights law 
jurisprudence on how states must and must not treat individuals in detention, for 
instance, could be quite straightforwardly applied to private contractors who are 
involved in the operation and running of detention centres. Similarly, it might 
seem quite uncontroversial to ask companies that provide education services to 
supply them in line with international human rights standards for states, such as 
not to discriminate against students on the basis of gender, ethnicity or any other 
of the protected characteristics in IHRL.  
 
However, firstly, an extension of IHRL would not be able to close the ‘impunity 
gap’ in the sense of ensuring that business entities are legally held to account. As 
was argued above, IHRL is enforced by states rather than international human 
rights institutions directly and so in fragile state contexts like Iraq or the 
Brazilian Amazon region it seems particularly problematic to assume that an 
extension of duties to businesses would have an immediate enforcement effect. 
The core problem in such fragile state contexts is a much broader problem of 
failure of accountability mechanisms, and not a problem of a lack of legal 
standards that would apply. In fact, as has been pointed out by a range of 
commentators, in the case of the abuses by private military contractors in Iraq 
one major problem in holding them accountable has been that on the one hand, 
they were granted immunity from Iraqi legal process by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority,
409
 and at the same time their home governments have 
failed to hold them accountable for crimes committed despite the existence of 
clear domestic legal standards. As non-governmental organizations like Human 
Rights Watch have pointed out, contractors could be prosecuted under a number 
of U.S. federal laws;
410
 however, there has been a deep reluctance on the part of 
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states to hold private military contractors to account. In such contexts, it seems 
unlikely that an extension of IHRL, which relies on much softer implementation 
mechanisms than the national laws that could be applied if states were willing to 
take action, would provide an effective solution.  
 
But secondly, a direct extension of human rights duties to businesses would raise 
important normative questions: while businesses can de facto exercise the kinds 
of functions that are typically the domain of states that does not mean they 
necessarily have the same kinds of duties. Returning to the example of 
businesses providing education services in the Brazilian Amazon: perhaps a case 
can be made that as long as companies do provide such services, they should 
comply with the duties that states have with regard to the provision of education, 
such as the principles of non-discrimination mentioned above.
411
 However, what 
happens in the case of companies ending their operations in the area? It seems 
much less plausible to argue that these companies should have duties to continue 
the provision of education services – their duties seem, at least in some way, 
contingent on their actual engagement in the area in the first place. This, by 
contrast, is not true for states – states, as the kinds of institutions they are, have 
obligations to provide for education that are independent of their doing so or not. 
Asking companies to continue to provide schooling in areas of the country where 
they do not even have operations would seem to confuse their role with the role 
of a state.
412
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5. CONCLUSION 
I argued that one assumption that often seems to be made in the current business-
and-human rights debate is that an extension of direct duties for business entities 
under IHRL would be a way of addressing the perceived impunity that these 
entities have often enjoyed due to a lack of regulation by states. However, while 
IHRL establishes international and legally binding duties, which means that it 
provides for legal standards beyond national systems, I argued that IHRL 
nevertheless relies for its enforcement on the actions of states. International 
human rights institutions (IHRIs) do not have powers of direct enforcement. 
They have two main avenues of implementing human rights standards: to make 
violations public and ‘name and shame’ states, and to provide guidance to states 
as to how to better honour their human rights obligations. An extension of direct 
duties for businesses under IHRL would allow IHRIs to name and shame 
business entities directly and to develop guidance for businesses with regard to 
their impact on important human interests – to some extent, this may provide 
valuable sticks as well as carrots to companies to act more responsibly; however, 
likely not to the extent needed to make a huge difference to corporate behaviour. 
 
Furthermore, I argued that many of the underlying concerns that have motivated 
calls for ‘business human rights accountability’ could also not be addressed 
effectively by an extension of IHRL to these actors. I argued that IHRL neither 
has a strong compensatory component, not does it have a punitive function in the 
way that criminal law does – given that in many cases that have been framed as 
‘business-human rights cases’ in the current debate, underlying concerns are to 
materially compensate victims or to punish corporate actors for harm done, I 
argued that IHRL would not provide the appropriate response. 
 
Overall, it seems fair to conclude that in the current debate the practical 
advantages of an extension of direct duties for business entities under IHRL may 
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have been exaggerated – contrary to what commentators often suggest such an 
extension would not automatically result in greater accountability of business 
entities. Through the naming and shaming mechanisms of IHRIs, it might 
provide some incentives for businesses to change their behaviour. And IHRL 
could arguably provide some guidance for the development of duties for 
businesses in the future. However, enforcement mechanisms other than the ones 
currently offered by IHRL would need to be developed for an effective 
implementation of such duties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 233 
 
CHAPTER 7: HOLDING BUSINESSES ACCOUNTABLE – 
CONCLUSION AND THE WAY FORWARD 
 
In this thesis, I discussed whether international human rights law (IHRL) should 
be extended to apply to multinational corporations and other business entities 
directly - a question that I argued is currently much discussed in policy debates 
as well as the academic literature. I argued that commentators have tended to 
assume that such an extension would be an appropriate response to the growing 
influence of business enterprises, without considering  
(1) What implications the extension of IHRL to business entities would have 
for the role that IHRL currently plays as a specific area of international 
law; and  
 
(2) Whether IHRL would at all be a suitable tool to regulate businesses, 
firstly, in the sense of whether existing human rights standards could be 
applied to business entities; and secondly, whether an extension of IHRL 
to business entities would indeed address the concerns that motivate calls 
for such an extension in the first place.  
 
Broadly speaking, this thesis has aimed to make two contributions to the 
ongoing business-and-human rights debate: on the one hand, I offered a 
methodology for thinking about the kind of legal reform that an extension of 
IHRL to business entities would imply. I argued that the view that underpins 
much of the current debate is that business organisations should become direct 
duty bearers under IHRL because of their increasing capacities to impact, or 
harm, the interests protected by IHRL (I called this the capacity view).
413
 The 
capacity view, I argued, implies a consequentialist understanding of IHRL that 
takes this area of international law to be concerned with bringing about certain 
consequences – that is to protect fundamental human interests against, and 
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 In chapter 1, section 3.1. 
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impose duties on, anyone who has the relevant capacities to impact on these 
interests. 
While IHRL, and indeed all legal regulation, is in some sense concerned with 
bringing about certain consequences, I made the case for not thinking about 
areas of law only in terms of the interests they seek to further, that is, in terms of 
the consequences they aim to bring about. I argued that different areas of law are 
distinguished by core principles, structural and substantive, and that these 
principles define each area’s functional role. The existence of different areas of 
law thereby allows us to differentiate between different ways that agents can be 
responsible, and between distinct reasons for holding agents responsible. In other 
words, different areas of law can express different types of agent liability. I 
explained why it is not only possible, but indeed valuable, to understand areas of 
law in terms of the particular type of responsibility they establish and argued that 
trying to decide issues and cases unconstrained by the functional role of an area 
of law will lead to fundamental problems of consistency and coherence. 
I then applied the interpretivist methodology proposed for determining the 
functional role of an area of law to IHRL and argued that - given how the scope 
of human rights duties has been interpreted in international human rights law and 
jurisprudence, and given how responsibility for human rights violations is 
generally determined - the functional role of IHRL is best understood as holding 
state entities to account for the use of their special powers and responsibilities, 
that is, with regulating the particular relationship between individuals and 
governments.  
I argued that business entities do not have the same powers and responsibilities 
and so it would challenge the functional role of IHRL to extend it to apply 
directly to corporations and hold them to account for their abuses. I argued that 
for human rights duties to be applicable to businesses, a number of changes to 
IHRL would be necessary that would change IHRL in such a way that its current 
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functional role and value of expressing the distinct institutional responsibilities 
of states would be undermined. (I argued this to be the case even if duties under 
IHRL were only partially extended to business entities as, for instance, the UN 
Guiding Principles suggest when proposing to extend only ‘duties to respect’ 
human rights to business entities.) 
I then discussed whether IHRL, even if it was extended to apply to business 
entities directly, would be able to address the concerns that have motivated calls 
for such an extension in the first place. I argued that one overarching concern 
that has motivated calls for business-human rights responsibility is the 
observation that states often fail to regulate businesses sufficiently to prevent or 
punish harmful corporate activities, but that given the implementation 
mechanisms of current IHRL an extension of direct human rights duties to 
business entities would not be able to address the problem from lack of national 
enforcement. At most, I argued, direct duties for businesses would allow 
international human rights institutions to name and shame corporate entities 
more directly – this might have some beneficial effects in terms of incentivizing 
more responsible business practices, however, likely not be a perfect substitute 
for other, more directly enforceable, regulation of corporate actors. 
 
I further identified a number of other motivations that underlie calls for business-
human rights-accountability. I argued that in some cases, commentators draw on 
IHRL because this area of international law establishes international minimum 
standards that can provide a frame of reference where national standards are 
lacking. Calls for human rights accountability of businesses can also be calls for 
material compensation for damage caused by corporate activities; or calls to 
punish corporate actors for wrongdoing and to prevent impunity for abusive 
behaviour where national criminal laws are not enforced. Lastly, calls for 
corporate human rights accountability can also be calls not for legal 
accountability but for corporate social responsibility more broadly speaking. In 
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such cases, the language of human rights is invoked to call on businesses to 
positively use their powers and capacities to contribute to the realization of 
important human interests. Discussing to what extent IHRL is suitable to address 
these distinct motivations, I concluded that IHRL may to some extent provide a 
frame of reference for judging corporate behaviour, and provide a starting point 
for developing obligations for businesses. In the same vein, it may provide some 
guidance to develop corporate social responsibility initiatives that positively 
contribute to the realization of important interests. However, IHRL does not 
currently offer clear standards that could directly be applied to businesses. 
Existing international human rights jurisprudence would first need to be 
reinterpreted before it could be applied to business entities (as opposed to states, 
as it has to date). And furthermore, IHRL neither has a strong compensatory 
component, nor does it fulfil a punitive function, and so it is arguably not well 
suited to address concerns from material compensation or the punishment of 
corporate wrongdoing.   
 
In sum, I argue that in the current debate, the practical advantages of an 
extension of direct duties for business entities under IHRL may have been 
exaggerated – contrary to what commentators have tended to suggest (or imply), 
such an extension would not automatically result in greater accountability of 
business entities. IHRL can provide a starting point for the development of 
duties for businesses in the future; however, enforcement mechanisms other than 
the ones currently offered by IHRL would need to be developed for an effective 
implementation of such duties. 
 
These pragmatic obstacles are not, of course, insurmountable. The law is a social 
construct and as such can be changed – and so the practical obstacles described 
here might simply be taken to identify the challenges that need to be addressed 
to make IHRL more effective in addressing the problems posed by corporate 
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abusive behaviour in the future. It would be perfectly conceivable, for instance, 
for international human rights institutions to begin to develop the appropriate 
jurisprudence for businesses. We could also imagine new treaty bodies, or even a 
new world court of human rights,
414
 to be established to address the particular 
challenges posed by MNCs and other business entities. For reasons of political 
consensus, or rather the lack thereof, such reforms might take time and not be 
short term solutions,
415
 and it is also unlikely that an international body would 
offer immediate easy access, let alone swift procedures and remedies, to 
potential applicants, at least not overnight.
416
 But that alone would not be a 
reason not to pursue this route at least for the longer run. And such new 
institutions might be designed from the start to meet what were identified as 
shortcomings here – for instance, we could imagine a treaty body that would 
have powers to make decisions regarding material compensation to be paid by 
companies for violations of standards, or one that could impose criminal law 
type sanctions on business entities. 
 
However, I also argued that there is a normative case to keep a distinction 
between state responsibilities for human rights on the one hand, and business/ 
private actor responsibilities for important human interests on the other.  I 
argued that states, given their particular institutional role, have powers as well as 
responsibilities that are qualitatively distinct from the powers and 
responsibilities of business entities and that an extension of direct human rights 
duties to businesses would blur this distinction and undermine the very role of 
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 As suggested by Scheinin, see chapter 1, section 1.2 (fn.25). 
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 See, for instance, the argument by Muchlinski that the current Ecuadoran proposal for a new 
international human rights treaty for businesses (see discussion in chapter 1, section 2.1 on 
‘Current developments towards an extension of IHRL’) is unlikely to be successful in the near 
future given little support from the main home countries of MNSs. Peter Muchlinski, ‘Beyond 
the Guiding Principles? Examining new calls for a legally binding instrument on business and 
human rights’ (2013), http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/guest/beyond-the-guiding-
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 Ibid. 
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IHRL which is precisely to express these particular responsibilities that states 
have in their function as states.  
And it is important to stress that to argue that IHRL should not be extended to 
apply to business entities directly is not to argue that businesses should be left 
unregulated: there are many alternative ways that could be pursued to better 
regulate businesses without undermining the functional role of international 
human rights law.  
 
1. STRENGTHENING STATES’ HUMAN RIGHTS DUTIES TO REGULATE 
To name just some of those, one avenue might be to strengthen IHRL so as to 
better address the challenges posed by the growing influence of business entities 
without, however, imposing direct human rights duties on these entities. Under 
current international human rights law, states already have the responsibility to 
protect their citizens from harm committed by third party agents – and part of the 
answer may lie in better implementing such state responsibilities. For instance, 
states might agree on optional protocols to the various international human rights 
treaties that would determine more specifically the steps that states need to take 
to regulate business entities. One limitation in the current regulation of business 
entities that has been identified by commentators, for instance, is the lack of 
state human rights duties to regulate companies extra-territorially,
417
 so one 
thing that such optional protocols might do is to impose more explicit duties on 
states to regulate businesses domiciled in their territories when they operate 
abroad.
418
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 Also see John Ruggie, ‘Background Paper: The Role of States in effectively Regulating and 
Adjudicating the Activities of Corporations With Respect to Human Rights’ (2007), esp. pp.6-8. 
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 For an extensive discussion of extraterritoriality in six different regulatory areas: anti-
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Jennifer A. Zerk, ‘Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Lessons for the Business and Human Rights 
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Short of extraterritorial jurisdiction, there are a number of other ways in which 
states can influence or regulate the activities of business entities abroad through 
domestic regulation. For instance, they may require parent companies to take 
specific steps towards managing their subsidiaries abroad. They may require 
companies to report on foreign activities, or demand that products that are 
imported from abroad fulfil specific standards. There are some regulatory areas 
where this is already done, such as the environment or anti-corruption.
419
 
 
Some alternative legal avenues that have been pursued by scholars and 
practitioners have been criminal law, both domestic and international, as well as 
tort and extra-territorial tort legislation. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
discuss the practicalities and challenges of each of these in detail and the 
purpose here is merely to highlight these areas of law as potential alternatives to 
an extension of IHRL. However, several commentators have suggested that 
criminal and tort law mechanisms are likely among the most promising legal 
regimes to contribute to greater accountability of corporations, at least in the 
short and medium run.
420
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Sphere from Six Regulatory Areas.’, Harvard University Corporate Social Responsibility 
Initiative Working Paper No. 59 (2010), 1-222. 
419
 Ibid. Also see John Ruggie, ‘Exploring extraterritoriality in business and human rights: 
Summary note of expert meeting’ (2010), esp. p.2, on measures that states can take to incentivise 
businesses to act in compliance with certain standards. http://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/ruggie-extraterritoriality-14-sep-2010.pdf 
420
 Ruggie has argued in this regard that given recent developments in ICL and extraterritorial 
tort legislation in recent years, it can be assumed that corporations will be subject to increased 
liability, whether this may be criminal or civil liability depending on whether international 
standards are incorporated by national states into their criminal codes or as civil causes for 
action. They may also have civil proceedings brought against them for acts that constitute 
wrongs under domestic law, such as assault or false imprisonment. John G .Ruggie, ‘Business 
and Human Rights – the Evolving International Agenda’, American Journal of International 
Law, 101.4 (2007), 819-840 (p.17).  
In a similar vein, the International Commission of Jurists has found that “criminal law 
(principally international criminal law, supplemented by criminal law concepts common to 
national systems) and the law of civil remedies found in both common law countries and civil 
law jurisdictions […] currently offer some of the richest avenues towards ensuring the legal 
accountability of companies when they are complicit in human rights violations committed by 
governments.” ICJ Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes, 
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2. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW  
Individual businessmen have been prosecuted for international crimes in a 
number of cases. The prosecutions of German businessmen for involvement in 
Nazi crimes after the Second World War are perhaps among the most well-
known cases.
421
 To name some more recent examples, Alfred Musema, the 
director of a tea company in Rwanda, was convicted for genocidal acts by 
employees of his firm who had used company vehicles to set up roadblocks and 
kill Tutsi.
422
 In 2007, Dutch businessman Frans van Anraat was found guilty for 
complicity in war crimes for delivering chemicals to the regime of Saddam 
Hussein for the production of chemical weapons used against civilians in the 
Kurdish-Iraqi town of Halabja and in Iran.
423
 The private military company 
Blackwater that provided security services for the U.S. State Department in Iraq, 
as well as its director and several of its private contractors have been sued 
through a number of suits for a shooting incident in Iraq in October 2007 during 
which 17 Iraqi civilians were killed. One suit was brought by the US non-
governmental Center for Constitutional Rights and a law firm under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act
424
 and the company Blackwater (now known as ‘Xe Services’) 
settled in 2010 with the victims for an undisclosed amount. The US Department 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability Vol. 1: Facing the Facts and Charting a Legal 
Path (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 2010), p.5. They also address complicity in 
abusive behaviour by armed groups or other business entities. 
421
 United States v. Carl Krauch et al. (I.G.Farben Case); United States v. Alfried Krupp (Krupp 
Case); United States v. Friedrich Flick (Flick Case), in Robert A. Wright, Law Reports of Trials 
of War Criminals: Selected and Prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission, 
Volumes I, IX, and X (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1946-1949). Quoted after Wim 
Huisman and Elies Van Sliedregt, ‘Rogue traders: Dutch businessmen, international crimes and 
corporate complicity’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 8(3) (2010), 803-828 (p.804).  
422
 Judgment, Musema (ICTR-96-13-T), Trial Chamber , 27 January 2000; Judgment, Musema 
(ICTR-96-13-A), Appeals Chamber, 16 November 2001; both quoted after Huisman and 
Sliedregt (p.805).  
423
 District Court of The Hague, 23 December 2005, Case No. AX6406; Court of Appeal of The 
Hague, 9 May 2007, Case No. BA6734; both quoted after Huisman and Sliedregt, p.805.  
424
 Estate of Himoud Saed Abtan et al. v Prince et al., United States District Court District 
of Columbia, 2009, Civil Action No. 07-1831 (RBW); also see 
http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/abtan-et-al-v-blackwater-usa-et-al  
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of Justice has also filed criminal charges against individual Blackwater 
employees involved in the shooting incident, charging them with voluntary 
manslaughter and attempted manslaughter.
425
 
 
To be sure, for ICL or national criminal law to serve as an effective tool for 
greater business accountability, both areas of law will need to be much 
developed and better implemented. ICL only covers a comparatively narrow 
range of areas where corporations can harm important human interests, and 
generally still suffers from many constraints to effective implementation. I 
argued that one reason that an extension of IHRL to business entities would not 
bridge the accountability gap, as is sometimes suggested by proponents by such 
an extension, is that IHRL relies for its implementation on states, and where 
states are unwilling to regulate businesses in the first place, they would likely 
remain reluctant to hold businesses accountable even if the latter suddenly had 
human rights duties under international law. The same objection of course 
applies to international and national criminal law which also relies for its 
implementation on the political will of states.  
 
It also remains disputed from a legal doctrinal perspective whether or not 
corporate entities, as non-natural persons, can be held criminally responsible at 
all.
426
 And even though the extension of international criminal law has been 
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 At the time of writing the criminal suits are ongoing. See http://business-
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Perspective’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 6 (2008), 927-945; Celia Wells, 
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subject of debate for a number of years,
427
 to date, no international forum 
recognizes legal liability of a company entity.
428
 However, as the number of 
jurisdictions in which charges for international crimes can be brought against 
corporations is increasing, scholars have identified a growing potential for 
businesses to be held accountable for international crimes.
429
  
 
But while doctrinal as well as practical questions certainly remain to develop 
ICL as an effective mechanism for holding businesses to account, a greater use 
of ICL with regard to corporations might be among the possible avenues that 
could be pursued. And as ICL, other than IHRL, has been developed to address 
private actors and to establish private actor responsibility this would arguably 
not affect the conception of responsibility in ICL in the same way that an 
extension of IHRL would.   
 
3. CIVIL LAW AND EXTRA-TERRITORIAL TORT LEGISLATION  
Another avenue that might be further pursued in parallel to more defined state 
human rights duties to regulate businesses, and international criminal regulation, 
might be tort regulation of MNCs and other business entities. This may be 
particularly attractive insofar as it would allow businesses to be sued for 
damages. I argued above that calls for an extension of IHRL to corporations 
have often been voiced with regard to the harmful social and environmental 
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 Also see Andrew Clapham, ‘Extending International Criminal Law Beyond the Individual to 
Corporations and Armed Opposition Groups’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 6(5) 
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 ICJ Expert Legal Panel on Corporate Complicity in International Crimes, Corporate 
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429
 For a detailed survey of 16 countries from different regions and legal systems, see Anita 
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impact of corporate activities, such as when operations of oil, gas, or mining 
companies involve forced resettlements, or when corporate operations pollute 
the environment with detrimental consequences for individual livelihoods.  
 
One avenue to pursue tort liability of companies, and in particular multinational 
corporations, for harmful conduct has been extra-territorial tort legislation that 
allows compensation claims be brought against a company  in its home country 
for its own wrongdoings or those of business partners (such as subsidiaries, 
contractors, or joint venture partners abroad). The UK and the US in particular 
have witnessed this kind of transnational litigation. UK courts have entertained 
claims grounded in the law of negligence when the parent company based on the 
UK culpably failed to prevent violations perpetuated through the activities of its 
subsidiaries.
430
 Under the US Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),
431
 US courts have 
admitted civil suits for serious violations of international law perpetuated 
overseas by US-based companies.
432
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Multinational Corporations: a Critical Stage in the UK’, in Liability of Multinational 
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An ATCA claim was brought against a corporation for the first time
433
 in the 
case of Doe I v Unocal Corp.
434
 The plaintiffs alleged that the company Unocal 
was responsible for the death of family members, assault, rape, torture, forced 
labour and the loss of homes and property as it had relied on the Myanmar 
military to ‘secure’ the area where a subsidiary of Unocal was building a 
pipeline in joint venture with a Burmese state-owned company,
435
 and the 
Unocal litigation ended in 2005 in a favourable settlement for the Burmese 
plaintiffs.
436
 Other lawsuits have been brought against corporations under the 
ATCA regarding a range of issues, such as violations of labour standards,
437
 or 
environmental harm and forced displacement caused by the activities of mining 
companies.
438
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One of the most recent and important cases brought under the ATCA went all 
the way to the Supreme Court. In Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
439
 the 
plaintiffs were Nigerian citizens who sought damages from the oil company 
Royal Dutch Shell for aiding and abetting the Nigerian government in the 1990s 
in committing violations of customary international law; in particular, that Royal 
Dutch Shell had compelled its Nigerian subsidiary to brutally crush peaceful 
demonstrations against oil development in the Ogoni Niger River Delta. 
 
While the Supreme Court dismissed the case, this dismissal was not based on a 
rejection of ‘corporate liability’ as such. Rather, the Supreme Court found the 
connection of the company Royal Dutch Shell to the US insufficient to ground a 
case under the ATCA. The fact that the Supreme Court did not explicitly address 
‘corporate liability’, but that it did consider the question of Royal Dutch Shell’s 
presence in the U.S., has been interpreted by commentators as suggesting that 
the Supreme Court did not disagree with the possibility of corporate liability 
under the ATCA in principle.
440
 
 
Like domestic and international criminal regulation, domestic tort as well as 
extraterritorial tort legislation would still need to be developed in many ways to 
become an effective mechanism for holding corporations accountable for 
harmful behaviour. This is not the place to discuss in detail the various legal-
technical as well as political obstacles for this to happen.
441
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However, if successful, such tort litigation could provide for significant 
compensation of victims (unlike IHRL, which is not primarily compensatory in 
nature).
442
 This, in turn, would not only be beneficial from the immediate 
victim’s perspective, but would also arguably provide a stronger disincentive for 
business enterprises to avoid harmful behaviour in the first place, and perhaps 
even incentivize large business enterprises that by virtue of their size have 
political influence to lobby in favour of regulation.
443
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In sum, I have argued in this thesis that for both practical and normative reasons 
an extension of IHRL to apply to multinational corporations and other business 
entities directly would not be appropriate. There is, however, a pressing need for 
the better regulation of MNCs and other business entities and the ongoing 
business-and-human rights debate has made an important contribution to 
highlighting the many ways in which corporate activities can be detrimental to 
fundamental human interests. Rather than extending international human rights 
law as such, however, I have argued that using or extending other areas of law 
that have different functional roles to IHRL, and the coherence and consistency 
of which would arguably not be challenged by such an application, would be 
more suitable and effective in achieving more responsible corporate practices 
and holding business entities to account for harmful behaviour. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Examining Bonded Labor Claims and Corporate Liability’. For detailed legal discussions of the 
ATCA, see also, for instance, Bornstein, ‘The Alien Tort Claims Act in 2007: Resolving the 
Delicate Balance Between Judicial and Legislative Authority; Cerone, ‘The ATCA at the 
Intersection of International Law and U.S. Law’. 
442
 Pagnattaro, ‘Enforcing International Labor Standards: The Potential of the Alien Tort Claims 
Act’, pp.203 and 218, discusses an ATCA case setttelemt that resulted in a fund of over 20 
million US dollars for plaintiffs. Quoted after Fuks, ‘Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of 
ATCA Litigation: Examining Bonded Labor Claims and Corporate Liability’, p.116. 
443
 Fuks (ibid.), p.117. 
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